

Public Housing Redevelopment: Seven Kinds of Success

Lawrence J. Vale
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Abstract

Three comprehensive redevelopment efforts were undertaken in Boston public housing projects during the 1980s, attempts that may well represent the clearest precedent for the current U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development initiatives under the Urban Revitalization Demonstration program. Despite receiving similar levels of funding and undergoing similar design and development processes, the results of these three redevelopment efforts vary widely: Two of them have become nationally recognized models for public housing revitalization, while the third proved disappointing to all involved.

This article examines and evaluates the three efforts. It argues that redevelopment success should be measured by at least seven criteria: smooth implementation, recognized design quality, improved tenant organization capacity, enhanced maintenance and management performance, improved security, progress on socioeconomic development, and resident satisfaction. It concludes by emphasizing the potential of partnerships among tenant groups, housing authorities, and private management companies to play a greater role in public housing policy.

Keywords: Low-income housing; Rehabilitation; Urban planning

From devastation to redevelopment

Most of the research and writing about public housing in the United States has stressed the intractability of its problems (Bauman 1994) yet has frequently focused on the search for a solution that emphasizes the transformative power of a single factor. For some, a key variable is architectural design (Coleman 1985; Cooper 1975; Newman 1972, 1980); for others, it is management reform (Kell 1978, 1979; Kolodny 1979; Sadacca et al. 1974), service provision and family self-sufficiency programs (Shlay 1993), drug prevention (Keyes 1992), resident satisfaction (Francescato et al. 1979), or public policy initiatives such as economic mixing (Spence 1993), resident management (Chandler 1991; Peterman 1993), homeownership programs (Rohe and Stegman 1992), or housing vouchers (Schill 1993).

Clearly, as the needs of public housing residents and public housing authorities have expanded, more and more specialists have been called in for consultation. Their prognosis, almost always dire, is further complicated by disagreements about the best course of treatment. It has long been clear that no single form of intervention is sufficient, and most who struggle to support or reform public housing (whether as residents, managers, designers, or policy makers) are only too well aware that the challenges come in many interlinked categories.

With signs of success in urban public housing so hard to come by, it is not surprising that most who attempt to build or redevelop low-income housing will look for indications of partial victories. These narrow successes are important, but it is also important to remember that success can be measured in many ways. Public housing redevelopment efforts today are necessarily partnerships among a variety of professionals and nonprofessionals who often have different agendas and priorities. The research reported here is part of an attempt to look across many possible criteria for success and to apply them to actual cases of public housing redevelopment. It represents a continuation of the author's efforts to link the socioeconomic changes affecting public housing residents to the prospects for comprehensive redevelopment (Vale 1993).

It is commonly recognized that the problems of severely distressed housing—often thought of as a matter of ill-conceived and deteriorating buildings—are also fully entwined with the socioeconomic problems of severely distressed public housing residents (Vale 1992). Eighty percent of the nonelderly public housing population lives below the poverty line, and a majority of households in big-city public housing developments are headed by unemployed single parents and report incomes below 20 percent of the local median. If public housing redevelopment efforts are to contribute to sustained improvement in the lives of such residents, their promoters will need to pursue and achieve success across multiple dimensions simultaneously.

As public housing authorities around the United States attempt to implement large grants received under the Urban Revitalization Demonstration (HOPE VI) program of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), it seems pertinent to consider the history of comprehensive attempts to revitalize severely distressed public housing.¹ In 1992, when the National

¹ In 1993 and 1994, more than two dozen public housing authorities, located mostly in the nation's largest cities, were awarded federal grants of up to \$50 million through HOPE VI. This money is intended to subsidize up to 500 units

Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH) assembled its *Case Studies and Site Examination Reports* (NCSDPH 1992b), it devoted chapters to four “turnaround” efforts thought worthy of special commendation; one of these was Boston’s Commonwealth development, built in 1951 and redeveloped between 1979 and 1985.² Of the four redevelopment programs touted by the commission, only Commonwealth’s was accomplished without total demolition of the site or wholesale restructuring of occupancy.³

What follows is an attempt to dissect and assess the reasons for Commonwealth’s widely praised success by setting this redevelopment effort in the context of the other two Boston Housing Authority (BHA) redevelopment efforts—at West Broadway and Franklin Field—that were carried out at the same time. It is hoped that the experiences of the BHA may be seen as both seminal and instructive.

Comparing public housing redevelopment potential

Close examination of the three major redevelopment efforts reveals characteristics that seem to contribute to success as well as features that seem to stymie all efforts to implement positive change. Drawing on data from 265 interviews with a broad spectrum of residents about the process of redevelopment and current conditions,⁴ as well as on other documents and interviews with designers, community organizers, managers, and

of redevelopment in a housing project judged to be “severely distressed,” according to criteria established by HUD stemming from the report of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH 1992a; see also Vale 1993). Unlike past redevelopment initiatives, in which nearly all funds were committed to the costs of physical redevelopment, HOPE VI urged public housing authorities to use 20 percent of the funds for socioeconomic development initiatives.

² The others are Steamboat Square Development in Albany, Robert B. Pitts Development in San Francisco, and Lake Parc Place in Chicago.

³ Other notable examples of similar redevelopment during the 1980s, not discussed in the commission’s book, may be found in Cambridge, MA.

⁴ The 265 interviews include those conducted with residents at two other BHA developments, Bromley Heath and Orchard Park, which had undergone no such large-scale architectural and urban design intervention. Those places are not discussed here, but they provided the author with a broader context in which to assess the three redevelopment efforts. Bromley Heath is run by the nation’s oldest tenant management corporation, and Orchard Park has recently been selected for a HOPE VI grant.

housing authority officials, this article describes and compares the effectiveness of each redevelopment effort by examining its successes and limitations from the point of view of those most affected.⁵ It attempts to explain the reasons for differential success and to explore which parts of the redevelopment efforts were most important to residents.

Given that these redevelopment efforts were centered on improvements to the physical environments of each place, this article examines how these environmental transformations are related to other kinds of necessary changes. Taking note of the extremely high costs of this sort of redevelopment effort (approximately \$100,000 per unit in today's dollars), it concludes by exploring the benefits that such expenditures can bring, while noting the ways that design-centered redevelopment approaches can fall short of the comprehensive social and economic package of change that is necessary to meet the full range of needs of an increasingly disadvantaged public housing population.

⁵ The residents interviewed constitute a stratified sample that includes approximately 10 percent of households living at the developments as of 1993. The sample includes 59 household heads from West Broadway, 35 from Franklin Field, and 41 from Commonwealth. While not sampled randomly, those interviewed are likely representative of the developments' adult populations, in terms of race, ethnicity, age, sex of household head, length of residence, location of residence within the development, and degree of participation in tenant association activities. Overall (including the respondents from Orchard Park [$n = 54$] and Bromley Heath [$n = 73$]), approximately 18 percent of those interviewed were self-identified as non-Hispanic white, 22 percent as Hispanic, 54 percent as black, and 2 percent as Asian. Twenty-seven percent reported that their major source of income came from salary, while the rest reported a variety of other sources (chiefly, Aid to Families with Dependent Children) or refused to answer. The ages of respondents ranged from 18 to 87, and 85 percent were female. Interviews were conducted in English, Spanish, Vietnamese, and Chinese by a multiracial and multiethnic group of residents trained for this purpose by the author and his assistants. All were semistructured interviews conducted on audiotape, each lasting about an hour. They involved a combination of closed- and open-ended questions. The interviewer was asked to record responses directly on the survey instrument, and the responses were verified and amplified by transcription of the tapes by the author and his assistants. The tenants' organization in each development cooperated in the interview process. The whole process was conducted almost completely independently of the BHA and its on-site management and was supported by grant money from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In addition to interviews with residents in 1992–93 and site visits beginning in 1986, interviews were conducted with the key players in each of the three redevelopment efforts, including managers, community organizers, and staff from the BHA. A full discussion of the methodology employed in this study (especially the use of residents as interviewers) is being prepared for separate publication.

