

## Neighborhood Opportunity Structures of Immigrant Populations, 1980 and 1990

George C. Galster, Kurt Metzger, and Ruth Waite  
*Wayne State University*

### *Abstract*

Several emergent theories assert that neighborhood affects immigrants' socioeconomic advancement. This study analyzes a range of demographic and socioeconomic indicators for immigrants' census tracts, summarized as exposure indices. Indicators are based on 1980 and 1990 census tract information for five major metropolitan areas. Seventeen immigrant groups are examined and contrasted with general populations distinguished by race/ethnicity.

Few general conclusions can be made about the "typical immigrant neighborhood." Most immigrants (especially whites) are highly spatially assimilated. Different immigrant groups often share the same census tracts in substantial numbers. There is considerable diversity among groups in their propensity to reside in central cities. White immigrant groups evince advantageous neighborhood socioeconomic indicators. With one exception, no immigrant group in any metropolitan area studied has such disadvantageous neighborhood indicators as black households, on average. These findings dispel any vestiges of the myth of the "immigrant ghetto" that might be generalized across immigrant groups or metropolitan areas.

**Keywords:** Demographics; Neighborhood; Minorities

### **Introduction**

The nature and consequences of the massive amounts of immigration to the United States during the 1980s and continuing into the present has been the object of growing interest to the public and policy makers alike (Clark 1998; Fix and Passel 1994; Frey 1995; Holmes 1998). Reflecting this interest, considerable scholarly research over the past decade has analyzed topics related to immigration. The majority of this work has focused on demographic, labor market, and fiscal impacts, addressing issues such as changes over time in immigrants' earnings and contributions to the labor force, the effects of immigrants on the employment and earnings of native-born persons, immigrant participation in public assistance programs, and the fiscal impacts of immigrants on various levels of government.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> See Fix and Passel (1994) for a summary of the extensive literature on these topics.

By comparison, to our knowledge only one statistical study has been conducted on the neighborhood socioeconomic situations confronted by immigrants. Zimmermann and Tobin (1995) analyzed a national sample of metropolitan census tracts to compare 1990 conditions in concentrated poverty neighborhoods that are primarily occupied by foreign-born households and those not so occupied. They found that the primarily immigrant-occupied poverty areas exhibited lower degrees of "underclass" indicators such as rates of public assistance use, unemployment, and female-headed households; they also tended to have lower average educational attainment levels.

Only two studies have examined patterns of immigrant residential segregation. White (1992) compared residential patterns of five broad racial/ethnic groups of immigrants in Los Angeles in 1980. He found that segregation from whites was inversely related to the period following immigration for all groups except black immigrants. White claimed that segregation was primarily a function of racial/ethnic status and socioeconomic status, not immigrant status. Smith's (1995) study of New York City Asian immigrants showed that they lived overwhelmingly in neighborhoods with substantial racial/ethnic diversity among whites, Hispanics, and Asians, but rarely lived in neighborhoods with substantial numbers of black residents.

These studies are tantalizing but provide information for only a limited number of neighborhood descriptors, place-of-birth groups, metropolitan areas, and periods. More comprehensive investigations of the neighborhood contexts experienced by immigrants clearly are warranted in response to intense scholarly and policy interest in the determinants of immigrant advancement.

Several conventional theories exist about the determinants of immigrants' success in the United States (Hirschman 1996; Portes and Zhou 1992). Most take into account cultural assimilation, human capital, economic restructuring, and ethnic enterprise, but place no significance on the neighborhood context in which immigrants find themselves. There is considerable, if not wholly convincing, empirical support for each of these theories, although none escapes from several empirical and conceptual conundrums. For a review of the arguments, see Portes and Zhou (1992) and Portes (1996).

Several strands of emergent theory, however, allege the importance of spatial dimensions in effecting immigrant socioeconomic advancement. The "ethnic enclave" theory has been developed most fully by Portes. He defines an enclave as a "spatially clustered network of businesses owned by members of the same minority [immigrant] group" (Portes 1995, 27). These ethnic enclave economies have been seen as promoting immigrant advancement by increasing social

capital (Borjas 1995; Sanders and Nee 1996), information about job prospects (Aponte 1996; Smith 1995), and appreciation for foreign-earned educational credentials (Light et al. 1994).

The “segmented assimilation” theory of Portes and Zhou (1993) argues that how a first generation of immigrants adapts to life in the United States creates different opportunities for the second generation. Those immigrant groups that maintain strong ethnic ties and resist acculturation provide better opportunities for their second generation through the creation of ethnic social capital. On the other hand, those that have inadequate social capital, face extreme discrimination, and (of particular interest here) reside in close proximity to American minorities who also have traditionally faced such discrimination appear to produce a second generation with more circumscribed prospects. This segment of the second generation is more likely to adopt an “adversarial stance” against the perceived discriminatory barriers that, in turn, produces negative consequences for their aspirations and educational achievements.

The notion of “ethnic capital” has been developed by Borjas (1992, 1995, 1998). He defines ethnic capital as the average amount of human capital present in the ethnic group of the preceding generation, and “effective” ethnic capital as the weighted average of ethnic capital possessed by various groups residing in a neighborhood. He hypothesizes that children of immigrants enjoy increased chances of economic success when they grow up in neighborhoods with larger amounts of ethnic capital and, to a lesser degree, effective ethnic capital. The “ethnic spillovers” that such colocation patterns provide in the Borjas formulation include intergenerational transmissions of social and human capital, norms regarding educational attainment, educational and job information, and employment opportunities.

The “metropolitan opportunity structure” theory, as formulated by Galster (1993; Galster and Killen 1995), though not focusing on immigrants, nevertheless offers useful insights here. The metropolitan opportunity structure is defined as the array of markets, institutions, social and administrative systems, and networks that potentially offer resources that promote socioeconomic advancement. The quality and quantity of resources that the opportunity structure offers a person vary across neighborhoods, especially in terms of the sorts of public services, educational quality, role models, labor market information, and peer networks one can access (Galster and Mikelsons 1995). The model posits that choices influencing future socioeconomic status, such as education, labor force participation, or criminal activity, will reflect the feasibility and relative payoffs of the alternatives, as perceived by decision makers from the perspective of their places of residence.

A growing empirical literature has identified relationships between neighborhood context and subsequent behavioral choices and economic success of residents, although for the most part this previous work does not distinguish between native- and foreign-born populations (see reviews in Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, and Aber 1997; Ellen and Turner 1997). By implication, it suggests that the study of neighborhood cannot be divorced from a comprehensive analysis of immigrants' socioeconomic performance and assimilation. Indeed, this is consistent with the central theoretical construct in the demographic/sociological literature for conceptualizing the relationship among immigrants' spatial circumstances, their economic conditions, and their assimilation into American society: the "spatial assimilation model" articulated by Massey (1985). The central tenet of this model is that cultural, economic, and spatial assimilation are interconnected. Immigrants from the same place of birth are seen as settling near one another for mutual support when they first move to the United States, but they and their children leave the initial neighborhood(s) and become more residentially dispersed among native-born populations as they become more familiar with American culture and advance in socioeconomic status. By implication, this framework suggests that, at any given point in time, immigrants' residential context will affect their opportunities for socioeconomic advancement, whereupon success in pursuing promising opportunities will yield subsequent changes in their residential context.

The research described here represents an effort to establish a descriptive, quantitative foundation for understanding and further analyzing the neighborhoods of immigrants along a variety of dimensions that plausibly may be predictive of future socioeconomic advancement. Exploratory in nature, this study provides, for the first time, a cross-group, cross-time, and cross-metropolitan area comparison of a range of neighborhood (census tract) demographic and socioeconomic condition indicators, summarized as exposure indices.<sup>2</sup> Levels and changes in these indicators are tabulated based on 1980 and 1990 census tract information for five metropolitan area study sites that vary widely in their extent of immigration, demographic composition, and growth profiles: Atlanta, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC. Seventeen immigrant groups from different places of birth are examined and con-

---

<sup>2</sup> The exposure index of group  $x$  to some other group  $y$  is simply a weighted average: It shows the proportion of population in group  $y$  for the "average"  $x$  person's neighborhood. The index often is calculated across census tracts in a metropolitan area. We provide the formula for calculating the index and describe its characteristics later in this article.

trusted with general resident populations distinguished by race/ethnicity.

Although our article provides a portrait of the neighborhood conditions faced by immigrants from different places of birth, we do not presume that this portrait will be uniform across these groups or the five study sites. Indeed, unlike many standard treatments that do not disaggregate immigrant groups or compare different metropolitan areas of residence,<sup>3</sup> our working hypothesis is that relatively few generalizations can be made about conditions in immigrant neighborhoods. Our findings prove us correct.

We begin with key definitions, an overview of the five study areas and 17 place-of-birth groups, and our rationale for selecting them. We also discuss data sources and features of our exposure indices. Second, we report on a variety of demographic characteristics of these immigrant groups' neighborhoods, including exposure rates to immigrants within and outside of their own group, recent immigrants, ancestry groups, and racial/ethnic groups. Third, we examine central-city and suburban residence of immigrants. Fourth, we examine exposure rates of the 17 groups to various neighborhood (census tract) socioeconomic characteristics, including employment rates, and numbers of female-headed households with children, households on public assistance, and poorly educated households. Fifth, we compare all the foregoing exposures for 1980 and 1990, and note exceptional patterns of change. Conclusions and implications for research and policy close the discussion.

## **Definitions, metropolitan areas selected for investigation, data sources, and exposure indices employed**

### *Definition of immigrants*

We used information from the decennial census on place of birth and citizenship to classify the population into two categories: native- and foreign-born. The latter group, which we refer to as immigrants, includes those who were born outside the United States, Puerto Rico, and outlying areas of the United States and who were not born to an American parent or parents. The census place-of-birth question asked respondents to report the (U.S.) state, commonwealth, or territory, or the foreign country, in which they were born. Individuals born outside the United States were asked to report their place of birth according to current international bound-

<sup>3</sup> As examples, see Espenshade et al. 1996; Frey 1996; Wilson and Jaynes 1996, and the citations therein.

aries. These data will be reported as immigrant place of birth.

Note that people born in Puerto Rico are not immigrants under our definition, even though they may share many characteristics, such as lack of English language fluency and acculturation, with immigrants. Given that they overwhelmingly identify themselves as of “Hispanic origin,” however, they will be counted as part of the total Hispanic tabulations we present. While Puerto Ricans are typically the most residentially segregated and poverty-stricken Hispanic group in metropolitan areas (Galster and Santiago 1995), their numerical predominance in some areas tends to make the observed circumstances of immigrant Hispanics more advantageous than for all Hispanics. Within our study sites, New York (where 46 percent of all Hispanics were Puerto Ricans in 1990) is especially susceptible to this bias.

The number of immigrants is growing rapidly and represents an increasing share of the U.S. population. From 1970 to 1980, the total number of immigrants rose 4.5 million; from 1980 to 1990, it rose another 5.7 million. As a share of the total population, immigrants rose from 4.7 percent in 1970 to 6.2 percent in 1980 and to 7.9 percent in 1990.

### *Metropolitan area study sites*

We selected five metropolitan areas in which to describe immigrants' neighborhood characteristics: Atlanta (GA), Los Angeles (CA), New York (NY-NJ-CT), Philadelphia (PA-NJ-DE), and Washington, DC (DC-MD-VA). These five were selected to represent disparate archetypes of metropolitan areas categorized by extent and type of immigration, racial/ethnic composition, and overall decadal changes in economic well being.<sup>4</sup>

Tables 1 and 2 provide selective census demographic and economic characteristics of our five study sites during the last decade. These data permit the following characterizations:

1. Atlanta: low percentage of immigrants, with those from Mexico, Korea, and the United Kingdom the largest groups; high popu-

---

<sup>4</sup> The geographic definitions of these study sites do not correspond precisely with Census Bureau definitions of the corresponding metropolitan areas, but rather are constructed to facilitate consistent comparisons between 1980 and 1990. These nonstandard definitions result in trivially different population counts from those of the corresponding census years. Details of the counties that compose each metropolitan area employed here and the comparative population counts are presented in Appendix table A.1.