There are many ways that one might compare the three redeveloped Boston housing projects under study. Franklin Field, West Broadway, and Commonwealth were built during the same period (in fact, as part of the same state-funded veterans' housing program) and were redeveloped during the same period, but they also differ in key ways that may help explain some of the difference in their redevelopment experiences (see table 1). There are differences in racial and ethnic makeup, size, building type, and form of post-redevelopment management. Moreover, each place exists in its own highly individual neighborhood context and has its own internal dynamic (figures 1 and 2). All of these factors can play some role in interpreting the trajectories of redevelopment, often in ways that are all too predictable but sometimes in ways that are counterintuitive.


Table 1. Three Boston Public Housing Developments

	Franklin Field	West Broadway	Commonwealth
Year constructed	1954	1949	1951
Dates of redevelopment	1977–87	1977–91	1979–85
No. of units (as built)	504	972	648
No. of apts. occupied (1993)	348	649	392
Building type	3-story walkup	3-story walkup	3-story walkup 6-story midrises
Racial/ethnic makeup (1993)	80% black 20% Latino	65% white 15% Latino 10% black 10% Asian	40% white 38% black 15% Latino 7% Asian
Form of management (1993)	BHA	BHA	Private

Note: BHA = Boston Housing Authority.

In December 1979, the BHA Planning Department produced a report on *Site Selection Criteria for Substantial Rehabilitation* (BHA 1979b) to identify the places where investing large amounts of money was most likely to yield success. The report compared the 10 most troubled BHA family developments (including Commonwealth, West Broadway, and Franklin Field) in terms of site accessibility, physical design, neighborhood

Figure 1. Neighborhood Location




Source: Created from block group data, 1990 U.S. census.

Note: This map of Boston (the portion north of the river at the top is part of Cambridge, and some of the wealthiest area at far left is part of Brookline) shows the location of Commonwealth (at center of top left circle) in Brighton, West Broadway (top right) in South Boston, and Franklin Field (bottom) in Dorchester. The map shows that, in each case, there is a mix of incomes within a half-mile radius of the development. However, only Commonwealth is close to predominantly middle-class residential areas. By contrast, Franklin Field, despite a pocket of higher income residents just south of the development, is near other areas of extreme poverty, and West Broadway's neighborhood may be characterized as more uniformly working class.

characteristics, and tenant characteristics, and it assessed BHA redevelopment priorities and prospects in relation to the research findings contained in HUD's national study of "troubled" public housing (Jones et al. 1979).

In terms of site accessibility, the BHA planners hypothesized that redevelopment was more likely to be successful in cases where the site was better served by transportation, shopping, recreation, and health care facilities. In terms of design, they felt more confident in the ability to effect a turnaround in cases where a development was small, lacked high-rise units, had ample parking, featured buildings with identifiable fronts and

Figure 2. Neighborhood Racial Composition



Source: Created from block group data, 1990 U.S. census.

Note: This map of Boston shows the extreme racial polarization of the city. West Broadway (top right) is located in overwhelmingly white South Boston; Franklin Field (bottom) is located in a predominantly nonwhite swath of the city; while Commonwealth (top left) is located in a mixed-race and multiethnic part of the city. Comparable maps from 1980 (not included here) reveal similar racial compositions in the three neighborhoods immediately surrounding the housing projects during the time immediately preceding redevelopment.

The Franklin Field neighborhood underwent a rapid and highly contentious white-to-black transition between 1968 and 1973, and the West Broadway project, briefly integrated by the BHA between 1965 and 1975, reverted to all white until after redevelopment because of racial harassment, when it was again integrated by the BHA during the early 1990s. The Commonwealth neighborhood, though still predominantly white, has become increasingly diversified during the last 30 years.

backs, was of relatively low density, and was amenable to greater territorial control by residents.

In terms of neighborhood characteristics, they stressed the hypothetical advantages of rising residential market values, a high percentage of owner-occupied units, a low percentage of subsidized units, low unemployment rates, and high ongoing public and private neighborhood investment. Finally, in terms of tenant characteristics, they hypothesized that redevelopment

success would be best ensured in places with a lower percentage of female-headed households, a higher percentage of working adults, and a lower percentage of minors. No judgments were made about the racial or ethnic composition of a development, though in Boston—where the BHA has faced 30 years of desegregation pressures—this remains a highly contentious issue. The BHA's assessment of the pre-redevelopment situation at Commonwealth, West Broadway, and Franklin Field relative to BHA averages for all of the above categories reveals no clear pattern (see table 2). Moreover, the assessment suggests that each of the three developments had distinctive strengths and weaknesses relative to the other two; out of 18 categories of assessment, there is not one for which all three developments are in the same place relative to the BHA average. That said, if one weighs all 18 categories equally,⁶ the composite scores show that Commonwealth (+4) ranked better than average, West Broadway scored about average (-1), and Franklin Field (-4) lagged behind BHA averages, with a score brought down by the intensity of its residents' poverty and by the perceived limitations of its neighborhood.⁷ Reflecting this, the BHA's own weighted scores for the 10 developments based on these 18 categories ranked Commonwealth second, West Broadway fifth, and Franklin Field dead last.

By the time of the BHA study, however, redevelopment efforts at West Broadway and Franklin Field were already under way and politically irreversible. There is no evidence that the housing authority regarded this one internal study as sufficient to warrant reconsidering its allocation of funds. Still, the BHA study may be seen as implying that Commonwealth was the development where comprehensive redevelopment would have the greatest impact as well as the greatest likelihood of success (BHA 1979b).

⁶ The BHA's own point system for assessing these data weighted the categories unevenly, allocating 25 percent of available points to site accessibility, 38 percent to physical design, 25 percent to neighborhood characteristics, and 12 percent to tenant characteristics. Even though this weighting favored Franklin Field (given its relatively high physical design scores and its relatively low tenant characteristics score), Franklin Field ranked last, and Commonwealth ranked at the top.

⁷ It is worth remembering, however, that all these poverty characteristics are defined within the range of the very poor; Franklin Field garnered a "minus" for its 3 percent rate of working adults, but the comparable figures—considered "average" by BHA standards—were only 14 percent for Commonwealth and 12 percent for West Broadway. Similarly, Commonwealth warranted a minus for its 94 percent rate of female-headed households, as did Franklin Field for its 92 percent rate, whereas West Broadway's 78 percent rate ranked as average—earning it the neutral (0) assessment (BHA 1979b).

Table 2. Pre-Redevelopment Characteristics of Three Developments Relative to BHA Average

	Franklin Field	West Broadway	Common- wealth
Site accessibility			
Transportation	–	+	+
Shopping	–	+	0
Recreation	0	+	0
Health care	0	0	+
Physical design			
Total no. of units	0	–	0
High-rise vs. low-rise units	0	0	–
Parking	+	–	+
Fronts and backs	+	0	0
Low density	+	0	0
Defensible edges	0	–	+
Neighborhood characteristics			
Increase in residential market values	–	0	0
High percentage of owner-occupied units	+	0	+
Low percentage of subsidized units	0	–	0
Low unemployment rate	–	0	+
Public and private investment	–	–	0
Tenant characteristics			
Female-headed households	–	0	–
Adults working	–	0	0
Low percentage of minors	–	+	0
Total (if given equal weight)	–4	–1	+4

Source: Adapted from BHA 1979b.

Note: BHA = Boston Housing Authority.

+ denotes that the development ranks well ahead of the authoritywide average.

– denotes that the development ranks well behind the authoritywide average.

0 denotes that the development approximates the authoritywide average.

The BHA did not define success, however, and the factors that might condition it—neighborhood economic health, design attributes, tenant characteristics, and the like—were thoroughly conflated in the aggregate development scores. Moreover, as the BHA planning department itself realized, many crucial aspects of comparative advantage and disadvantage at individual developments were highly subjective and interlinked and did not lend themselves easily to quantitative assessment. In addition to the 18 categories mentioned above, the BHA recognized other mitigating factors such as the presence of a strong tenant organization, evidence of influential outside neighborhood support, a record of previous or ongoing revitalization efforts, the relative

availability of state (versus federal) funds for certain developments, limitations imposed by HUD regulations on renovating certain building types, and the relative urgency of a development's physical needs.