Table 1. Selected Demographic and Economic Characteristics of Metropolitan Areas, 1980 and 1990

	Atlanta		Los Angeles		New York		Philadelphia		Washington, DC	
	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990
Total population <sup>a</sup>	1,779,226	2,302,706	11,497,568	14,531,529	17,419,251	17,961,038	5,555,662	5,762,704	3,175,714	3,938,312
Percent white, not Hispanic <sup>a</sup>	71.7	66.6	61.2	49.9	70.2	63.2	77.9	75.4	67.0	62.7
Percent black, not Hispanic <sup>a</sup>	26.1	29.0	9.0	8.1	15.5	16.7	18.2	18.6	26.8	26.3
Percent Asian, not Hispanic <sup>a</sup>	0.7	2.0	4.9	8.9	2.2	4.7	1.0	2.1	2.6	5.0
Percent Hispanic <sup>a</sup>	1.2	2.2	24.0	32.4	11.8	15.0	2.7	3.7	3.0	5.5
Total foreign born <sup>a</sup>	44,328	109,269	2,124,027	3,944,828	2,828,285	3,544,271	288,001	302,914	251,723	484,159
Percent foreign born <sup>a</sup>	2.5	4.7	18.5	27.1	16.2	19.7	5.2	5.3	7.9	12.3
Median family income <sup>b</sup>	\$21,328	\$41,618	\$21,744	\$41,132	\$21,705	\$45,818	\$21,410	\$42,206	\$27,802	\$54,094
Unemployment rate (percent)	4.8	5.1	5.8	6.8	6.5	6.7	7.5	5.6	4.1	3.7
Poverty rate (percent)	12.2	10	11.8	13.1	13.2	11.7	11.7	10.1	8.2	6.4

<sup>a</sup>Refers to definition of metropolitan areas used in this study. See table A.1.  
<sup>b</sup>In current dollars.  
 Source: 1980, 1990 census STF4.

Table 2. Foreign-Born Share of the Total Population by Place of Birth, Year, and Metropolitan Area (Percent)

Immigrant Place of Birth	Atlanta		Los Angeles		New York		Philadelphia		Washington, DC	
	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990
Brazil	NA	0.03	NA	0.05	NA	0.13	NA	0.03	NA	0.11
Canada	0.17	0.20	0.80	0.55	0.27	0.22	0.17	0.15	0.26	0.23
China	0.05	0.09	0.34	0.54	0.42	0.77	0.08	0.15	0.22	0.30
Colombia	NA	0.10	NA	0.16	NA	0.68	NA	0.06	NA	0.16
Dominican Republic	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.83	1.53	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.08
El Salvador	NA	0.04	NA	1.59	NA	0.28	NA	0.01	NA	1.12
Germany	0.23	0.23	0.46	0.32	0.88	0.59	0.49	0.36	0.49	0.39
India	0.08	0.22	0.12	0.27	0.26	0.59	0.15	0.29	0.28	0.55
Italy	0.04	0.03	0.25	0.14	1.89	1.26	0.78	0.48	0.19	0.14
Jamaica	0.04	0.14	0.04	0.05	0.66	0.91	0.10	0.15	0.22	0.33
Korea	0.13	0.32	0.53	1.05	0.18	0.50	0.16	0.29	0.47	0.78
Mexico	0.05	0.43	7.59	11.39	0.07	0.30	0.03	0.07	0.07	0.24
Philippines	0.04	0.08	0.77	1.42	0.24	0.46	0.10	0.17	0.29	0.49
Poland	0.04	0.04	0.17	0.12	0.76	0.63	0.26	0.20	0.09	0.08
Soviet Union	0.06	0.05	0.33	0.38	0.70	0.60	0.43	0.29	0.15	0.11
United Kingdom	0.20	0.25	0.62	0.47	0.56	0.46	0.40	0.32	0.42	0.40
Vietnam	0.06	0.21	0.40	1.00	0.04	0.09	0.07	0.17	0.28	0.55
All Immigrants (including others not listed above)	2.49	4.75	18.47	27.15	16.24	19.73	5.18	5.26	7.93	12.29

Note: NA = not available.  
Source: 1980, 1990 census STF4.

lation growth rate; large black population relative to the non-Hispanic white (“white,” hereafter) population; moderate and falling poverty rate

2. Los Angeles: high percentage of immigrants, with those from Mexico far outpacing other birthplaces; high population growth rate; unusually high proportions of Asian and Hispanic residents and low proportions of white and black residents; high and rising poverty rate
3. New York: high percentage of immigrants, with those from the Dominican Republic (“Dominicans” hereafter), Italy, Jamaica, and China having relatively high shares; low population growth rate; high percentages of Asians and Hispanics; high but falling poverty rate
4. Philadelphia: low percentage of immigrants, with slightly more western Europeans than other groups; low population growth rate, unusually high percentage of whites; moderate and falling poverty rates
5. Washington, DC: moderate percentage of immigrants, with Salvadoran and Korean groups largest; high population growth rate; high percentages of blacks and Asians; low and falling poverty rates

### *Groups analyzed*

Table 2 delineates the 17 place-of-birth (foreign-born) groups that are analyzed in this study. We selected these groups primarily to ensure that the five largest immigrant groups in each of the study metropolitan areas would be represented. We purposively selected several additional groups to provide a variety of both continental origins and average socioeconomic status in the United States. Three immigrant groups employed in 1990 analyses—natives of Brazil, Colombia, and El Salvador—were not tabulated separately in the 1980 census.

Most tables present corresponding data for four additional, mutually exclusive race/ethnicity groups as specified by the census: non-Hispanic whites (whites), non-Hispanic blacks (blacks), non-Hispanic Asians (Asians), and Hispanics. These groups provide a useful benchmark with which immigrant groups can be compared. We emphasize, however, that the census tract data for race/ethnicity do not make it possible to distinguish between U.S.-born and foreign-born groups. Thus, these racial/ethnic categories include foreign-born residents as a subset and so do not represent a purely distinctive basis for comparison.

*Data sources and summary indices calculated*

All data for this research were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau's 1980 and 1990 STF-4 census tract files. We used data from all tracts from all the counties fitting our definitions of metropolitan areas.

These data are summarized in the tables below in the form of the well-known exposure (P) index. Massey and Denton (1988) have identified five dimensions of intergroup residential patterns that are conceptually and empirically distinct. Inasmuch as the residential exposure dimension refers to the degree of potential contact or possibility of interaction among members of different groups within geographic areas, we deemed it most appropriate for our purposes here. The extent to which immigrants are residentially exposed to members of their own group, other immigrants, or various racial/ethnic groups serve as operational measures of several important dimensions of the aforementioned theories of immigrant socioeconomic advancement.

The residential exposure of immigrant group  $x$  to some other group  $y$  across  $i$  census tracts within the given metropolitan area is given by an exposure index:

$${}_xP_y = 100 * \sum_i (x_i / X) (y_i / n_i) \quad (1)$$

where:  $x_i$  is the number of immigrants in group  $x$  residing in tract  $i$ ;  $X$  is the total population in immigrant group  $x$  in the metropolitan area;  $y_i$  is the population of another group residing in tract  $i$ ; and  $n_i$  is the total population residing in tract  $i$ .

The intuitive interpretation of our exposure index is the average percentage of group  $y$  members living in a group- $x$  immigrant's neighborhood in the metropolitan area. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the probability that a randomly drawn group- $x$  member shares a census tract with a member of group  $y$  (Massey and Denton 1988).

As for distributional features of this index,  ${}_xP_y$  evinces a minimum equal to the minimum value of  $y_i / n_i$  observed in the tracts comprising a metropolitan area. For example, if every tract were to have group  $y$  comprise at least 2 percent of the population, then no matter how group  $x$  was distributed,  ${}_xP_y$  would yield an exposure of at least two. On the other hand, even if some tracts were to have no group- $y$  members, all group- $x$  members would need to live in such tracts for  ${}_xP_y$  to equal zero. Thus, the smaller the absolute numbers

of the two groups in the metropolitan area ( $\Sigma x_i, \Sigma y_i$ ), the smaller the minimum value of  ${}_xP_y$  that is feasible and likely.

The maximum feasible value of  ${}_xP_y$  will depend on the population of group  $y$  relative to  $x$  in the metropolitan area ( $\Sigma y_i/\Sigma x_i$ ). The maximum feasible  ${}_xP_y$  would be the highest value of  $y_i/n_i$  observed across all tracts occupied by any  $x$ . At one extreme, if group  $y$  were large relative to  $x$  and all of group  $x$  resided in tracts where there was only one  $x$  member and all other residents of such tracts were in group  $y$ ,  ${}_xP_y$  would equal 99.9. But  ${}_xP_y$  need not be large, even if group  $y$  were much larger than  $x$ . For instance, if all the relatively few group- $x$  members were to live in tracts where the numbers of  $x$  and  $y$  were equal and no other groups were present,  ${}_xP_y$  would equal 50; if all  $x$  were to live in tracts where they were the only residents,  ${}_xP_y$  would equal zero. At the other extreme, if  $\Sigma y_i/\Sigma x_i$  were very small, and all of a small number of group  $y$  were scattered evenly across all  $i$  tracts inhabited by group  $x$ , and only those two groups were present,  ${}_xP_y$  would equal  $\Sigma y_i/\Sigma x_i$ .

The exposure index also can be computed for  $y = x$ , that is, immigrant group =  $x$  member's exposure to other members of the same group. In this formulation the index often is called an "isolation index" (Massey and Denton 1988). In this case, the lower bound of  ${}_xP_x$  equals the share of the metropolitan area population that group  $x$  comprises,  $\Sigma x_i/\Sigma n_i$ . This lower bound would pertain if all members of group  $x$  were evenly distributed across all census tracts. The upper bound would be 100, which would occur when all group- $x$  members lived exclusively in tracts populated by other members of group  $x$ .

In this article we also employ a variant of the exposure index to measure how immigrant households face different sorts of neighborhood conditions besides the race, ethnicity, or immigrant status of their neighbors. In this variant, the "neighborhood condition exposure index," we calculate the exposure of immigrant group  $x$  to a particular neighborhood (scalar) condition  $C$  (such as employment rate, rate of welfare receipt, etc.) as follows:

$${}_xP_c = 100 * \frac{\Sigma (x_i / X) (C)}{i} \tag{2}$$

As with the basic exposure index (1), this index ranges from a minimum equal to the minimum value of  $C$  observed across tracts in a metropolitan area, to a maximum equal to the maximum value of  $C$  observed among tracts occupied by any members of group  $x$ . The interpretation of the neighborhood condition exposure index (2) is the average value of the neighborhood characteristic  $C$  present in census tracts occupied by members of immigrant group  $x$ .

## Demographic characteristics of immigrants' neighborhoods, 1990

### *Exposures to other members of own immigrant group*

To what extent do immigrants live among other immigrants from the same birthplace? Table 3 provides the answer. Its first column presents, for each study site and immigrant group, the own-group exposure index,  ${}_xP_x$ , showing the average percentage of the same immigrant group residing in the census tracts occupied by this group's members. In Atlanta, for example, Brazilian immigrants comprise 0.5 percent of the population in the neighborhoods occupied by Brazilian immigrants, on average.

These own-group exposures are modest in magnitude. The highest values for each of the metropolitan areas are 4.6, 4.5, 15.2, 8.9, and 26.2—for Mexicans in Atlanta; Soviets in Philadelphia; Dominicans in New York; Salvadorans in Washington, DC; and Mexicans in Los Angeles, respectively. Own-group exposures are especially low in all sites for Canadians and western Europeans.<sup>5</sup> Across all sites and groups, only in 3 of 85 cases—Dominicans and Chinese in New York and Mexicans in Los Angeles—are own-group exposure rates greater than 10 percent.<sup>6</sup> In addition, these rates are usually quite similar to the corresponding exposure rate of the racial/ethnic group most comparable to the given immigrant group (e.g., whites' exposure to German immigrants, Hispanics' exposure to Mexican immigrants). We interpret all this to mean that, on average, immigrants in our five metropolitan areas do not live in an "own-group immigrant enclave."<sup>7</sup>

Some ambiguity remains, however, in interpreting the relatively low values of own-group exposure indices. The weighted average  ${}_xP_x$

<sup>5</sup> Data not reported here show, however, that exposure to immigrants of one's own place of birth is greater than exposure to any other immigrant group in Atlanta, Philadelphia, and New York. This is rarely true in the cases of Los Angeles and Washington, DC, where exposure to the dominant Mexican and Salvadoran immigrant groups, respectively, is typically the highest for all immigrant groups. As explained above, this can be expected when the relative sizes of the two groups being considered are vastly different. Data are available, upon request, from the first author.

<sup>6</sup> By comparison, the variation across the metropolitan areas in own racial/ethnic group exposures are as follows: whites, 68 to 88 percent; blacks, 37 to 68 percent; Asians, 5 to 20 percent; and Hispanics, 6 to 53 percent; see table 4 for details.

<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the upper bound of the own-group exposure measure is not sensitive to the absolute or relative size of the given group, so the modest magnitudes of the vast majority of own-group exposures in all sites is no mere artifact. That is, a group of any size could, in theory, register a high own-group exposure were it to cluster exclusively in neighborhoods where its members were the sole occupants.

*Table 3. Immigrant Exposure Rates to Various Census Tract Demographic Characteristics by Place of Birth and Metropolitan Area, 1990 (Percent)*

Immigrant Place of Birth	Atlanta				Los Angeles				New York			
	All		Other Immigrant Groups*		All 1980-1990 Immigrants		Other Immigrant Groups*		All		Other Immigrant Groups*	
	Immigrants from Same Country of Origin	in Same Ancestry Group	Immigrants from Same Country of Origin	in Same Ancestry Group	Immigrants from Same Country of Origin	in Same Ancestry Group	Immigrants from Same Country of Origin	in Same Ancestry Group	Immigrants from Same Country of Origin	in Same Ancestry Group	Immigrants from Same Country of Origin	in Same Ancestry Group
Brazil	0.50	0.16	7.47	4.63	0.47	0.26	27.60	14.75	1.53	1.09	30.02	14.86
Canada	0.58	0.23	5.58	3.18	1.13	0.36	19.85	9.66	0.64	0.25	17.19	6.73
China	0.63	1.51	8.27	5.68	5.84	15.33	33.59	21.35	12.27	20.83	27.96	20.04
Colombia	1.04	1.19	10.36	7.46	0.74	0.88	29.98	16.56	4.40	5.41	33.46	19.12
Dominican Republic	0.55	0.66	11.72	8.20	0.43	0.47	29.47	15.38	15.21	21.92	22.89	20.36
El Salvador	1.52	1.72	17.59	15.17	8.18	9.70	41.34	30.95	3.53	4.22	29.29	17.76
Germany	0.55	14.84	5.40	3.10	0.77	14.04	20.36	9.61	1.47	11.78	17.69	6.74
India	1.08	1.52	7.90	5.70	1.20	1.75	25.09	13.29	3.52	5.01	24.79	13.94
Italy	0.27	2.76	6.23	3.38	0.54	4.70	23.85	11.38	4.30	27.70	17.19	7.83
Jamaica	0.91	1.17	4.53	2.71	0.52	0.61	25.20	14.14	6.76	7.69	23.87	14.51
Korea	1.45	1.65	7.47	5.45	6.57	8.01	30.56	22.06	5.50	6.82	30.31	18.26
Mexico	4.61	6.27	9.00	10.65	26.16	50.53	15.38	23.33	3.52	4.64	29.03	18.29
Philippines	0.49	0.59	5.89	3.69	5.49	7.46	29.51	19.05	2.91	3.58	25.28	13.50
Poland	0.73	2.40	6.62	3.91	1.10	3.55	26.40	12.84	4.24	10.82	21.77	11.01
Soviet Union	0.95	2.28	11.68	8.21	6.97	5.85	36.35	25.46	7.77	10.77	24.57	14.09
United Kingdom	0.63	23.42	5.54	3.36	1.07	14.02	20.15	9.84	1.02	7.76	17.43	7.22
Vietnam	2.21	2.32	10.90	9.80	7.16	6.63	30.12	21.64	1.28	1.16	31.38	17.31

*Table 3. Immigrant Exposure Rates to Various Census Tract Demographic Characteristics by Place of Birth and Metropolitan Area, 1990 (Percent) (continued)*

Immigrant Place of Birth	Philadelphia				Washington, DC			
	All Immigrants from Same Country of Origin	All Persons in Same Ancestry Group	Other Immigrant Groups*	All 1980-1990 Immigrants	All Immigrants from Same Country of Origin	All Persons in Same Ancestry Group	Other Immigrant Groups*	All 1980-1990 Immigrants
Brazil	0.44	0.23	8.50	3.45	0.98	0.72	19.57	11.67
Canada	0.53	0.18	5.92	2.14	0.74	0.28	14.22	7.62
China	3.37	6.56	9.99	6.21	2.59	4.92	18.32	11.87
Colombia	0.88	1.04	9.64	5.48	0.87	1.03	20.63	13.24
Dominican Republic	0.89	1.26	6.48	3.61	1.07	1.32	25.79	18.36
El Salvador	0.47	0.52	5.50	2.79	8.94	10.18	22.58	23.27
Germany	0.85	19.86	5.83	2.04	0.85	15.88	13.68	7.56
India	1.60	2.22	8.66	4.56	1.93	2.77	17.80	11.68
Italy	2.05	23.23	5.31	2.05	0.59	4.29	15.56	8.26
Jamaica	1.24	1.39	4.75	2.57	2.58	2.80	18.70	13.74
Korea	2.57	3.25	8.50	5.38	2.71	3.33	15.56	10.38
Mexico	2.76	3.76	5.89	4.42	1.78	2.77	20.73	15.86
Philippines	1.01	1.31	7.00	3.29	1.81	2.47	14.12	8.78
Poland	1.39	10.65	6.80	2.91	0.67	3.24	19.10	11.40
Soviet Union	4.49	12.74	8.67	5.02	0.95	0.04	21.01	13.18
United Kingdom	0.81	13.47	5.57	2.14	0.87	17.46	13.67	7.67
Vietnam	2.87	2.49	9.69	7.04	2.93	3.02	19.91	14.40

\*Other 16 immigrant groups analyzed in this study.  
Source: 1990 census STF4.

does not tell us about the maximum exposure extant in any particular neighborhoods. A  $P_x$  score of 10, for example, could mean that all immigrants live in neighborhoods where 10 percent of the residents are immigrants from the same place of birth, or that 10 percent live in neighborhoods occupied exclusively by their group whereas the other 90 percent live in neighborhoods where they are the only member of their group. These interpretations yield different implications about the significance of own-group immigrant enclaves.

We explored this issue by tabulating the maximum value of the percentage of own-group neighbors represented in the population across all census tracts.<sup>8</sup> Thus, if any members of group  $x$  reside in a tract exclusively occupied by group- $x$  members, a 100 for that group will be indicated. This occurs only in the case of Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles. Mexicans in other sites also have relatively high values of own-group exposure in one or more tracts: 19.8 percent in Atlanta, 48.7 percent in New York, and 23.7 percent in Washington, DC. Some other maximum own-group immigrant clusters at the tract level also are notable: Vietnamese (72.2 percent), Germans (66.7 percent), and Chinese (43.9 percent) in Los Angeles; Dominicans (78.9 percent), Jamaicans (69.7 percent), Poles (64.7 percent), Soviets (53.2 percent), and Chinese (49.4 percent) in New York; Chinese (37.4 percent) in Philadelphia; and Koreans (48.0 percent), Germans (45.0 percent), Canadians (44.0 percent), and Chinese (40.7 percent) in Washington, DC. Thus, despite the fact that living in a census tract predominantly occupied by one's own group is not the typical experience of immigrants in our study, it certainly is the experience of some members of the particular immigrant groups in the particular metropolitan areas noted above.

Despite their relative infrequency, census tracts that consist predominantly of immigrants from the same place of birth may hold social, political, and economic influence far beyond their numbers (Rutledge 1992; Tsai 1986). Socially, such clusters may form the institutional core of the immigrant culture and the nexus of its communal intercourse. Politically, they may provide the spatial basis for community organizing and the election of local ethnic politicians. Economically, they may provide a variety of enclave networks that boost the chances for immigrant wealth accumulation, a topic discussed further in the following section.

### *Exposures to ancestry groups*

Although examining clusters of immigrants with identical birthplaces reveals much about the "enclave" nature of their residential

<sup>8</sup> These data are available from the first author.

environment, the portrait can be rendered more fully by additional consideration of residents' ancestry, whether foreign born or not. The second column for each site in table 3 helps us address this issue.

Although the format of this column appears identical to that of others in table 3, the ancestry information is not completely comparable and, indeed, not fully satisfactory. The main differences arise because place of birth was designated by the census forms as one of a set of single-country, closed-ended choices, whereas ancestry was designated as a write-in item.<sup>9</sup> Multiple ancestry responses were frequent, yet we only coded responses tabulated under "first ancestry listed" because we have no way of unambiguously allocating such dual responses. Thus, people who listed two ancestries of equal importance could have been coded under only one. Moreover, inasmuch as some respondents coded the ancestry item in less-revealing ways (e.g., "American") they would not have been tabulated at all in the second column of table 3.

Despite their shortcomings, data on exposures of immigrants to groups defined by self-designated, "first" ancestry proves enlightening. Indeed, examination of table 3 permits the identification of "ethnic enclaves" in which substantial numbers of some immigrants live.

In the case of Philadelphia, examination of the first column of table 3 led us to conclude that immigrants typically do not live in own-group immigrant enclaves because the highest own-group exposure rates were only a few percentage points. The second column of table 3 shows, however, that some Philadelphia immigrants' exposure to individuals of the same ancestry is substantial. Although Soviet immigrants only had, on average, 4.5 percent of other Soviet immigrants in their tract, they had 12.7 percent who claimed Soviet ancestry (presumably including most immigrants). Analogously, Polish immigrants had only, on average, 1.4 percent of Polish immigrants in their tract but 10.7 percent of those claiming Polish ancestry. Most dramatically, Italian immigrants lived in tracts with only 2 percent of Italian immigrants on average, but with 23.2 percent of residents claiming Italian ancestry.

In the case of Los Angeles, analogous differences in the portrait of ethnic concentrations experienced by some immigrant groups

---

<sup>9</sup> We created the "Soviet Union" ancestry category by combining listings of all nations listed that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Similarly, we combined listings from England, Scotland, and Wales to create the United Kingdom grouping. Details of census table items employed in the construction of these ancestry figures are available from the second author.

emerge. Chinese immigrants are exposed to 5.8 percent of their own immigrant group, but to 15.3 percent of all those claiming Chinese ancestry. An even more significant adjustment comes in the case of Mexican immigrants, where the corresponding exposure figures change from 26.2 to 50.5 percent. These latter figures for Mexican immigrants are the largest own-group exposures evinced across our sample. They clearly show the unusually high degree of concentration of Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles census tracts having, on average, a quarter of their population consisting of other Mexican immigrants and another quarter consisting of those claiming Mexican ancestry. Note that such an inflation in the portrait of an ethnic enclave when considering ancestry does not occur for most immigrant groups in Los Angeles; the substantial own-group exposure rates for Salvadorans, Koreans, Soviets, and Vietnamese defined by place of birth are not significantly altered when defined by ancestry.

In the case of New York, five immigrant groups evince significantly higher exposures to those of the same ancestry than to those who are immigrants from the same place of birth. These groups, with comparative exposure rates shown parenthetically, are Dominicans (15.2 and 21.9 percent); Chinese (12.3 and 20.8 percent); Soviets (7.8 and 10.8 percent); Poles (4.2 and 10.8 percent); and, most dramatically, Italians (4.3 and 27.7 percent). Assuming that immigrants write in the census forms the same ancestry as their place of birth, the above figures suggest that Chinese and, especially, Italian immigrants to New York are exposed to substantial numbers of similar-ancestry but native-born populations, whereas that is less likely to be true for Dominican, Polish, or Soviet immigrants.

The foregoing results for own-group and own-ethnicity exposures suggest that substantial numbers of some immigrant groups in particular metropolitan areas are living within residential enclaves. Inasmuch as living in such enclaves could affect the prospects for immigrants' economic success (Borjas 1995; Massey and Denton 1987; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes and Zhou 1992; Sanders and Nee 1996; Smith 1995; Waldinger 1995, 1996), our finding that there is wide variation in this sort of immigrant residential arrangement may have significance in matters of social welfare.

### *Exposures to other immigrant groups*

To what extent do immigrants live among other immigrants of different places of birth? If they rarely live in own-group immigrant enclaves, as noted above, might they live in more mixed immigrant enclaves?