This analysis sorts out the elements of success in public housing redevelopment and relates them to the characteristics of specific housing developments, neighborhoods, and planning processes. However, any comparative study of public housing projects is constrained by the fact that every development differs from every other in multiple ways. This study—through its careful selection of developments and its openness to the presence of multiple explanatory variables—attempts to maximize the grounds for making valid comparisons. Despite the manifold differences among Franklin Field, West Broadway, and Commonwealth, many characteristics of their baseline pre-redevelopment conditions and the subsequent approaches to redevelopment seem similar enough to make a comparative study plausible. The three each received approximately \$30 million⁸ that was spent primarily on enlarging and upgrading apartments, reconfiguring buildings, and relandscaping and restructuring the site. A central goal of these revitalization efforts, though not always explicitly stated, was to eliminate the institutional features that had worked to stigmatize these places (see Vale 1996, forthcoming).

Conditions before redevelopment

Fifteen years ago, when work on the redevelopment got under way, the tasks seemed as overwhelming as those facing housing authorities today. In 1979, by anyone's definition, these developments were "severely distressed," characterized by rapidly escalating vacancy rates and plagued by vandalism and violence.⁹ By

⁸ Commonwealth received \$31.6 million for 392 units, Franklin Field received approximately \$26 million for 346 units, and West Broadway received about \$26.5 million, which was expected to cover only the first phases of the redevelopment, with the full costs estimated to exceed \$60 million (Massachusetts Executive Office of Communities and Development 1990). Per-unit total redevelopment costs were in the range of \$75,000 to \$80,000 (all figures here are in 1983 dollars).

⁹ In 1979, in an internal document, the BHA assigned all of its developments to four categories: sound, slipping, in danger, or seriously distressed. Commonwealth, Franklin Field, and West Broadway were all included in the last category, along with 10 other family developments (BHA 1979c). For detailed accounts of the devastated conditions at West Broadway and Commonwealth at the end of the 1970s, see Vale (1995, forthcoming). These two other articles, as well as a forthcoming book, provide much more comprehensive discussion of the redevelopment efforts at those two places than is possible here.

the time redevelopment efforts started, Franklin Field, West Broadway (then known as D Street), and Commonwealth (then known as Fidelis Way) all had vacancy rates of between 30 and 50 percent, involving scattered unusable apartments and abandonment of entire buildings (Carr, Lynch Associates and Wallace, Floyd Associates 1982; Community Planning and Research 1979; Lane, Frenchman, & Associates and Goody, Clancy, & Associates 1981).

Moreover, the conditions at individual developments were a product of a system in disarray. Even after tenant-initiated lawsuits had finally resulted in assignment of a court-appointed master to oversee the operations of the BHA after 1975, the pattern of institutional corruption continued unabated despite the master's best efforts. In 1979, the BHA was put into court-ordered receivership, seen as a last desperate measure to gain some relief for the tenant plaintiffs (Schneiderman 1982). As the judge who ordered the receivership observed, the failures of management entailed horrific consequences for Boston's public housing tenants:

The conditions in the BHA's family developments are depressingly similar irrespective of the deterioration or absence of deterioration in the surrounding neighborhoods. Those tenants [including residents of Commonwealth, West Broadway, and Franklin Field] who testified did so concerning the physical conditions of their apartments and of their developments generally. Their testimony, again incontroverted, of leaky ceilings, of frequent cessation of such basic services as heat, hot water and electricity, of windows which do not open in hot weather and which cannot be closed in cold weather, of infestation of rodents and insects, of mounds of rubbish and trash, of packs of wild dogs and of much more remind one of casualty lists in wartime. One's sensibilities become saturated until one realizes that each and every name on the casualty list represents a human tragedy. In recent years it seems that if the media requires a housing horror story to fill air time or newspaper space, one is guaranteed such a story by trekking to almost any of the BHA's family developments and to many of its elderly developments. (Garrity 1979, 102)

What followed during the next five years, under the celebrated leadership of receiver Harry Spence (Cohen 1981; Lovinger 1981; Pynoos 1986), was an attempt to tackle three of the more egregious failures of this system by allocating substantial and

disproportionate resources to the redevelopment efforts at Commonwealth, West Broadway, and Franklin Field.¹⁰

Approaching comprehensive redevelopment

The physical redevelopment goals at all three sites, though carried out by different teams of designers, shared many principles. At the level of the apartment design (which was the primary concern of most residents, at least at the beginning), there were several goals, nearly all of which were carried out to some extent at all three housing developments. Apartments were enlarged¹¹ and reconfigured to match family size, using both vertical and horizontal breakthroughs. Dining areas were increased to accommodate all family members eating at once, and a separate entrance vestibule with closet was added to provide privacy for the living room. Second bathrooms were added to larger apartments, and individual washer and dryer hookups were provided in many cases. At a more conceptual level, apartments were given a clearly defined front and rear, with living rooms facing the front and more service-oriented rooms facing the rear, and new semiprivate front stoops and back yards were added to encourage families to regard more of their environment as being under their own control and management.

At the level of individual buildings, there were also attempts to make public housing resemble more closely the private housing stock. Many of the multibedroom apartments were reconfigured into two-story or three-story pseudo-rowhouses, allowing for

¹⁰ A fourth initiative that gained momentum during the receivership was the largest turnaround effort of all—the \$250 million transformation of Boston’s notorious Columbia Point project into Harbor Point, a mixed-income, privately developed community. Harbor Point no longer formally serves as public housing, although 400 of its 1,283 units are reserved for low-income families; the rest rent at market rate. Since it involved such irreducibly complex financing and was located on a uniquely attractive waterfront site, this project was not included in the present study, although it certainly represents a plausible alternative approach to public housing redevelopment.

¹¹ As built, the apartments in these developments fell well below the current HUD minimum square footages for the various bedroom-unit sizes. During redevelopment, BHA planners elected to approximate the more generous “contemporary design standards” used by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency for its subsidized mixed-income units. This decision resulted in apartments that may well be larger than the average for market-rate units in the city. In contrast to the strict limitations placed on public housing when it was built, the goal here seems to have been to avoid anything that signaled “minimum standards,” in terms of either appearance or amenities. These design specifications, of course, did not necessarily entail the management and community improvements crucial to desirable living environments.

larger apartments and clearer division between sleeping and living areas. In this process, common stairwells, seen as overcrowded and unsupervisable, were substantially eliminated, as was free access to roofs from stair landings, which had been a security risk. The new reconfiguration into apartments resembling town houses allowed for many units to gain private entrances and direct ground floor access through both front and back doors. At West Broadway, the accommodation of middle-class building imagery even entailed the construction of pitched roofs on both the rowhouses and suburban-esque village community centers.

Finally, at the level of urban design and site planning, the designers also attempted to reduce the stigma associated with the housing developments as separate enclaves. In each case, this was done by decreasing overall density. The number of units was reduced both by reconfiguring them into fewer, larger apartments and by replacing some buildings or apartments with nonresidential community facilities. In contrast to the goals of some housing authorities to reinforce the separateness of the development by constructing perimeter fencing, the Boston plans all involved greater inclusion of the surrounding streets instead of continued reliance on a superblock. This feature was combined with concerted efforts to control and direct the presence of cars by separating them from pedestrians and providing parking near dwelling entrances, thereby allowing vehicle surveillance and easy access. Extensive relandscaping was done to extend residents' control over space outside their apartments by providing a variety of traversable, semitraversable, and nontraversable barriers. Play areas were delineated for different age groups, including hard and soft surfaces, with paved areas for above-ground tenant-owned wading pools, wide sidewalks, and other kinds of less obviously "purpose-built" places.

At all levels of design, then, the shapers of these redevelopment efforts seem to have drawn on many of the "defensible space" principles first articulated by Oscar Newman and others (Chermayeff and Alexander 1965; Coleman 1985; Jacobs 1961; Newman 1972, 1980).¹² This was no accident. In 1980, just as the

¹² Since these efforts, defensible space theory seems to have become even more widely implemented. It is fundamental to city and state guidelines such as those contained in the *Redevelopment Handbook* produced by the Massachusetts Executive Office of Communities and Development (1990). The handbook has been touted by the NCSDPH (1992a, 1992b), is heavily funded through HUD's HOPE VI grants, and was championed by HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros (1995) in a widely distributed booklet. The 1980s Boston redevelopment schemes, then, portended something of a national trend.

planning efforts for Commonwealth, Franklin Field, and West Broadway were gearing up, BHA design consultant Gayle Epp was commissioned to write a thorough overview of this emerging literature. Harry Spence set up an environment of thoughtful, careful decision making, Epp recalls, marveling that “this very academic piece . . . was the subject of a whole senior staff meeting” (Epp 1994). What Oscar Newman had proposed, the BHA—using a variety of experienced architecture and urban design firms—chose to extend and apply.¹³

Measuring and explaining seven kinds of success

As already noted, success in redevelopment efforts may be measured in many ways and may be an indication of many different things. It is not only that individuals and groups involved in these ventures may use widely differing criteria for evaluation; it is also that these criteria and goals for redevelopment efforts seem rarely to be set out explicitly. As a consequence, even when there is a consensus that a redevelopment effort has been a success or a failure, there is often less consensus about how or why this is so. The range of definitions of success is accompanied by a range of attempts to explain it. Interviews with a wide range of individuals associated with each of these redevelopment efforts, including tenants, managers, designers, housing authority officials, service providers, and community organizers, suggest at least seven kinds of success:

1. Smooth implementation
2. Recognized design quality
3. Improved tenant organization capacity
4. Enhanced maintenance and management performance
5. Improved security
6. Progress on socioeconomic development
7. Resident satisfaction

Certainly, some individuals judge success by many of these measures rather than only one, yet personal and professional identities often dictate the lens through which the

¹³ Most of the ideas used in the BHA redevelopment efforts (and in their counterparts in Cambridge) had been discussed or implemented elsewhere, though chiefly with new construction. Most earlier public housing *redevelopment* stressed the site design aspects of defensible space but fell short of the more radical (and expensive) gutting of buildings that allowed for the substantial elimination of common hallways and the creation of private entrances. For discussion of the benefits and limitations of such design interventions, see Vale (1995, 1996, forthcoming). See also Franck and Mostoller (1995).

redevelopment is seen. Moreover, the reasons that individuals give to explain success according to one or more of these measures are closely linked to such personal stakes and institutional affiliations. Each of these measures exists as a continuum, and evidence of progress—in almost every case—is rarely collected or assessed.¹⁴ In the end, however, true institutional learning—the capacity to fix problems in midstream and to do better next time—depends on such reflective assessment and on a consolidated and holistic view of success. Each of these forms of success matters.

What follows is an articulation of the seven measures of success as applied to the redevelopment efforts at Commonwealth, West Broadway, and Franklin Field.

Smooth implementation

For many housing authority officials, particularly those in a construction management division, the overriding challenge is to get the job done, and the key measure of success is adherence to budgets and timetables. Success means coping with strict budgetary constraints and managing the complex processes of construction and resident relocation. Anything resembling a full account of the three redevelopment implementation processes at Commonwealth, West Broadway, and Franklin Field is far too involved for inclusion here, though a few key points may be set out. All three redevelopment efforts experienced costly delays and were compromised by the limitations of their budgets.

At West Broadway, the redevelopment was carried out in phases. It was clear from the beginning that the initial funding was insufficient to carry out a comprehensive redevelopment of the whole 972-unit state-owned project. Rather than scale back the intervention by eliminating the dramatic reconfiguration of the buildings, the BHA chose to work intensively on limited areas of the project at a time. Predictably, perhaps, the money needed to complete the last phase of the redevelopment has not been forthcoming. Nearly 15 years after it began, approximately 80 percent of West Broadway has been redeveloped, but the remainder (mostly still inhabited) still looks as it did during the late 1970s (see figures 3 and 4). The result has been not only a physical problem but a severe social problem: The obvious inequities were

¹⁴ Part of the problem is also lack of accurate or comprehensive data. In 1992, the NCSDPH noted that HUD provided data for only 3 of the 13 measures of “severe distress” that the commission believed should be quantified and tracked (NCSDPH 1992a; see also Vale 1992, 1993).

Figure 3. Site Conditions at the West Broadway Development Prior to Redevelopment (c. 1981)



Source: Stephen E. Tise, A.I.A.

Note: This view shows the deterioration of the landscaping, in which all outdoor space is fully public and automobiles move freely across the project.

exacerbated by the mid-redevelopment attempt to integrate this previously all-white project, during which some white long-term residents still living in the old part have had to watch as new, nonwhite arrivals have been given renovated apartments in the redeveloped sections. In short, failure to find funds to complete the redevelopment has compromised its success.

At Commonwealth, too, there were delays and cost overruns, and all parties concede that the private developer, John M. Corcoran & Company, lost money on this turnkey venture.¹⁵ Nonetheless,

¹⁵ Under the turnkey process, Commonwealth's emptied buildings were turned over to a private developer, who executed the rehabilitation according to a detailed agreement and then sold the revitalized development back to the BHA. By temporarily removing the development from the public sector, the turnkey process allowed the housing authority to use advantageous construction financing terms available from the Massachusetts Housing Finance Authority and to bypass the expense of the public bidding process and union regulations. Although the BHA had developed more than 2,500 units of housing under the turnkey process between 1970 and 1981, most of this was for scattered-site housing and elderly housing, and Commonwealth was to become the single largest such effort (BHA 1981).

Figure 4. West Broadway Transformed

Note: The imagery of the renovated buildings attempts to eliminate the institutional features of the original structures.

all concur that this was still the redevelopment effort that proceeded most smoothly. In fact, all the key players in the Commonwealth redevelopment effort seem to regard it as a high point in their professional careers. By contrast, the redevelopment effort at Franklin Field was the one that suffered the most setbacks, including the bankruptcy of the major contractor. There were tensions over the budget from the beginning, and tenants frequently mentioned ways that their raised expectations were frustrated by the elimination of favored amenities and by shoddy construction. Here, even though nearly a decade has passed since the redevelopment was finished, most long-term residents and others who were interviewed still feel bitter. Tenants who were frustrated veterans of the redevelopment wars complained about a low level of resident influence, while interviews with several of the redevelopment planners invariably turned to a discussion of what went wrong; no one attempted to defend either the process or the end product.

Interviews with key players reveal diverse explanations for the wide variation of quality in the three redevelopment processes. Some stress the relative strength of political connections, which

clearly favored West Broadway and Commonwealth. Local newspaper accounts provide some insight into the ways that powerful neighborhood politicians in South Boston championed West Broadway as a candidate for redevelopment, just as they had influenced early decisions to site a disproportionate share of Boston's public housing in their neighborhood when that housing was first built and was seen as a desirable amenity. Moreover, the court-appointed master, Robert Whittlesey, went out of his way to tout the redevelopment potential of West Broadway (as well as Commonwealth) in his July 1976 report (Whittlesey 1976), and the West Broadway tenants' association engaged excellent outside community development and design consultants, who initially worked pro bono.

In 1977, armed with an arsenal of connections and a clearly demonstrable need, West Broadway was awarded an initial \$6.5 million pilot modernization grant from the Massachusetts Executive Office of Communities and Development. This gave it a head start in the competition for redevelopment funds when Spence launched the BHA's full-scale efforts in 1980. However, because West Broadway was located in an overwhelmingly white neighborhood in the city, there was pressure to award money also to a housing development serving a primarily nonwhite community. This, according to several sources, is why Franklin Field (now approximately 80 percent African American and 20 percent Latino) received a pilot grant. And, in turn, the pilot grant was the main reason Franklin Field was chosen for large-scale redevelopment, even though it had ranked last according to the BHA planning department's *Site Selection Criteria for Substantial Rehabilitation* (BHA 1976b). In this context, while it is not clear whether one should interpret Franklin Field's inclusion in the redevelopment program as evidence of political strength or political weakness, it seems important to reiterate that the BHA *began* the Franklin Field redevelopment process with the recognition that it was the least likely to succeed.