The third column for each site in table 3 provides the answers. It presents the exposure for members of the place-of-birth group listed in the left-hand column to members of all the 16 remaining immigrant groups combined. In all cases (except Mexicans in Los Angeles), there is substantially more exposure to immigrants outside of one's group than to those within it. Not surprisingly, given the discussion of exposure indices in the previous section, the absolute level of exposures generally evinced in a metropolitan area is directly related to the overall percentage of immigrants in the population. But it is noteworthy that, in Los Angeles and New York, immigrants reside in census tracts where anywhere from one-fifth to one-third of their neighbors are immigrants from other places of birth, on average.

Some clear region-of-origin patterns are evinced, however. Immigrants with western European ethnic roots (Canada, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom) have among the lowest exposures to other immigrants in all metropolitan areas. Surprisingly, the same can be said of Jamaican immigrants. Immigrants from Central and South America (El Salvador, Colombia, Brazil) and from the Soviet Union generally have the highest interimmigrant exposures across all sites. Dominicans have exceptionally high interimmigrant exposures in Atlanta and Washington, DC. The same is true of Vietnamese in New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles.<sup>10</sup>

These findings indicate that whereas only a few immigrant groups in a few metropolitan areas reside in own-group/ethnicity enclaves, neighborhoods with substantial fractions of immigrants from different places of birth are a more representative residential arrangement. Whether this situation benefits these intermingled groups is a matter of some debate, depending on the extent of cooperation or competition for public resources, housing, and jobs (Waldinger 1996).

### *Exposures to recent immigrants*

To what extent are there patterns in the exposure of immigrant groups to "new" immigrants who moved into the United States dur-

---

<sup>10</sup> Despite the substantial cross-group variation in exposure to other immigrants, all groups in all study sites have at least some members who reside in enclaves occupied almost exclusively by members of other immigrant groups. In Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC, every immigrant group has at least some members who reside in a tract where all other residents are members of one or more of the other 16 immigrant groups under investigation. In Atlanta and Philadelphia, the highest proportion of immigrants observed in any tract is roughly one-half.

ing the 1980s? The fourth column for each site in table 3 provides this information. For the same 17 immigrant place-of-birth groups considered above, these columns give the exposure to those immigrating from 1980 to 1990.

Not surprisingly, the overall immigrant exposures to 1980 to 1990 immigrants are generally higher in metropolitan areas experiencing more recent immigration: Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC. Common patterns persist across the study sites, however: Certain immigrant groups have substantially higher proportions of new immigrants as a whole in their neighborhoods, on average. With the exception of Philadelphia, Mexican immigrants consistently rank within the top five groups in terms of exposure rates to recent immigrants.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, Salvadoran, Vietnamese, Soviet, Dominican, and Korean immigrants rank within the top five, according to this measure, in three of five sites.

This cross-group pattern of exposures to recent immigrants may hold important socioeconomic implications. Recent immigrants are least likely to be residentially or culturally assimilated (Massey 1985; White 1992) and thus likely would be of less assistance in promoting the upward social mobility of immigrant neighbors compared with immigrants who had longer tenures in the United States.

### *Exposures to racial/ethnic groups*

Are immigrants exposed to neighbors of different racial/ethnic classifications in about the same fashion as all households in their metropolitan area? Recall that in answering this question we cannot distinguish between domestic-born and foreign-born residents in terms of racial/ethnic breakdowns. Thus, when we tabulate immigrant group  $x$ 's exposure to whites, for example, we actually tabulate exposure to both domestic-born and foreign-born residents who classify themselves as white.

Table 4 presents the data, with our 17 immigrant groups listed in the first column, followed by our four basic racial/ethnic groups for the entire population. Cells in the table provide the given group's exposure to members of the four racial/ethnic groups.

<sup>11</sup> In Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia, roughly half of this amount was due to exposure to recent immigrants from Mexico. These data are available from the first author upon request.

Table 4. Immigrant Exposure Rates to Race/Ethnic Groups by Place of Birth and Metropolitan Area, 1990 (Percent)

Immigrant Place of Birth	Atlanta				Los Angeles				New York			
	White, not Hispanic	Black, not Hispanic	Asian, not Hispanic	Hispanic	White, not Hispanic	Black, not Hispanic	Asian, not Hispanic	Hispanic	White, not Hispanic	Black, not Hispanic	Asian, not Hispanic	Hispanic
	71.11	21.90	3.58	3.17	59.27	5.45	11.70	22.95	62.63	9.42	6.36	20.98
84.07	10.78	2.52	2.41	68.36	3.81	8.51	18.74	78.74	7.89	4.61	8.51	
78.88	12.66	4.34	3.88	36.98	3.35	27.61	31.60	47.80	6.84	26.01	18.99	
72.56	16.51	4.41	6.03	50.33	5.54	10.85	32.68	46.65	11.94	10.26	30.60	
60.83	27.58	4.79	6.42	43.99	9.13	10.33	35.94	19.21	20.99	4.66	54.41	
59.47	20.38	7.30	12.54	20.95	11.58	10.03	56.87	37.96	21.48	5.32	34.61	
81.63	13.40	2.35	2.39	68.64	4.02	8.56	18.17	80.23	5.45	4.99	9.10	
73.30	18.20	4.87	3.32	57.95	4.92	13.95	22.60	62.92	8.55	12.27	15.79	
84.24	10.28	3.02	2.30	63.26	3.80	10.20	22.18	78.02	5.17	5.30	11.26	
44.70	50.93	2.13	1.91	36.07	27.74	8.33	27.15	20.42	59.42	2.76	16.88	
76.89	14.51	4.80	3.53	46.45	5.23	20.75	27.02	60.09	5.12	17.64	16.76	
57.40	28.18	4.74	9.36	23.94	8.53	6.99	59.94	37.58	15.34	6.20	40.28	
75.71	17.81	3.14	3.06	41.44	6.54	17.34	34.10	59.35	11.16	11.52	17.50	
84.20	9.79	2.88	2.90	68.99	3.72	8.62	18.20	74.03	6.91	5.68	13.09	
78.56	10.11	5.22	5.70	59.97	3.48	9.63	26.41	73.72	6.83	7.79	11.38	
United Kingdom	81.51	13.38	2.48	2.39	69.36	3.84	8.60	17.63	74.84	11.12	4.44	9.31
Vietnam	58.93	27.12	6.20	7.37	39.39	3.75	21.66	34.64	50.31	12.82	12.74	23.66
All Residents												
White, not Hispanic	83.07	12.25	2.19	2.22	67.66	3.87	8.10	19.73	82.47	4.99	4.32	7.99
Black, not Hispanic	28.17	68.62	1.33	1.67	24.00	36.89	5.98	32.44	18.88	59.37	2.37	18.83
Asian, not Hispanic	72.02	18.99	4.83	3.86	45.33	5.40	19.82	28.90	58.22	8.42	16.16	16.80
Hispanic	68.30	22.24	3.60	5.53	30.37	8.06	7.95	53.00	33.56	20.91	5.24	39.69

Table 4. Immigrant Exposure Rates to Race/Ethnic Groups by Place of Birth and Metropolitan Area, 1990 (Percent) (continued)

Immigrant Place of Birth	Philadelphia				Washington, DC			
	White, not Hispanic	Black, not Hispanic	Asian, not Hispanic	Hispanic	White, not Hispanic	Black, not Hispanic	Asian, not Hispanic	Hispanic
Brazil	86.30	5.91	3.67	3.85	71.72	12.12	7.13	8.57
Canada	87.32	7.55	2.59	2.32	75.42	12.34	6.30	5.61
China	74.53	11.31	10.58	3.34	66.17	14.76	11.11	7.53
Colombia	62.57	16.68	4.72	15.58	64.24	17.00	7.54	10.82
Dominican Republic	46.63	23.95	2.75	26.27	38.74	38.29	6.20	16.24
El Salvador	55.92	19.98	2.20	21.57	43.40	27.12	7.45	21.55
Germany	85.54	8.87	2.47	2.88	74.50	13.56	5.97	5.63
India	83.03	7.75	5.81	3.14	68.06	14.07	9.55	7.92
Italy	86.75	7.79	2.27	2.99	70.46	16.28	6.33	6.58
Jamaica	36.69	56.64	1.93	4.23	37.02	46.88	5.38	10.23
Korea	75.91	13.52	6.83	3.47	70.22	12.86	9.76	6.79
Mexico	75.63	11.30	2.45	10.30	57.12	21.95	6.41	14.09
Philippines	74.58	15.53	4.47	5.16	63.95	20.85	7.80	6.97
Poland	85.65	8.46	2.48	3.14	71.85	12.58	7.17	8.04
Soviet Union	84.93	8.64	3.39	2.81	68.23	15.39	7.91	8.07
United Kingdom	85.92	9.03	2.35	2.47	74.67	13.44	5.82	5.73
Vietnam	62.72	18.95	9.09	8.95	65.62	12.38	10.56	11.01
All Residents	88.54	6.92	2.06	2.26	76.77	12.34	5.47	5.04
White, not Hispanic	28.01	65.16	1.48	4.95	29.42	62.82	2.75	4.57
Black, not Hispanic	75.37	13.34	6.79	4.22	68.13	14.35	9.40	7.73
Asian, not Hispanic	46.44	25.05	2.37	25.74	57.07	21.72	7.03	13.73

Source: 1990 census STF4.

First, consider places of birth that likely yield immigrants who classify themselves as white: Canada, Germany, Italy, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. We can compare these groups' exposures to a given group with all whites' exposure to the same group to gain a perspective on how immigrant whites are residentially distributed compared with all whites. In general, the variance in exposure rates across these six immigrant groups is not large and they closely match that of all whites in the given metropolitan area. There are some notable differences, however, such as Soviet immigrants in most sites. With these few exceptions, the findings are to be expected from Massey's (1985) spatial assimilation model: The immigrant white groups thought to be most assimilated evince the pattern of residential location that most closely mirrors that of all white residents.

Consider next the set of places of birth that likely would have immigrants identifying themselves as Asian: China, India, Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Unlike the case of white immigrants studied, there is a large variance in exposures across Asian place-of-birth groups. Nevertheless, several general patterns emerge across all study sites. Chinese immigrants are more exposed to Asians than are Asians in general in a given metropolitan area. Conversely, Indian immigrants are less exposed to Asians than are all Asians. Indians and Koreans in almost all sites have greater exposure to whites than do all Asians in general; the opposite is true for Chinese (except in Atlanta) and Vietnamese. With the exception of one site each, Chinese, Indians, and Koreans evince lower exposure to blacks than all Asians, although these exposures are still higher than those experienced by whites in general. Filipino and Vietnamese immigrants experience higher exposure to blacks than other Asian immigrants and Asians as a whole in almost all sites.

Jamaicans are the only immigrant group studied here who overwhelmingly identify themselves as black.<sup>12</sup> Compared with all blacks, Jamaican immigrants have greater exposure to whites and Asians in all five sites. They have less exposure to other blacks in four sites and less exposure to Hispanics in three sites, compared with all blacks. In an absolute sense their exposures to other blacks are significantly higher than any other immigrant group studied in all sites.

Finally, consider places of birth that probably produce immigrants who identify themselves as Hispanic: Brazil, Colombia, the Domini-

---

<sup>12</sup> According to our analysis of the 1990 national Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 1 percent sample, 95 percent of Jamaican immigrants identified themselves as black. Only 4 percent identified themselves as Hispanic.

can Republic, El Salvador, and Mexico.<sup>13</sup> Typically, the South American groups perform distinctly from the North American and Caribbean ones. For example, Brazilian and Colombian immigrants in all study sites are exposed to whites to a greater degree and Hispanics to a lesser degree than are Hispanics in general, and than are any of the other three Hispanic immigrant groups analyzed. On the other hand, with the notable exception of Philadelphia, Salvadorans evince the opposite comparative exposure rates to whites and Hispanics. Dominicans have the lowest exposures to whites of all five Hispanic immigrant groups in Philadelphia; Washington, DC; and, especially, New York (only 19 percent). Salvadorans and Dominicans have the greatest exposure to blacks and to Hispanics in two sites apiece. Mexicans are most likely to mirror the exposure rate pattern of all Hispanics across all sites, although they have higher comparative exposure rates to blacks and Hispanics in Atlanta and to Hispanics in Los Angeles than do Hispanics in general there.