Commonwealth's relative political clout seems to have come about less because of state house connections (although these were ample) than because of its location on a highly desirable parcel of land. Before the BHA's decision to seek substantial funding for its redevelopment, Commonwealth not only had Whittlesey's attention and blessing but was already the subject of two lengthy planning reports funded by a state grant. One of these focused on financial issues and confirmed that Commonwealth, unlike other public housing projects, has excellent real estate redevelopment potential by virtue of its hilltop location,

its surrounding middle-class residential and institutional community, and its proximity to transit (Walsh & Associates 1979).

Just after these reports were completed, a large parcel of land adjacent to Commonwealth was proposed for sale, and the Boston Redevelopment Authority established a task force to assist it with coordinating all planning and development in the area known as Monastery Hill, including Commonwealth. Though this task force ultimately did not get to plan the future of Monastery Hill as a whole, it did serve as a major catalyst for the Commonwealth redevelopment. Its diverse membership, bringing together representatives from all the city and state planning, funding, and regulatory agencies and a broad array of neighborhood agencies and groups—including representatives from both the Commonwealth Tenants Association and the project-based Commonwealth Health Improvement Program—provided a highly public platform for discussing the needs of the development and its residents, a forum unparalleled and unprecedented in the city (see Vale 1996). As a result, by the time the BHA was ready to commence its three large redevelopment efforts, Commonwealth had emerged as a clear priority, especially since—in stark contrast to Franklin Field—it ranked as most likely to succeed in the BHA's own internal judgment.

There is, however, another persuasive explanation for the success of Commonwealth's redevelopment process. Some key players (even in the BHA itself) attribute the superior performance of the Commonwealth process to the presence of an outside private developer who, under the turnkey process, was able to bypass some of the constraints associated with the usual public bidding process. But the act of privatization of the development process is not the only issue. Through the extremely fine detail included in its *Commonwealth Developer's Kit* (BHA 1981) and through the careful process by which six creditable proposals from developers were scrutinized and evaluated, the BHA served as a highly active player throughout the process. Delegation to the private sector did not entail abrogation of responsibility.

While local political influence is surely central to getting redevelopment projects launched, and while the ability to employ a private developer for Commonwealth seems to have been important, some key players in the redevelopment efforts attribute the success of Commonwealth to less tangible factors. Several participants in the Commonwealth redevelopment effort spoke of it as a kind of "confluence of personalities," one that was not matched elsewhere. It is not fully clear how to interpret this, since the confluence may well be a result of other successful

aspects of the process, rather than the cause. The relative quality of the relationship among the various parties during the process does seem to be a key indicator of problems. During the course of the Franklin Field redevelopment, especially, there were many open conflicts about how to proceed and an undesirably large number of turnovers of leadership among on-site management, tenant organizers, BHA redevelopment staff, and resident leaders. Part of this “confluence of personalities” explanation also seems rooted in the presence of specific strong leaders—whether tenants, consultants, or housing authority personnel.

Clearly, successful project management during planning and construction is one kind of success, and it may well be a good predictor of others. Yet, while it does expedite completion, this form of success does not necessarily lead to sustainable positive change. Because the research reported here continued for a decade after post-redevelopment reoccupancy, it is possible to go beyond analysis of implementation to examine how well the redevelopment efforts have been received and sustained.

Recognized design quality

In addition to the central concerns about the time and money involved in a redevelopment process, almost everyone in a housing authority is concerned about the quality of the resultant product—the redeveloped housing. Designers (and those who work in design, development, and planning sections of housing authorities) tend to measure this quality by the number and kind of awards that professional societies confer on these ventures. Commonwealth and West Broadway each won multiple regional and national design and planning awards, while Franklin Field won none.¹⁶

¹⁶ The West Broadway Comprehensive Renewal Program, a joint venture of Lane, Frenchman, & Associates, Inc., and Goody, Clancy, & Associates, Inc., won the American Planning Association’s citation as “most outstanding project in the nation,” a *Progressive Architecture* citation for urban design excellence, and an American Institute of Architects national award for excellence in urban design. Commonwealth—a collaboration of developer John M. Corcoran & Company and architects Tise, Wilhelm, & Associates—was featured in the NCSDPH (1992b) case studies book and received an Urban Design Award from the Boston Society of Architects in 1985, a Governor’s Design Award in 1986, a Merit Award for landscaping for multifamily housing from the Boston Society of Landscape Architects in 1987, and the Urban Land Institute’s 1989 Award for Excellence in the category of Rehabilitation Development. The Franklin Field redevelopment was a joint venture between Carr, Lynch Associates Inc. and Wallace, Floyd Associates Inc.

More immediately, design quality is measured every day by residents. In our interviews, 81 long-term residents of West Broadway, Commonwealth, and Franklin Field (i.e., those who had lived in one of these places both before and after its redevelopment) were asked to discuss the “most important” physical changes that resulted from the redevelopment. In each case, more tenants stressed changes that had taken place *within their apartments* than any other kind of change. Overall, 44 percent of the most important changes were thought to be apartment centered, 38 percent were building centered, and only 18 percent were site related or programming related.¹⁷

Most of the changes noted as most important by residents at each development involved such details as larger rooms, more convenient layouts, better kitchen facilities, second bathrooms in larger apartments, and the addition of laundry hookups. Only slightly less central were changes at the scale of individual buildings, such as private entrances, reduction or elimination of common hallways, private yards, elimination of flat roofs (at West Broadway), and better overall appearance. While many residents—especially at Commonwealth—also mentioned site-level improvements such as landscaping, improved parking areas, children’s play areas, and new community buildings, these matters were less frequently commented on than changes closer to individual apartments. Resident priorities suggest a considerable desire for expensive changes—involving gutting buildings and reconfiguring them to resemble town houses, maximizing private entrances, and minimizing common hallways.

Design quality may be measured in other ways beyond overtly voiced resident priorities. Perhaps the most significant are the ways that design interventions improve the image of public housing in the eyes of residents, neighbors, and the general public whose political representatives ultimately decide its future funding. Design awards, usually conferred not long after occupancy (if not before it), rarely take into account the social effects of public housing design that ultimately form its most enduring legacy.

Interview respondents from the three developments were asked whether they believed that the development where they lived looked like public housing. Nearly three-quarters of respondents from Commonwealth indicated that they did not think so, markedly higher than the comparable figures for West Broadway and

¹⁷ Tables of development-specific responses to the various issues raised in the interviews are available from the author, and some appear in an earlier version of this article (Vale 1994).

Franklin Field. This is true even though Commonwealth has many midrise elevator buildings—usually the most stigmatized form of public housing—whereas the other two developments are all three-story walkups.¹⁸ In other words, the fact that only one-quarter of respondents believed that Commonwealth still looked like public housing is especially impressive, since its redesigners arguably had more stigma to overcome.¹⁹

At West Broadway, despite some elaborate attempts to deinstitutionalize its appearance, involving the replacement of flat roofs with pitched ones, this image transformation ranked less well than Commonwealth's—40 percent of respondents still said the redeveloped parts looked like public housing. And at Franklin Field, although its buildings were reconfigured in ways similar to the approach at Commonwealth and West Broadway, fully two-thirds of respondents reported that it still looked like public housing. The extreme variation of responses, in itself, does not prove that design changes affect resident attitudes toward their environments, yet residents' explanations of *why* the public housing look persists or has dissipated do suggest powerful ways that design issues are interwoven with other social matters where architects and urban designers exert far less control.