Thus, once again, we find dramatic differences among immigrant groups, even among groups with a common Asian or Hispanic background, in their exposure to other racial/ethnic groups and especially to whites. Our results, therefore, support White's (1992) argument that immigrant segregation is more a function of socioeconomic and racial/ethnic status, not immigrant status. Moreover, our findings may hold considerable import if, presumably, immigrants who are more residentially integrated among whites can more quickly learn what it takes to join the mainstream, whereas the opposite might be implied from exposure to certain nonwhite groups (Portes and Zhou 1993, 1994). If Portes and Zhou are correct, the high observed exposures to black neighbors in particular may create obstacles for the second-generation children of Salvadoran, Dominican, and, especially, Jamaican immigrants.

### **Central-city location of immigrants' residences, 1990**

One of the simplest yet potentially powerful indicators of the geographic characteristics of immigrants' neighborhoods is the percentage of immigrants who reside in the central city. Table 5 shows the percentage of immigrants living in the central city of each of our five study sites, by place of birth.<sup>14</sup> Cross-metropolitan area comparisons of these unadjusted percentages are problematic because

<sup>13</sup> According to our analysis of the 1990 national PUMS 1 percent sample, 96 percent of Dominican immigrants identified themselves as Hispanic in ethnicity; on the race question, 43 percent identified themselves as black, 30 percent as white, and 27 percent as other.

<sup>14</sup> In each of our metropolitan areas, only residents of the *named* central city are defined as central-city residents.

Table 5. Immigrants Living in the Central City by Place of Birth and Metropolitan Area, 1990

Immigrant Place of Birth	Atlanta		Los Angeles		New York		Philadelphia		Washington, DC		Average*	
	Percent	Index	Percent	Index	Percent	Index	Percent	Index	Percent	Index	Percent	Percent
Brazil	6.32	0.37	38.22	1.59	48.71	1.15	41.17	1.50	13.94	0.90	29.67	29.67
Canada	11.33	0.66	22.39	0.93	35.86	0.85	15.36	0.56	12.43	0.81	19.47	19.47
China	12.84	0.75	29.61	1.23	82.76	1.96	43.79	1.59	11.02	0.72	36.00	36.00
Colombia	16.45	0.96	26.53	1.11	54.49	1.29	43.94	1.60	13.04	0.85	30.89	30.89
Dominican Republic	12.34	0.72	23.88	1.00	82.75	1.96	34.31	1.25	34.49	2.24	37.55	37.55
El Salvador	19.38	1.13	67.05	2.79	38.97	0.92	34.80	1.26	21.03	1.36	36.25	36.25
Germany	9.91	0.58	25.12	1.05	36.41	0.86	23.20	0.84	9.35	0.61	20.80	20.80
India	4.03	0.24	24.46	1.02	38.54	0.91	25.07	0.91	3.67	0.24	19.15	19.15
Italy	16.06	0.94	31.65	1.32	44.14	1.04	33.53	1.22	11.85	0.77	27.45	27.45
Jamaica	7.89	0.46	41.41	1.73	71.57	1.69	44.17	1.61	21.38	1.39	37.28	37.28
Korea	8.60	0.50	38.79	1.62	63.57	1.50	31.39	1.14	1.84	0.12	28.84	28.84
Mexico	19.83	1.16	29.84	1.24	60.69	1.43	12.19	0.44	10.88	0.71	26.69	26.69
Philippines	5.09	0.30	32.20	1.34	45.34	1.07	32.95	1.20	8.57	0.56	24.83	24.83
Poland	16.45	0.96	43.47	1.81	54.78	1.30	40.93	1.49	10.77	0.70	33.28	33.28
Soviet Union	16.37	0.96	58.07	2.42	76.24	1.80	66.80	2.43	13.57	0.88	46.21	46.21
United Kingdom	11.50	0.67	25.31	1.06	35.30	0.83	19.64	0.71	13.51	0.88	21.05	21.05
Vietnam	8.50	0.50	14.99	0.62	61.41	1.45	56.84	2.07	3.00	0.19	28.95	28.95
All Residents												
White, not Hispanic	7.77	0.45	17.99	0.75	28.40	0.67	19.05	0.69	6.73	0.44	15.99	15.99
Black, not Hispanic	39.48	2.31	39.36	1.64	67.69	1.60	58.44	2.12	38.26	2.48	48.65	48.65
Asian, not Hispanic	7.01	0.41	25.40	1.06	59.19	1.40	35.58	1.29	5.41	0.35	26.52	26.52
Hispanic	15.30	0.89	29.07	1.21	66.89	1.58	39.76	1.45	14.39	0.93	30.05	30.05

Note: Index = Percent of metropolitan area population in immigrant group living in central city divided by percent of total metropolitan area population living in central city.

\*Unweighted average across sites.

Source: 1990 census STF4.

in each the central city represents a quite different share of the entire metropolitan area population, as we have defined it geographically. To overcome this hurdle, we also present a relative central-city residency index, defined as the ratio of the percentage of the metropolitan area's foreign-born residents living in the central city to the percentage of the metropolitan area's entire population living in the central city. Values of the index greater than one signify that the given immigrant group is relatively more concentrated in the central city than the population as a whole in that region. This measure assumes a maximum value of the inverse of the proportion of the metropolitan area represented by the given immigrant group (when the sole occupants of the central city are members of the given group), and a minimum value of zero (when no members of the given group reside there).

It is clear from table 5 that certain immigrant groups are much more likely to reside in the central city.<sup>15</sup> On average across our five sites, Soviet immigrants surprisingly prove to be the most likely to live there, with 46 percent residing in the central city. They were ranked in the top three by both the absolute and the relative index measures in Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia. From 36 to 38 percent of Dominican, Jamaican, and Salvadoran immigrants reside in the central city, on average; this represents a higher percentage than the general population in four of the five sites. The groups least likely to reside in the central city are Canadian, Indian, and United Kingdom immigrants.

On average, all 17 immigrant groups proved more likely to reside in the central city than the white population as a whole and less likely than the black population as a whole. The relative percentages living in the central city between immigrant groups and Asians or Hispanics vary widely across the groups.

The averages belie some important cross-metropolitan area differences, however. In Atlanta and Washington, DC, blacks are more likely to live in the central city than any immigrant group studied. But in the other three metropolitan areas, at least two immigrant groups are significantly more likely to reside in the central city than blacks.

Some immigrant groups evince wide variations across sites. For example, Korean immigrants in Los Angeles and New York are highly represented in the central city, at 39 and 64 percent, respectively, and rank fifth among all groups in both sites. Yet, in Washington,

---

<sup>15</sup> Although not observable in the data collected, other studies also have noted a distinct class differentiation between city and suburban immigrants (Allen and Turner 1996; Kasarda et al. 1997; Tseng 1995).

DC, less than 2 percent reside in the central city, the lowest fraction observed for any group in any site. Analogously, Vietnamese immigrants are the least likely group to live in the city of Los Angeles and the second-least likely group to live in central-city Washington, DC. But they are the sixth-highest group in New York and the second-highest in Philadelphia, in terms of probability of central-city residence.

Residence in the central city may, of course, be partially an indicator of one's achieved socioeconomic status (Massey 1985). Indeed, Tseng (1995), Allen and Turner (1996), and Kasarda et al. (1997) have found evidence that less well-off immigrants tend to move into central cities instead of suburbs. Our additional interest, however, is that central-city locations may be less proximate to burgeoning suburban employment sites and may possess less advantageous tax/public service packages, especially related to the quality of public education. If so, the opportunity structure theory (Galster 1993; Galster and Killen 1995) would predict that the future economic progress of immigrants residing in the central city may be inhibited by the choices the environment encourages them to make.

### **Socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants' neighborhoods, 1990**

In this article we characterize the socioeconomic dimensions of neighborhood with four indicators of census tract conditions: the percentage of households receiving public assistance, the percentage of adults ages 16 to 64 who are employed, the percentage of those ages 25 or older who do not have a high school diploma, and the percentage of all households with children that are headed by a female. These indicators are measured directly in the census and are chosen to represent the four key dimensions of "underclass" neighborhoods employed in the seminal work of Ricketts and Sawhill (1986): high percentages of unemployed, welfare-using, poorly educated, female-headed households. From the perspective of the opportunity structure theory outlined above and previous empirical work, we would predict that the isolation, joblessness, violence, and social dislocation associated with neighborhoods deprived on these dimensions would produce severely limited opportunities for all who resided in them (Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, and Aber 1997; Ellen and Turner 1997; Wilson 1987, 1996).<sup>16</sup>

For each of these indicators we compute a neighborhood condition exposure index (2) for each of our 17 immigrant groups, and for our

---

<sup>16</sup> Although highly correlated in practice, we choose percentage on public assis-

four racial/ethnic groups for comparison. Results are presented in table 6, which reveals that there are marked differences among immigrant groups in the average kinds of socioeconomic conditions they confront in their neighborhoods, and that these differences persist remarkably across our sample of metropolitan areas. One way to see these patterns is to tally the five immigrant groups with the highest exposures in a given metropolitan area to the disadvantageous neighborhood conditions. Doing so reveals the following:

1. Jamaican immigrants rank within the top five groups on exposure to all four indicators in all sites, except for no high school diploma in Atlanta, Los Angeles, and New York.
2. Salvadoran immigrants rank within the top five groups on exposure to all four indicators in all sites, except for employment rates in New York and Washington, DC.
3. Dominican immigrants rank within the top five groups on exposure to all four indicators in all sites except Atlanta. They have dramatically less favorable neighborhood conditions compared with other immigrants in New York and, to a lesser degree, Philadelphia.
4. Mexican immigrants rank within the top five groups on exposure to all four indicators in all sites except Philadelphia.
5. Vietnamese immigrants rank within the top five groups on exposure to receipt of public assistance and no high school diploma indicators in four sites; other indicators are less consistent across sites.
6. Chinese immigrants rank within the top five groups on exposure to the employment rate indicator in four sites; other indicators are less consistent across sites.
7. Colombian immigrants rank within the top five groups on exposure to all four indicators in Philadelphia.

Another set of useful insights about neighborhood conditions can be gained by comparing immigrants' exposure rates to those of various racial/ethnic groups in the population at large. Table 7 summarizes

---

tance instead of percentage poor to better distinguish areas of working poor and welfare-dependent, unemployed households. We see the latter as more detrimental in inhibiting prospects for subsequent success of those raised there (Wilson 1996).

**Table 6. Immigrant Exposure Rates to Census Tract Socioeconomic Characteristics by Place of Birth and Metropolitan Area, 1990 (Percent)**

Immigrant Place of Birth	Atlanta				Los Angeles				New York			
	Receiving Public Assistance		No High School Diploma		Receiving Public Assistance		No High School Diploma		Receiving Public Assistance		No High School Diploma	
	Employed	Households with Children	Employed	Households with Children	Employed	Households with Children	Employed	Households with Children	Employed	Households with Children	Employed	Households with Children
Brazil	2.56	80.65	10.64	22.87	6.77	73.11	20.34	17.57	7.36	71.74	30.77	18.58
Canada	2.25	78.23	10.47	14.62	6.12	73.08	18.07	15.19	4.87	73.07	18.44	14.13
China	2.40	76.59	11.58	15.93	11.31	68.91	29.81	15.85	10.09	66.67	36.73	18.42
Colombia	2.88	78.22	13.75	18.39	8.35	71.95	27.00	17.62	8.66	69.98	32.51	21.07
Dominican Republic	3.66	80.01	14.54	19.98	10.08	69.02	30.54	19.08	22.73	58.15	47.27	42.05
El Salvador	6.52	75.23	26.53	25.23	14.33	65.21	48.68	22.98	12.28	67.79	36.58	27.34
Germany	2.73	78.03	12.18	16.30	6.05	72.92	17.60	14.92	4.63	72.58	19.48	13.15
India	2.63	79.68	12.68	19.11	6.45	73.62	19.51	15.16	5.90	72.29	23.20	15.34
Italy	2.13	78.03	10.99	14.82	6.68	72.82	20.23	15.92	6.03	71.07	27.02	14.73
Jamaica	4.32	78.02	14.89	23.68	11.55	68.50	27.64	24.84	13.23	66.84	31.92	34.88
Korea	2.68	78.89	12.43	17.78	7.96	71.61	24.26	16.14	5.87	70.84	23.13	14.86
Mexico	6.82	75.33	25.95	27.44	13.94	65.00	49.72	20.24	16.22	63.82	41.33	31.53
Philippines	3.29	78.96	16.28	18.69	9.39	70.65	28.57	16.65	6.97	71.25	25.34	17.77
Poland	2.42	80.74	10.11	14.35	6.34	73.54	18.70	16.72	7.17	70.16	27.47	17.02
Soviet Union	2.89	80.48	11.30	15.63	11.54	69.38	27.26	18.92	9.29	67.21	26.14	17.43
United Kingdom	2.42	78.16	11.22	15.67	5.76	73.96	16.90	15.40	5.24	72.97	19.30	15.50
Vietnam	5.75	75.43	23.69	25.95	11.84	69.34	33.06	16.66	10.94	67.59	31.87	22.84
All Residents												
White, not Hispanic	2.92	78.03	14.61	15.55	6.49	72.48	18.75	15.18	4.61	72.95	19.86	12.70
Black, not Hispanic	11.34	68.82	28.12	40.22	16.39	62.37	35.65	28.62	17.78	61.74	36.11	41.52
Asian, not Hispanic	3.31	78.14	14.79	19.47	9.14	70.71	26.03	16.20	7.46	70.00	26.96	16.81
Hispanic	4.61	76.97	18.50	21.94	12.82	66.04	43.77	19.58	18.11	61.64	40.72	34.88

Table 6. Immigrant Exposure Rates to Census Tract Socioeconomic Characteristics by Place of Birth and Metropolitan Area, 1990 (Percent) (continued)

Immigrant Place of Birth	Philadelphia				Washington, DC			
	Receiving Public Assistance	Employed	No High School Diploma	Female-Headed Households with Children	Receiving Public Assistance	Employed	No High School Diploma	Female-Headed Households with Children
Brazil	5.30	73.11	21.42	15.37	2.42	78.76	10.05	16.90
Canada	3.71	74.89	16.28	13.09	2.37	79.16	9.56	14.06
China	6.94	68.92	23.21	16.88	3.14	77.85	12.38	14.60
Colombia	11.51	66.06	31.02	23.77	3.00	79.61	12.87	19.13
Dominican Republic	19.03	58.08	39.07	34.14	5.24	77.53	23.32	27.77
El Salvador	16.47	63.50	33.75	29.11	4.83	78.72	24.98	25.20
Germany	4.56	74.20	19.82	14.14	2.50	78.23	10.38	14.44
India	4.32	74.49	17.98	14.25	2.49	80.25	10.87	14.89
Italy	5.79	72.84	26.30	16.12	2.57	79.35	11.34	14.27
Jamaica	12.21	66.60	30.45	34.87	4.79	76.76	20.75	26.74
Korea	4.98	72.86	19.17	16.82	2.49	79.08	10.33	14.86
Mexico	6.05	72.71	25.73	17.15	3.58	78.68	19.34	20.64
Philippines	7.59	70.21	23.78	19.14	2.81	77.86	11.49	15.96
Poland	5.78	72.93	26.87	16.91	2.56	79.34	11.04	15.35
Soviet Union	6.18	72.09	24.46	17.04	2.74	78.97	10.72	16.85
United Kingdom	4.45	73.85	18.35	14.29	2.48	78.37	9.96	14.69
Vietnam	13.63	64.69	35.49	27.46	3.11	79.95	14.10	15.95
All Residents								
White, not Hispanic	4.58	74.36	20.70	13.92	2.53	78.47	11.28	13.45
Black, not Hispanic	17.51	60.52	36.05	43.53	7.62	72.35	24.39	34.95
Asian, not Hispanic	6.81	70.63	22.20	18.24	2.70	78.98	11.37	14.99
Hispanic	19.73	58.76	40.95	34.49	3.67	78.35	17.39	20.65

Source: 1990 census STF4.

Table 7. Relative Exposures to Census Tract Socioeconomic Characteristics, 1990

	Atlanta	Los Angeles	New York	Philadelphia	Washington, DC
Number of immigrant groups with less favorable indicator than all blacks (N = 17)					
Percent receiving public assistance	0	0	1	1	0
Percent employed	0	0	1	1	0
Percent with no high school diploma	0	2	3	1	1
Percent of female-headed households with children	0	0	1	0	0
Number of "white" immigrant groups with more favorable indicator than all whites (N = 6)					
Percent receiving public assistance	6	4	0	3	3
Percent employed	6	5	1	1	4
Percent with no high school diploma	6	4	3	3	5
Percent of female-headed households with children	3	1	0	0	0
Number of "nonwhite" immigrant groups with more favorable indicator than all whites (N = 11)					
Percent receiving public assistance	5	1	0	1	3
Percent employed	4	2	0	1	7
Percent with no high school diploma	6	0	0	2	2
Percent of female-headed households with children	0	1	0	0	0
Number of "Asian" immigrant groups with more favorable indicator than all Asians (N = 5)					
Percent receiving public assistance	4	2	3	2	2
Percent employed	3	2	3	2	2
Percent with no high school diploma	3	2	3	2	2
Percent of female-headed households with children	4	3	2	3	3
Number of "Hispanic" immigrant groups with more favorable indicator than all Hispanics (N = 5)					
Percent receiving public assistance	3	3	4	5	3
Percent employed	3	3	4	4	4
Percent with no high school diploma	3	3	3	5	2
Percent of female-headed households with children	2	2	4	5	3

Source: 1990 census STF4.

these comparisons. It shows the number of immigrant groups, classified as before by the presumed race/ethnicity of those within them, that are exposed to greater (or lesser) degrees of detrimental neighborhood conditions than the comparable racial/ethnic group in the population, for each of our five study sites.

Table 7 first demonstrates that, with a few notable exceptions, immigrants are not exposed to neighborhood socioeconomic conditions as disadvantageous as those to which black residents of the same metropolitan area are exposed. The main exception is Dominican immigrants in Philadelphia and, especially, New York, who face dramatically worse neighborhood situations than even black populations in general. There also are a few exceptions involving Mexican and Salvadoran immigrants, who face higher rates of high school dropouts in their neighborhoods than do blacks. But note that Jamaicans, who overwhelmingly identify themselves as black, perform significantly better than blacks in general on all neighborhood indicators in all study sites. These findings provide additional confirmation for those of Zimmermann and Tobin (1995), who find the incidence nationally of “underclass” census tract indicators to be lower among immigrants than among black populations. Our results further attest to the more disadvantageous, opportunity-stifling neighborhood environments that metropolitan black populations confront compared with other groups (Galster 1993).

Next, table 7 shows that any conclusions about the neighborhood conditions of immigrants presumed to be white (those from Canada, Germany, Italy, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom) relative to all whites depend on the indicator and the metropolitan area. All or most of the white immigrant groups in Los Angeles; Washington, DC; and, especially, Atlanta live in neighborhoods that are more advantaged than whites’ in terms of public assistance, employment, and high school diplomas. White immigrant groups generally have comparatively less advantaged neighborhood conditions of all types in New York and Philadelphia, and everywhere except Atlanta when measured in terms of female-headed households in the area. In general, then, it appears that white immigrant groups currently occupy neighborhood niches that promise roughly the same opportunities for advancement as do those of the white population as a whole.

The 11 remaining “nonwhite” immigrant origin groups also can be compared with all whites in terms of neighborhood conditions, as presented in the third panel of table 7. Again, in Atlanta and, to a lesser degree, Washington, DC, even nonwhite immigrant groups often occupy neighborhoods having more favorable rates of public as-

sistance use, employment, and high school completion compared with whites'. On the contrary, in Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and especially New York, nonwhite immigrant groups rarely if ever occupy neighborhoods that are more advantaged than those of whites. Moreover, with one exception, the rate of female-headed families with children is higher in neighborhoods occupied by nonwhite immigrants than by whites.

The fourth panel of table 7 compares Asian immigrant origin groups' (China, India, Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam) neighborhoods with all Asians' neighborhoods. Across all sample sites, Indian and Korean immigrants' neighborhoods have more advantageous conditions than Asians' in general on all four indicators. Conversely, Vietnamese immigrants' neighborhoods are more disadvantaged than Asians' in general on all four indicators in all metropolitan areas. Only in Atlanta do Chinese and Filipino immigrants' neighborhoods prove more favorable than Asians' in general on most indicators.

Finally, table 7 presents an analogous comparison for Hispanics. Colombian and Brazilian immigrants' neighborhoods are more advantaged than Hispanics' in general on all four indicators in all sites. Other Hispanic immigrant groups have considerably more cross-sectional variation, however. Dominican immigrants reside in generally superior neighborhoods to those of Hispanics as a whole, except in New York and Washington, DC, where they reside in clearly inferior neighborhoods. Only in New York and Philadelphia do Salvadoran and Mexican immigrants experience more advantaged neighborhood conditions than Hispanics in general.

The portrait of neighborhood socioeconomic conditions experienced by nonwhite immigrant groups in 1990 thus is decidedly mixed, across both presumed racial/ethnic categories of immigrant groups and metropolitan areas. This suggests that worries over prospective long-term ghettoization of immigrant populations in underclass neighborhoods and resultant social and fiscal strains (Espenshade et al. 1996) are not generally appropriate, though they may be in particular contexts.

### **Salient changes in the characteristics of immigrants' neighborhoods, 1980 to 1990**

To ascertain whether the neighborhood contexts confronting immigrant groups changed dramatically during the 1980s, we create analogs to all the foregoing tables, and then compute changes in each

cell.<sup>17</sup> (Given space considerations, we do not present either set of tables here; they are available, upon request, from the first author.) Trends that are general across all groups and metropolitan areas are summarized in table 8 and further analyzed below.

First, consider changes in immigrant exposure rates to other members of one's immigrant group. In the vast majority of cases in every study site, these exposures rose. Even in the metropolitan areas with the largest immigration, however, in no case was the increase greater than four percentage points. Own-group exposures increased 2 to 4 percentage points for Mexicans in Atlanta, Los Angeles, and New York, for Soviets in Los Angeles and New York, for Vietnamese in Los Angeles, and for Koreans in New York. With the exception of Soviets in New York, those groups evincing the largest increases in own-group exposures also experienced the largest growth in their metropolitan area population shares (see table 2). Inasmuch as groups' increments in own-group exposure indices closely paralleled their increments in metropolitan area population shares, this suggests that most of the additional immigrant population growth occurred evenly, both in areas inside and outside traditional enclaves. There is, therefore, little support for the notion that immigrant groups in general are becoming noticeably more residentially clustered in own-group enclaves.

Virtually all of the exceptions to modestly rising own-group exposures occurred for (presumably) white immigrants from European or Canadian origins. This is what one would expect, of course, given that these groups were not only white but typically slow growing during the 1980s. This means that the average immigrant in such groups presumably has had more time to assimilate economically and spatially into the U.S. mainstream (Massey 1985).

**Table 8. Predominant Changes in Immigrant Exposure Rates to Various Neighborhood Characteristics, 1980-90**

Increasing Exposure to:	Decreasing Exposure to:
Own immigrant group	Whites
Asians	Residence in central city
Hispanics	High school dropouts
Employed households	

*Note:* Changes evinced by the majority of immigrant groups in most metropolitan areas analyzed.

*Source:* Author's calculations based on 1980 and 1990 census data.

---

<sup>17</sup> Note, however, that the 1980 census did not tabulate Brazil, Colombia, and El Salvador as distinct places of birth, and the Dominican Republic was not a distinct ancestry category.

Next, consider changes in exposures of immigrants to various racial groups and those of Hispanic ethnicity. Across all 14 immigrant groups analyzed here and in all five metropolitan areas:

1. Exposure to non-Hispanic whites declined (with the exception of two groups in Philadelphia that had no change). In every site there were at least two groups in which this decline exceeded 10 percentage points; there was no relationship between declining immigrant exposure to whites and degree of immigration.
2. Exposure to non-Hispanic Asians rose, although for no group was the increase in exposure as large as 10 percentage points.
3. Exposure to Hispanics rose (with two minor exceptions), although in only one case did the increase exceed 9 percentage points (Mexicans' in New York rose by 12.9 points).
4. Exposure to non-Hispanic blacks varied considerably in trend, both across groups and sites.

Certain immigrant groups demonstrated distinctive trends in inter-racial/ethnic exposures that were common across all study sites during the 1980s. Dominicans and Mexicans evinced large (typically double-digit percentage point) declines in exposure to whites and substantial (if not double-digit) increases in exposure to Hispanics. Koreans had seriously declining exposure to whites coupled with offsetting (increasing) exposure to Asians. Vietnamese showed strongly lower exposure to whites, half-as-large increases in exposure to both Asians and Hispanics, but mixed trends in exposure to blacks across sites.