At West Broadway, for example, most respondents chose to make a clear differentiation between those parts of the development that had been redesigned and those parts that remained physically unaltered. The new buildings were described as looking like “town houses” or “condos” or “individual homes,” “a nice complex,” “more like a development,” and “less like projects and more like private homes” (see Vale 1995). Still, as elsewhere, a substantial minority of respondents from West Broadway were not convinced that the redevelopment had done much to change

¹⁸ If one compares the results of the interviews at the three redeveloped sites with the responses from residents at a conspicuously non-redeveloped site—Orchard Park—the contrast is even more striking: Fully 92 percent of Orchard Park respondents said that their project looked like public housing.

¹⁹ Of course, since there was no comparable survey that asked this question prior to redevelopment, it is conceivable that Commonwealth residents felt less stigmatized by their surroundings even before redevelopment, perhaps for reasons of neighborhood rather than architecture. Yet, given that the physical conditions at Commonwealth at its nadir were arguably even worse than those at the other places, it seems logical to credit the redevelopment effort with fostering improvement in residents' perceptions about their environment, especially given the amplifications and explanations offered by residents during the interviews. See Vale (forthcoming) for a longer discussion of whether it is possible to destigmatize public housing.

the character of the development: “[You] still can tell it’s public housing”; “it’s still a project”; “it all look[s] alike.” Another respondent, acknowledging that the renovated sections look “less” like public housing, noted that “people still know it’s public housing. They know we’re here” (cited in Vale 1995). Much of the dissociation from public housing seems to stem from the acts of designers who reconfigured the buildings and relandscaped the site, but a lot of the look of the place seems to be its social appearance. One person explained why she thought Commonwealth did not look like public housing by noting that “people are calm and you don’t see them disturbing others on the sidewalks.” In the end, there is a merging of these social and physical explanations, since the redevelopment efforts are social processes as well as physical ones, and they yield social as well as physical results (see Vale forthcoming).

The success of the design aspect of a redevelopment process has many other social features. Elaborate rehabilitation of buildings necessitates resident relocation, which in turn provides an opportunity for restructuring occupancy before the redeveloped apartments are rerented.²⁰ More directly, the success of design processes may be measured by their ability to incorporate resident input in significant ways. Rather than simply choosing the colors of kitchen counters and the like, in some cases resident influence over design decisions carried considerably broader import. At West Broadway, for instance, residents succeeded in reversing the BHA plan to begin the phased redevelopment in the most publicly visible place. Instead, they convincingly argued, the redevelopment should begin at the rear, so that the eyesore of the front would remain as a testament to the continuing need for new funds to complete subsequent phases. Design, in this sense, is tenant organizing carried out by other means.

Improved tenant organization capacity

For community organizers and for many tenants, a key dimension of success in public housing redevelopment is just this—

²⁰ In each redevelopment case, the process for rehousing current residents was a major point of contention. Temporary relocation was necessary, whether on site or off site, but the vast majority of residents were able to return after redevelopment—in many cases to locations close to their original apartments and neighbors. At Commonwealth, for instance, some problem families were weeded out through a one-time offer of a housing voucher, and all families who wished to return had to agree to abide by an expanded set of development rules and to commit to a rent arrears repayment plan. In no case was the restructuring of occupancy as extreme as that practiced in places where a major goal of redevelopment is income mixing.

helping the residents become active and influential decision makers in their developments and build their skills to attract additional resources. In each of the three Boston redevelopment cases, housing officials recognized from the outset that such transformations could not simply be imposed on residents but must emerge through negotiation. In two of the three cases, those at West Broadway and Commonwealth, the redesign efforts were preceded by years of resident organizing. Only at Franklin Field, where the redevelopment ultimately proved far less successful in most other dimensions as well, was resident involvement more limited and more belated.

At both West Broadway and Commonwealth, however, the role of the tenants was central. In the interviews conducted in 1993, residents who lived through the redevelopment processes were asked to name those they believed were most important to the process. The results are quite revealing. At both Commonwealth and West Broadway, more than 80 percent of respondents stated that the tenants themselves played the leading role. At Franklin Field, however, only 39 percent gave credit to the tenants, and the majority credited (or blamed) either the on-site management or the BHA for the redevelopment. Moreover, all those at Franklin Field who did credit the tenants credited only “tenant leaders,” rather than a broader spectrum of tenant involvement as the Commonwealth and West Broadway respondents often did. Clearly, something went right at Commonwealth and West Broadway that did not happen at Franklin Field. As one of the BHA staff members responsible for coordinating the Franklin Field redevelopment recalled,

the tenant organization [at Franklin Field] wasn’t terribly strong. There wasn’t a long-standing tenant advocacy group the way there was at Commonwealth and D Street. It was one that we at the BHA had to foster and develop the leadership. Because we wanted tenant involvement, we had to have someone to talk to. And so it was more of a top-down situation, as opposed to the other two which were much more bottom-up, people saying “we want to be redeveloped,” and pushing themselves to the forefront. (Gilmore 1994)

While there were almost certainly some tenants at Franklin Field who saw themselves as key players in the redevelopment, it seems significant that at least some in the housing authority saw the task of building links to the tenants as a process of inventing someone to talk to.

While it cannot be denied that it was Spence, as receiver, who masterminded the innovative redevelopment schemes discussed here, the degree of tenant involvement at all levels of decision making remains striking. It is not so much that there were so many tenants involved—like most tenant organizations, the efforts at Commonwealth and West Broadway were led by a few committed individuals, though many meetings did attract dozens, if not hundreds, of participants. More than mere numbers, what seems key is the degree to which the redevelopment efforts at these two places were carried out as true partnerships between tenant associations and the housing authority. Rather than simply receive the wisdom of professionals, for instance, the residents hired their own architectural consultants to clarify, defend, and advance tenant interests.

This kind of initiative went beyond design issues as well. At Commonwealth, the tenants association actually entered into a binding agreement with the housing authority and a private management company. This agreement continues to govern the post-redevelopment management of the development and allows the tenants to fire the management with 30 days' notice (Commonwealth Tenants Association, BHA, and Corcoran Management Company 1983). In short, though the vast majority of the money in these redevelopment efforts was spent on physical improvements, a great deal of the time was spent on improving the climate of negotiation in ways that made clear the value of resident input. Just as the physical design alteration was intended to normalize the appearance of the housing, so too the redevelopment process was intended to lessen the social costs of distant and top-down management.

Enhanced maintenance and management performance

For many in housing authorities and other housing development organizations, the key measure of success in public housing is always management. Measuring the success of management is, in part, a matter of tracking the performance of "official" maintenance and management entities, such things as work order turnaround times. But it is also a matter of assessing the relationship that is built (or rebuilt) between the representatives of management and the tenants themselves. Here, taking account of both quantifiable assessments and the more intangible accounts of tenant-management relationships, the interviews with

residents clearly suggest that the privately managed Commonwealth has fared best.²¹

When respondents were asked whether they had experienced problems with the response time of maintenance since the redevelopment, only 10 percent of those at Commonwealth reported problems with Corcoran Management Company, compared with more than one-third at West Broadway and nearly two-thirds at Franklin Field, both of which were still managed by the BHA. The post-redevelopment maintenance problems at Franklin Field were reported to be even greater than those prevailing at the two non-redeveloped sites where interviews were also conducted. BHA-supplied statistics regarding outstanding work orders suggest that these perceptions are not without substance. At the end of 1992, shortly before the interviews were conducted, the quarterly total of outstanding work orders revealed a service backlog of 182 orders at Franklin Field, 319 at West Broadway (including the non-redeveloped part), and only 2 at Commonwealth (BHA 1993b).

When residents were asked about the maintenance of the development as a whole, a similar pattern prevailed. Respondents were asked to rank maintenance in terms of several components: grass, trees, and flowers; dumpster areas; parking areas; and overall cleanliness. When the responses to these are combined to yield an aggregate measure, only at Commonwealth and at West Broadway (despite the fact that the redevelopment there remains incomplete) did a majority of respondents report that development maintenance was either good or very good. Here, too, Franklin Field lagged behind. Like respondents from the two non-redeveloped sites, most Franklin Field respondents rated project maintenance as fair or poor.

The superior performance of Commonwealth's management on maintenance issues is all the more remarkable when compared with pre-redevelopment conditions. Surveys of Commonwealth

²¹ Though it was the BHA's decision to go with private management, it was a decision that tenants wholeheartedly endorsed. Beyond the shift to private management, the tenants also wanted to play a substantial role in management themselves—though they evinced little interest in taking on responsibility for day-to-day operations (Commonwealth Tenants Association Management Committee 1981). Commonwealth's tenants have therefore been able to exert a high degree of control over management without attempting to form a tenant management corporation themselves. As of 1995, though some tenant leaders do discuss the possibility of resident management for Commonwealth in the future as a way of removing the influence of the BHA, even this "tenant management" might well involve continuing to contract for management services from a private company such as Corcoran.

residents carried out in 1979 (near the nadir of the pre-redevelopment conditions) and again in 1993 (after nearly a decade of reoccupancy) suggest the magnitude of change that has occurred.²² In 1979, three-quarters of the respondents complained about the inability of maintenance staff to address problems in their apartments; in 1993, only 10 percent indicated that they had experienced any problems with maintenance. Since this measure is taken nearly a full decade after the completion of the redevelopment, and since the 1993 survey was conducted during a time when the Corcoran Management Company was arguing that the BHA provided Commonwealth with a disproportionately low subsidy, the relatively low level of complaint combined with a superb record in the turnaround of work orders surely provides compelling testimony that Commonwealth's management has been in good hands.²³

What such numbers do not do is offer an *explanation* for this "good" management; most of those at the BHA are personally and institutionally reluctant to say that the Corcoran Management Company succeeds at Commonwealth because it is a private and for-profit organization. All parties do concur that much of the management success at Commonwealth comes from setting and enforcing high standards and from having maintenance carried out by on-site staff trained in multiple trades, rather than—as with the BHA—by centrally administered specialists who work according to union regulations (see Vale 1996).

At base, Corcoran Management Company succeeds because Commonwealth's residents helped negotiate the terms of the 223-page management plan that remains a reference point for an enormous range of matters (Commonwealth Tenants Association,

²² The two surveys, conducted in 1979 by Community Planning and Research, Inc., and in 1993 by a team under the author's supervision, asked several questions that were phrased and coded identically and reflect remarkably comparable samples. Both were stratified by race, ethnicity, and sex and accurately reflected the breakdown of those living at the development at the time; both used adult respondents with a broad range of ages and length of residency in the development. The 1979 sample contained 80 respondents, representing about 30 percent of the households then living on site, whereas the 1993 sample contained 41 respondents, comprising about 11 percent of households.

²³ As further testimony to the quality of Corcoran's maintenance record at Commonwealth, it is worth noting that Commonwealth is three years older than Franklin Field and, since its redevelopment effort was completed first, might be expected to be the most likely to show signs of decline, rather than the least. Also, unlike those of West Broadway and Franklin Field, many of Commonwealth's buildings have elevators, often a major maintenance problem in public housing.

BHA, and Corcoran Management Company 1983). Tenants at Commonwealth get not just a lease but a set of community rules formulated by their fellow tenants and a commitment by the management to undertake a detailed preventive maintenance program, with written standards for corrective maintenance procedures, janitorial service, and grounds maintenance. At the same time, the management plan describes eviction procedures and spells out charges for damage to apartments. Interviews suggest that Corcoran Management Company and most Commonwealth residents have accepted a sense of coresponsibility for upkeep and behavior in the development; after more than a decade of partnership between residents and management, both groups seem committed to maintaining and enforcing high standards.

Improved security

Some who participated in the redevelopment efforts argue that, beyond issues of management and maintenance, any determination of redevelopment success must be measured against the security problems that have plagued much of the nation's inner-city public housing stock in recent years. In this sense, success has to do with the ability of residents and management to cope not only with problems internal to a development but also with external forces (such as gangs) whose incursions thwart its manageability. More broadly, this view of success asks that one take into account the socioeconomic context of each redevelopment when attempting comparisons. Socioeconomic trends in surrounding neighborhoods may either help residents of a public housing development change in positive ways or hinder such growth. In this regard, many involved with the redevelopment efforts in Boston emphasize that Commonwealth is located in a stable, economically diverse neighborhood with excellent public transportation access, whereas the pre-redevelopment Franklin Field was one "distressed" piece of a broader distressed neighborhood and remains part of an area that has experienced still further impoverishment and disinvestment since the completion of the redevelopment effort.

When respondents were asked in 1993 whether they believed that most people in the surrounding neighborhoods were "better off than, worse off than, or about the same" as they were 10 years ago, all 23 of the long-term Commonwealth residents who responded to the question indicated that neighborhood residents were better off or about the same; only 46 percent of Franklin Field residents were so sanguine. Respondents were

also asked to rank their sense of security as “very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe” in a wide variety of settings in and around the development, ranging outward from the interior of their apartments.²⁴ Two-thirds of respondents from Franklin Field said that they felt somewhat unsafe or very unsafe going into the surrounding neighborhoods at night, whereas only 10 percent of Commonwealth respondents and about one-third of West Broadway respondents felt that way. Even during the daytime, only 14 percent of Franklin Field respondents said that they felt very safe traveling to neighborhoods immediately outside of the development. By contrast, the majority of respondents from both Commonwealth and West Broadway did report feeling very safe in their neighborhoods during the daytime.

Boston Police Department data on reported crimes in Boston housing developments confirm that residents’ perceptions are rooted in reality (Boston Police Department 1994). The number of crimes per occupied unit was far lower at Commonwealth, where, taking an annual average for the years 1991 to 1993, there was about one reported crime for every five apartments. At West Broadway there was approximately one reported crime for every two apartments and at Franklin Field approximately two crimes for every three apartments, somewhat higher than the authoritywide mean. Even Franklin Field, however, had fewer reported crimes than some other BHA developments, where, over the 1991–93 period, the annual average of reported crimes exceeded one per apartment.

Such statistics do not distinguish between crimes committed by outsiders and those committed by development residents and therefore do not provide direct evidence of neighborhood problems, yet it seems likely that much of the crime in public housing is related to troubled surrounding areas. This “neighborhood effects” explanation, in turn, makes clear that some measures of redevelopment success have little to do with the bricks-and-mortar investment that required the vast majority of the money.

When residents were asked to name whom they feared most while living in their developments, the most common answer given by respondents from Commonwealth and West Broadway was “nobody”; but for Franklin Field respondents, the most common response was “gangs.” On average, respondents from each development said that they felt safer inside their

²⁴ Residents’ interpretations of the terms “safe” and “unsafe” may well vary considerably, of course, with residents having different expectations for their own security.

development than they did in the neighborhoods surrounding it, both during the day and at night. Yet, in some places, this reveals little more than the fact that, for many, security was a problem everywhere around them. Even during daylight hours, at Franklin Field only 20 percent of respondents reported feeling very safe in their development, compared with 61 percent of those at West Broadway and 80 percent of those at Commonwealth. At night, only 3 percent of respondents from Franklin Field reported feeling very safe in the development as a whole, and fully 41 percent said they felt very unsafe. At West Broadway, too, perceptions of nighttime safety dipped—only 28 percent reported feeling very safe. Only at Commonwealth did a majority of respondents (66 percent) indicate that they felt very safe in their development after dark, though at least a narrow majority at each place did say they felt very safe within their own apartments at night.

Resident insecurity, both inside and outside their developments, was almost invariably attributed to the presence of drug trafficking, often closely associated in respondents' minds with gangs and violence. Even at Commonwealth, despite its many successes, nearly two-thirds of respondents described drugs as a "major problem" in the development; at the other developments, distress about drugs was even more prevalent.