Still other patterns of dramatic change were idiosyncratic to group/site combinations. Jamaican immigrants in Atlanta saw their exposure to whites fall 10.4 percentage points and exposure to blacks rise by 8.1 points, but in Los Angeles their exposure to blacks fell 10.7 points and exposure to Hispanics rose 9.0 points. Soviet immigrants in Los Angeles reduced their exposure to whites by 10.6 percentage points and increased their exposure to Hispanics by 8.6 points.

The foregoing results provide a richer context to the demographic generalizations provided by Frey and Farley (1996). They found that metropolitan areas with the greatest 1980 to 1990 increases in dissimilarity (or "evenness") measures of Hispanic/non-Hispanic and Asian/non-Asian segregation were those experiencing the largest growth of Hispanic and Asian immigrants, respectively. Our findings suggest that Frey and Farley's results are produced by a combination of two factors directly associated with immigrants'

residential patterns: (1) modest increases in own-immigrant group exposures; and (2) often significant decreases in exposure to whites. These two factors must be overwhelming two contrary factors we also observe that would tend to reduce overall patterns of Hispanic/non-Hispanic and Asian/non-Asian segregation: immigrant Hispanics' increasing exposure to Asians and vice versa. Moreover, we stress that no generalizations can be made regarding the impact of all immigrant groups on general patterns of ethnic segregation vis-a-vis whites. For example, we find that Brazilian and Colombian immigrants have higher exposure to whites than do all Hispanics; the opposite is true for Salvadorans. What indirect effects immigrants might have had on overall segregation patterns by inducing mobility of other groups is beyond the scope of this study but should be considered for future research.<sup>18</sup>

On average across the study sites, all immigrant groups except Koreans showed declines in the fraction of their group residing in the central city during the 1980s. The largest average declines were manifested by Jamaicans (−11.2 percentage points), Dominicans (−9.5 points), and Poles (−9.0 points). Atlanta had the highest overall rate of central-city residential decline for immigrants during the decade, with both Poles and Vietnamese registering decreases of more than 20 percentage points. Although 9 of 14 groups evinced declining percentages residing in New York City, several had significantly higher fractions there by 1990: Vietnamese (+12.2 points), Koreans (+4.6 points), and Soviets (+3.8 points).

Finally, distinctive trends emerge in socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhoods inhabited by immigrants. Across all sites and all groups, the average percentage employed in immigrants' neighborhoods rose. This is, perhaps, more a reflection of the overall superior condition of the national and regional economies in 1990 than the increasing ability of immigrants to inhabit better neighborhoods. The average neighborhood percentage of high school dropouts declined in all cases except Mexicans in Philadelphia and Washington, DC; Vietnamese in Philadelphia; and Dominicans in Washington, DC. Again, part of this decline undoubtedly can be attributed to national trends. Generally, there were declines in the neighborhood percentages of female-headed households with children and those on public assistance, but there was more variation across groups and sites in these indicators. A few place-of-birth groups evinced changes in two or more indicators suggesting neighborhood decline: Dominicans in Atlanta, New York, and Washing-

---

<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately, Frey and Farley (1996) did not include in their multivariate analysis of segregation any independent variables measuring the degree or type of immigration.

ton, DC; Chinese in Philadelphia; Mexicans in New York and Washington, DC; and Vietnamese in Atlanta and Philadelphia.

Despite these exceptions, the overall pattern is clearly one of improving socioeconomic conditions during the 1980s in the neighborhoods occupied by immigrants, although some unspecified share of this improvement can be attributed to positive national trends in several indicators. This is encouraging nevertheless, given that during the decade these same metropolitan areas witnessed an increase in the number of census tracts evincing poverty rates of 40 percent or more, with all the attendant problematic social indicators (Jargowsky 1997). This suggests that the bulk of immigrants were not exposed to this growing trend of concentrated poverty during the 1980s and the associated underclass socioeconomic indicators analyzed by Zimmermann and Tobin (1995).

Before closing this section, we note that we have not presented comparisons of changing neighborhood conditions for pre-1980 and post-1980 immigrants. Although such a comparison likely would prove interesting, STF-4 data do not permit it. Data from the 1990 STF-4 showing year of immigration are cross-tabulated only with broad region of origin, not specific country of birth, and we deemed this lack of specificity to be severe and potentially misleading compared with the rest of our findings.

## **Conclusions and implications**

What is patently clear from our exploratory investigation into the neighborhood conditions facing immigrants is that one can make precious few generalizations across immigrant groups classified by place of birth or across metropolitan areas. Indeed, even comparisons across large metropolitan areas characterized by roughly similar degrees of immigration during the 1980s reveal many more differences than similarities. In sum, there is an extremely circumscribed set of general conclusions one can make about the “typical immigrant neighborhood” in the five metropolitan areas studied here.

Emphasizing this caveat, however, should not suggest that no patterns can be observed. On the contrary, the findings reveal much about what is and is not typical of immigrants’ neighborhood environs, at least in these five major metropolitan areas. In this final section we review these conclusions and draw implications from them for future research and public policy.

On average, immigrants in all the place-of-birth groups we analyzed do not live in enclaves populated by large proportions of other

immigrants from the same birthplace. Although the exposure to own-group immigrants has risen slightly during the 1980s, this would be expected tautologically as the percentage of immigrants in the general population has risen correspondingly. Put differently, most immigrant groups are highly spatially assimilated and show little tendency to become more spatially clustered. However, “own-group immigrant enclaves,” census tracts with majorities of immigrants from the same place of birth, do exist for a few (though different) groups in all five metropolitan areas.

Some groups in some study sites show distinctive “own-ancestry enclaves,” wherein the exposures to those identifying themselves from the same ancestry as the immigrants (though not necessarily immigrants themselves) are high. Notable illustrations include Italians in Philadelphia, Mexicans and Chinese in Los Angeles, and Dominicans and Chinese in New York. In conjunction with the aforementioned findings regarding own-group immigrant enclaves, these results suggest that there are nontrivial examples of certain immigrant groups in certain metropolitan areas that reside among substantial numbers of “their own kind,” although it is not the norm for any group in any study site. It will be important for future research to determine whether immigrant enclave economies continue to flourish, insofar as some have argued that their usefulness is being eroded (Kasarda et al. 1997).

It is not unusual for different immigrant groups to share the same census tracts in substantial numbers. Indeed, in Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC—all metropolitan areas with substantial 1980s immigration—all groups studied demonstrate tracts in which their members live among exclusively immigrant neighbors. In particular, Central American, South American, and Soviet immigrants evince the highest average exposures to other immigrant groups across most sites. The opposite holds true for western European, Canadian, and, surprisingly, Jamaican immigrants. The economic, political, and sociological ramifications of the intensive sharing of space among certain immigrant groups in particular settings must be left for other studies to explore. In particular, whether alternative pairings of immigrants tend to produce cooperative or competitive intergroup arrangements would be important to understand (Waldinger 1996).

Further insights into the role of immigrants in shaping patterns of residential diversity in our metropolitan areas can be seen by comparing immigrants’ and all residents’ exposures to various racial/ethnic groups. The relative exposures of all presumably white immigrant groups to other racial/ethnic groups are (with a few exceptions) virtually indistinguishable from the exposures evinced by all white residents, suggesting that white immigrants are gener-

ally as residentially assimilated as whites as a whole. Within other (presumed) racial/ethnic categories of immigrants, the patterns are much more diverse. For example, Chinese immigrants have higher exposure to Asians than do Asians as a whole; the opposite is true for Indians. Brazilian and Colombian immigrants have higher exposure to whites than do all Hispanics; the opposite is true for Salvadorans. Of course, virtually all Hispanic and Asian immigrant groups studied have higher exposures to Asians and Hispanics, respectively, than do immigrant whites or all whites. The foregoing suggests that many (though not all) nonwhite immigrant groups locate in ways that increase many sorts of interracial and interethnic exposure for the metropolitan population as a whole, although less often vis-a-vis whites. But this is rarely the case for (presumably) white immigrants, who typically follow the same segregated living patterns established by whites in general. By implication, one consequence of a continuation in the long-term alteration in the mix of immigrants from whites to nonwhites should be the increased diversification of metropolitan neighborhoods.

Substantial diversity exists among immigrant groups in terms of their propensity to reside in central cities. At one extreme, 46 percent of Soviet immigrants, on average, reside in the central cities of our five study sites; roughly one-third of Dominican, Jamaican, Salvadoran, and Chinese immigrants do as well. At the other extreme, relatively few Canadian, United Kingdom, or Indian immigrants reside in the central city, on average. We hasten to add that there are important differences across metropolitan areas both within and among groups in this proportion. We can say, however, that the proportion of immigrants in virtually all groups living in the central cities in all metropolitan areas studied (with the partial exception of a few groups in New York) fell during the 1980s, matching the trend for the U.S. population as a whole. It thus is not the general case that immigrants are being "left behind" in the decaying cores of our larger metropolitan areas as the rest of the population suburbanizes.

Although not directly observable from our analysis, the above data are consistent with the findings of other studies that many immigrants now are bypassing traditional, central-city "ports of entry" and moving directly to the suburbs (Alba and Logan 1991; Alba, Logan, and Leung 1994; Allen and Turner 1996; Smith 1995; Zhou and Logan 1991). Perhaps, as argued by Kasarda et al. (1997), the traditional functions of dense immigrant enclaves at the core of cities, such as group identity and networks of mutual support, now can be carried out in the suburbs through improvements in transportation and communication technologies.

Finally, when we analyze the socioeconomic status of neighborhoods inhabited by immigrants, several conclusions follow. Several place-of-birth groups—Jamaica, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico—typically demonstrate exposures to the lowest-status neighborhood conditions, undoubtedly because on average, these groups themselves evince lower rates of employment and higher rates of use of public assistance, high school noncompletion, and female-headed households with children. With the exception of Dominicans living in New York City, however, no immigrant groups in any of the metropolitan areas studied (even black Jamaicans) are exposed to the sort of disadvantageous neighborhood conditions to which black households are exposed. This suggests that while certain immigrant groups may, indeed, provide important sources of demand for modest-quality neighborhood submarkets, they typically are not occupying the lowest-quality submarkets, which apparently still are being occupied by blacks.

As for presumably white immigrant groups, some reside in higher-status neighborhoods than all white households as a group, on average, whereas others reside in lower-status ones; the relationships vary across groups and metropolitan areas. As for presumably nonwhite immigrant groups, in Atlanta and Washington, DC, roughly half live in more advantaged neighborhoods than do whites in terms of public assistance, employment, and high school completion rates, whereas in the other three sites they are almost always less advantaged than whites on all neighborhood indicators. In all sites, nonwhite immigrant groups have greater exposure to neighboring female-headed households than do whites.

In sum, our exploratory research may be viewed as shattering any vestiges of the myth of the “immigrant ghetto”—a disadvantaged neighborhood teeming with immigrants from the same place of birth—that might be generalized across place-of-birth groups or metropolitan areas. Although there are some notable enclaves with high proportions of immigrants and other residents from the same ancestry, these residential patterns are atypical. White immigrants in general appear to be as residentially assimilated as all white residents, although there is considerably more diversity in interracial/ethnic exposures when we compare presumably nonwhite immigrant groups. These differences in residential assimilation likely are caused, in part, by longer duration of U.S. residence of most white immigrant groups compared with nonwhite immigrant groups. Although in Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and (especially) New York, immigrants typically live in more disadvantaged neighborhoods compared with the average white household, in all study sites there are at least some white and (with the exception of New

York) nonwhite immigrant groups that live in superior neighborhoods, on average, as measured by one or more indicators.

From the perspective of future research, we view these findings as tantalizing prelude. As noted at the outset, one of the central motivations of this study was the hypothesized link between neighborhood conditions and prospects for residents' socioeconomic advancement. Having found here that substantial differences exist among immigrant groups in neighborhood conditions, it is a natural next step to investigate the extent to which immigrants with disadvantaged neighborhood conditions in 1980 experienced less socioeconomic progress during the 1980s. This investigation will be reported in a companion article now under development.

From the perspective of policy makers, the foregoing can be interpreted as a "good news, bad news" story for neighborhoods. Many immigrants, especially disproportionate numbers of Soviets, Dominicans, Jamaicans, Salvadorans, and Chinese, continue to move into central-city neighborhoods. Insofar as they augment net housing demand there, they provide a fillip for housing maintenance or renewal activity that would not have occurred in their absence. In center-city neighborhoods, however, more often than not these immigrant in-movers have low incomes (Enchautegui 1994; Kasarda et al. 1997) and thus may affect neighborhoods in ways that are not altogether positive. Although most immigrants are dispersed in small numbers across many neighborhoods, own-group exposure rates have risen modestly during the 1980s. Immigrant groups often have established thriving commercial and residential districts that provide employment, unique goods and services, tax revenues, and even tourist potential for the neighborhood and encompassing jurisdiction (see, e.g., Rutledge 1992; Tsai 1986; Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996). In such enclaves, neighborhood revitalization policy may need to acquire a particular "ethnic character" to be effective. Community development organizations need to be especially sensitive to idiosyncracies of the immigrant group involved in order to be successful, as has the Little Havana Community Development Corporation in Miami. On the other hand, most (and an increasing share of) immigrants reside in neighborhoods with sizable numbers of different immigrant and racial/ethnic groups. This suggests that both indigenous and top-down neighborhood revitalization efforts will face increasingly difficult challenges in sensitively integrating multicultural concerns into their plans.





Table A.1. Metropolitan Area Definitions and Populations (continued)

Definition Used in this Study	Population		Census Definition		Population	
	1990	1980	Component Parts—1990			1990
			Component Parts—1980			
Philadelphia						
Total	5,762,704	5,555,662	Philadelphia–Wilmington–Trenton, PA–NJ–DE–MD CMSA	5,899,345	Philadelphia–Wilmington–Trenton, PA–NJ–DE–MD SCSA	
New Castle County	441,946	398,115	New Castle County	441,946	New Castle County	
Burlington County	395,066	362,542	Burlington County	395,066	Burlington County	
Camden County	502,824	471,650	Camden County	502,824	Camden County	
Cumberland County	138,053	132,866	Cumberland County	138,053	Gloucester County	
Gloucester County	230,082	199,917	Gloucester County	230,082	Mercer County	
Mercer County	325,824	307,863	Mercer County	325,824	Bucks County	
Bucks County	541,174	479,211	Bucks County	541,174	Chester County	
Chester County	376,396	316,660	Chester County	376,396	Delaware County	
Delaware County	547,651	555,007	Delaware County	547,651	Montgomery County	
Montgomery County	678,111	643,621	Montgomery County	678,111	Philadelphia County	
Philadelphia County	1,585,577	1,688,210	Philadelphia County	1,585,577	Cecil County	
			Cecil County	71,347	Salem County	
			Salem County	65,294		

Table A.1. Metropolitan Area Definitions and Populations (continued)

Definition Used in this Study	Population		Census Definition		Population	
	1990	1980	1990	1980		
	Component Parts—1990		Component Parts—1980			
Washington, DC						
Total	3,938,312	3,270,247	Washington, DC—MD—VA MSA	3,923,574	Washington, DC—MD—VA SMSA	3,060,922
District of Columbia	606,900	638,333	District of Columbia	606,900	District of Columbia	638,333
Calvert County	51,372	34,638	Calvert County	51,372	Charles County	72,751
Charles County	101,154	72,751	Charles County	101,154	Montgomery County	579,053
Frederick County	150,208	114,792	Frederick County	150,208	Prince George's County	665,071
Montgomery County	757,027	579,053	Montgomery County	757,027	Arlington County	152,599
Prince George's County	729,268	665,071	Prince George's County	729,268	Fairfax County	596,901
St. Mary's County	75,974	59,895	Arlington County	170,936	Loudoun County	57,427
Arlington County	170,936	152,599	Fairfax County	818,584	Prince William County	144,703
Fairfax County	818,584	596,901	Loudoun County	86,129	Alexandria city	103,217
Loudoun County	86,129	57,427	Prince William County	215,686	Fairfax city	19,390
Prince William County	215,686	144,703	Stafford County	61,236	Falls Church city	9,515
Alexandria city	111,183	103,217	Alexandria city	111,183	Manassas city	15,438
Fairfax city	19,622	19,390	Fairfax city	19,622	Manassas Park city	6,524
Falls Church city	9,578	9,515	Falls Church city	9,578		
Manassas city	27,957	15,438	Manassas city	27,957		
Manassas Park city	6,734	6,524	Manassas Park city	6,734		

Source: Metropolitan component counts and population counts from U.S. Census Bureau: (1980) *Number of Inhabitants: U.S. Summary (PC80-1-A1)*; (1990) *Population and Housing Unit Counts: U.S. (1990 CPH-2-1)*.

\*Unlike most of the United States where metropolitan areas consist of whole counties, New England metropolitan areas are formed by towns. In most cases, the entire county is included in a metropolitan area, but in some cases the towns included do not equal the entire county.

## Authors

George C. Galster is the Clarence Hilberry Professor of Urban Affairs in the College of Urban, Labor, and Metropolitan Affairs at Wayne State University in Detroit. Kurt Metzger is Director of the Michigan Metropolitan Information Center at the College of Urban, Labor, and Metropolitan Affairs at Wayne State University. Ruth Waite is an Information Specialist at the Michigan Metropolitan Information Center at the College of Urban, Labor, and Metropolitan Affairs at Wayne State University.

The authors thank Michelle Porter and Anne Zobel for their excellent research assistance. The helpful comments of Robert Lang, Pat Simmons, Amy Bogdon, Ayse Can, Zhong Yi Tong, and two anonymous referees are also gratefully acknowledged.

## References

- Alba, Richard, and John Logan. 1991. Variations on Two Themes: Racial and Ethnic Patterns in the Attainment of Suburbanization. *Demography* 28 (August):431–53.
- Alba, Richard, John Logan, and Shu-yin Leung. 1994. Asian Immigrants in American Suburbs: An Analysis of the Greater New York Metropolitan Area. *Research in Community Sociology* 4:43–67.
- Allen, James, and Eugene Turner. 1996. Spatial Patterns of Immigrant Assimilation. *Professional Geographer* 48(2):140–55.
- Aponte, Robert. 1996. Urban Employment and the Mismatch Dilemma: Accounting for the Immigration Exception. *Social Problems* 43 (August):268–83.
- Borjas, George. 1992. Ethnic Capital and Intergenerational Mobility. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 85:365–90.
- Borjas, George. 1995. Ethnicity, Neighborhoods, and Human Capital Externalities. *American Economic Review* 85(3):365–90.
- Borjas, George. 1998. To Ghetto or Not to Ghetto: Ethnicity and Residential Segregation. *Journal of Urban Economics* 44(2):228–53.
- Brooks-Gunn, Jeanne, Greg Duncan, and J. Lawrence Aber, eds. 1997. *Neighborhood Poverty*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Clark, William A.V. 1998. Mass Migrations and Local Outcomes. *Urban Studies* 35(3):371–84.
- Ellen, Ingrid Gould, and Margery Austin Turner. 1997. Does Neighborhood Matter? Assessing Recent Evidence. *Housing Policy Debate* 8(4):833–66.
- Enchautegui, Maria. 1994. *Latino Neighborhoods and Latino Poverty*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.

Espenshade, Thomas J., Michael Fix, Wendy Zimmermann, and Thomas Corbett. 1996. Immigration and Social Policy: New Interest in an Old Issue. *Focus-Institute for Research on Poverty* 18(2):1–10.

Fix, Michael, and Jeffrey S. Passel. 1994. *Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.

Frey, William H. 1995. Immigration and Internal Migration 'Flight' from U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Toward a New Demographic Balkanization. *Urban Studies* 32 (May):733–57.

Frey, William H. 1996. Immigration and the Changing Geography of Poverty. *Focus-Institute for Research on Poverty* 18(2):24–8.

Frey, William H., and Reynolds Farley. 1996. Latino, Asian and Black Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Are Multiethnic Metros Different? *Demography* 33(1):35–50.

Galster, George. 1993. Polarization, Place and Race. *North Carolina Law Review* 71 (June):1,421–62.

Galster, George, and Sean Killen. 1995. The Geography of Metropolitan Opportunity: Reconnaissance and Conceptual Framework. *Housing Policy Debate* 6(1):7–44.

Galster, George, and Maris Mikelsons. 1995. The Geography of Metropolitan Opportunity: A Case Study of Neighborhood Conditions Confronting Youth. *Housing Policy Debate* 6(1):73–102.

Galster, George, and Anna Santiago. 1995. Puerto Rican Segregation in the U.S.: Cause or Consequence of Economic Status. *Social Problems* 42(3):361–89.

Hirschman, Charles. 1996. Studying Immigrant Adaptation from the 1990 Population Census: From Generational Comparison to the Process of 'Becoming American.' In *The New Second Generation*, ed. Alejandro Portes, 54–81. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Holmes, Steven. 1998. Immigration Fueling Cities' Strong Growth. *New York Times*, January 1, pp. A1, A13.

Jargowsky, Paul. 1997. *Poverty and Place*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Kasarda, John D., Stephen J. Appold, Stuart H. Sweeney, and Elaine Sieff. 1997. Central-City and Suburban Migration Patterns: Is a Turnaround on the Horizon? *Housing Policy Debate* 8(2):307–58.

Light, Ivan, Georges Sabagh, Mehdi Bozorgmehr, and Claudia Der-Martirosian. 1994. Internal Ethnicity in the Ethnic Economy. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16:581–97.

Massey, Douglas. 1985. Ethnic Residential Segregation: A Theoretical and Empirical Review. *Sociology and Social Research* 69 (April):315–50.

- Massey, Douglas, and Nancy Denton. 1987. Trends in Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. *American Sociological Review* 52(6): 802–25.
- Massey, Douglas, and Nancy Denton. 1988. The Dimensions of Residential Segregation. *Social Forces* 67(2):281–315.
- Portes, Alejandro. 1995. *The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Portes, Alejandro. 1996. Introduction: Immigration and Its Aftermath. In *The New Second Generation*, ed. Alejandro Portes, 1–7. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Julian Sensenbrenner. 1993. Embeddedness and Immigration. *American Journal of Sociology* 98:1,320–50.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Min Zhou. 1992. Gaining the Upper Hand: Economic Mobility Among Immigrant and Domestic Minorities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 15(4):491–522.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Min Zhou. 1993. The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 530 (November):74–96.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Min Zhou. 1994. Should Immigrants Assimilate? *The Public Interest* 18:18–33.
- Ricketts, Erol, and Isabel Sawhill. 1986. *Defining and Measuring the Underclass*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
- Rutledge, Paul. 1992. *The Vietnamese Experience in America*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Sanders, Jimmy, and Victor Nee. 1996. Immigrant Self-Employment: The Family as Social Capital and the Value of Human Capital. *American Sociological Review* 61 (April):231–49.
- Smith, Christopher. 1995. Asian New York: The Geography and Politics of Diversity. *International Migration Review* 29 (spring):59–84.
- Tsai, Shih Shan Henry. 1986. *The Chinese Experience in America*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Tseng, Yen-Fen. 1995. Beyond ‘Little Taipei’: The Development of Taiwanese Immigrant Businesses in Los Angeles. *International Migration Review* 29 (spring):33–58.
- Waldinger, Roger. 1995. The “Other Side” of Embeddedness: A Case-Study of the Interplay of Economy and Ethnicity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18 (July):555–80.
- Waldinger, Roger. 1996. Ethnicity and Opportunity in the Plural City. In *Ethnic Los Angeles*, ed. Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Waldinger, Roger, and Mehdi Bozorgmehr, eds. 1996. *Ethnic Los Angeles*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

White, Michael J. 1992. Immigrants, Cities, and Equal Opportunity. In *Urban Labor Markets and Job Opportunity*, ed. George E. Peterson and Wayne Vroman, 283–315. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.

Wilson, Franklin D., and Gerald Jaynes. 1996. Immigration and Labor Market Outcomes for Native Workers. *Focus—Institute for Research on Poverty* 18(2):30–4.

Wilson, William Julius. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wilson, William Julius. 1996. *When Work Disappears*. New York: Knopf.

Zhou, Min, and John Logan. 1991. In and Out of Chinatown: Residential Mobility and Segregation of New York City's Chinese. *Social Forces* 70 (December):387–407.

Zimmermann, Wendy, and Mitchell Tobin. 1995. *Immigration and Concentrated Poverty*. Washington DC: The Urban Institute.