Moreover, in each place, when respondents were asked to rank the development's greatest problems, most described drugs as the worst and indicated that the drug problem had worsened, rather than improved, during the preceding two years (1991 to 1993). Many Franklin Field residents and others suggest that the epidemic of crack cocaine, and the violence associated with drug dealing, hit this development especially hard in the years immediately following the completion of the redevelopment in 1987, thwarting attempts to sustain what had been achieved both physically and socially. Some desirable design changes, however highly touted as providing "defensible space," have little value for residents in a broader climate of extreme insecurity. There is little purpose in having a private yard if, as at Franklin Field, 80 percent of respondents who have such yards say they are afraid things will be stolen from them, if only 42 percent of respondents report feeling very safe in the yard during the day, and if more than a third feel very unsafe using the yard at night.

One might conclude from all this that violent neighborhoods are a fact of life around most public housing, that matters of insecurity and drug traffic tend to overwhelm efforts at redevelopment, and that some redevelopment efforts—such as the one at

Commonwealth—are fortunate that their problems are not quite so severe as those elsewhere. All of that may be true, but there also seems to be some evidence that redevelopment efforts *can* enhance security.

At the heart of any notion of defensible space is the contention that design changes can both enhance the perception of security and reduce the reality of crime. A comparison of resident perceptions of safety in the West Broadway development between those who live in its carefully programmed and zoned redeveloped parts and those who live in the vast undefined expanse of the old part suggests that redevelopment may lead to important gains in security (for greater detail, see Vale 1995). Whether they were talking about their apartments, the area outside their front doors, or the shared courtyards, respondents from the redeveloped part consistently reported feeling safer than did respondents who still lived in the old parts. Conversely, those in the non-redeveloped part were much more concerned about gangs and people from outside the development, while the largest number of respondents from the new part of the development reported that they feared “nobody.” While it certainly remains possible that other forces besides the redevelopment led to these differences, it is not at all clear what these would be.²⁵ Residents frequently voiced pleasure at the control over outdoor space that was possible in the new parts of the development—especially apparent in the heavily used shared courtyards and the many well-tended private gardens. Many praised the subdivided outdoor space, the elimination of the ability to cut through buildings, and the shared commitment to keeping doors locked, noting that “undesirables” now tended to enter the development through the old part (where resident surveillance had little architectural reinforcement).

However promising, defensible space measures are only a part of a broader effort that is needed to improve security in public housing and in the depressed neighborhoods that so often surround it. When residents were asked about measures that could be taken to improve security, most stressed the need for enhanced community policing, private security firms, and stricter management practices.²⁶ The central importance of security to

²⁵ The demographic breakdown of respondents from the old and new parts is similar in terms of race, ethnicity, age, and length of residence at the development, and sections of both the new part and the old part face a busy street with a number of bars, reported as a source of much of the trouble.

²⁶ At Commonwealth, where management practices are already strict, many respondents wished that the management company could have more leeway in screening out undesirable new tenants.

residents of public housing cannot be overemphasized, and the ability of development-based or neighborhood-based violence and illegal activities to disrupt a redevelopment effort and limit its sustainability remains a key factor in any assessment of success.

Progress on socioeconomic development

Success in public housing redevelopment may also be measured in broader public policy terms in which redevelopment is seen not only as a matter of fixing a housing project but also as an opportunity for addressing the root causes of the poverty that led residents to need public housing in the first place. In some cases, this goal entails policy initiatives directed at economic development of large areas surrounding and including public housing developments. Sometimes initiatives are targeted only to residents within a particular public housing development; sometimes the goal entails sharing facilities with residents of surrounding neighborhoods. In the 1990s, under the Urban Revitalization Demonstration program, many housing authorities have centered redevelopment initiatives on such public policy goals, most frequently on efforts to achieve an economic mix and to develop consolidated and coordinated social service facilities in the name of improving family self-sufficiency.

The three Boston public housing redevelopment efforts of the 1980s also stressed the provision of new community facilities and the need to increase employment among residents but did not make education and job training a central piece of the redevelopment agenda and did little to link these redevelopment efforts to other initiatives in the surrounding communities.²⁷ Despite active efforts by tenant organizations to raise outside funds for starting or sustaining programs, service provision has remained wholly inadequate even in the most successful of funding cycles. In short, the innovative approaches to physical redesign have not

²⁷ The principal socioeconomic policy initiative of the Boston redevelopment efforts is of a different nature and involves the desegregation of public housing in South Boston. At West Broadway, one of the three South Boston public housing developments, the population had become nearly all white by the late 1970s, and the redevelopment effort of the 1980s was quickly followed by a far-reaching effort at racial and ethnic integration. In the first five years after the redeveloped site was opened to new residents, the occupancy pattern shifted to 40 percent nonwhite. Despite periodic press reports attesting to numerous acts of racially and ethnically motivated violence, two-thirds of respondents from West Broadway said that they had not experienced such problems while living in the development. While this may still imply a high degree of racial friction, it pales beside the wholesale intolerance that shattered the first attempts to integrate the development, between 1965 and 1975.

been matched by systematic commitments to exploring new strategies for socioeconomic redevelopment.

Despite the physical improvements that were implemented at Commonwealth, West Broadway, and Franklin Field, it is hard to sustain any claim that the redevelopment efforts have done much to improve the economic circumstances of residents. Even at Commonwealth, where income data suggest that residents are better off, on average, than those at Franklin Field or West Broadway, less than a quarter of households reported that employment is their principal source of income. This is almost identical to the situation 15 years earlier, before redevelopment (BHA 1979a, 1993a, 1993b).

It is worth noting, however, that this seemingly dismal statistical fact still means that Commonwealth has one of the highest employment rates at a BHA development, and it is more impressive if the 132 households headed by persons over age 62 are not factored in. Nonetheless, Commonwealth still serves a population that is extremely disadvantaged economically, and many of the state-sponsored programs that helped tenants during the 1980s with education and economic development were curtailed or eliminated after 1989 (Braverman 1989; NCSDPH 1992b). At the time of this writing, substantial and sustained investment in education and job training is still absent and, as one newspaper reporter put it, "Commonwealth's social service safety net is hanging by a thread" (Kahn 1993).

If one is looking for signs of modest improvement, however, Commonwealth's marginally better economic showing seems worth further scrutiny. Though the housing authority abandoned early plans to redevelop Commonwealth as mixed-income housing, enhanced tenant screening does seem to have occurred in the years immediately following the completion of the redevelopment, which may well have increased the number of employed residents. Between 1984 and 1988, Commonwealth (like other BHA developments) had its own waiting list and drew new tenants from that list rather than from a citywide list.

Above and beyond the usual BHA screening processes, Corcoran Management Company and the Commonwealth Tenants Association chose to exercise additional control over who was admitted by implementing extensive background checks and home visits. Since 1988, when the BHA entered into a voluntary compliance agreement with HUD that prohibited development-based waiting lists on the grounds that they could be used to foster racial segregation, Commonwealth (despite its being perhaps the most

racially and ethnically diverse development in the city) has had to accept tenants from the citywide waiting list and has had no more than an advisory role in keeping out those deemed undesirable.

As of 1995—despite ongoing discussions about the desirability of achieving a greater mix of incomes in public housing—there was no mechanism in place to enable some developments to favor employed applicants, and infrastructure was inadequate for enhancing the employment prospects of those who moved to public housing without a job. While there is presumably much to be learned from other cities where self-sufficiency programs have been attempted in public housing, the consensus seems to be growing that economic development within public housing—given the dire socioeconomic circumstances of the average family—cannot occur only through ambitious programs of on-site services. Given the paucity of employed persons on the citywide waiting lists for public housing, the prospects for sustaining or enhancing the percentages of employed residents depend not only on the expansion of education and job training programs for those already in public housing but also on changes in admissions policies that would import more employed families and on a version of welfare reform that makes employment an economically advantageous and socially possible option for more single-parent families.

Even in advance of all this, however, it seems likely that the restoration of a calm, clean, and secure environment at Commonwealth will contribute to sustained efforts at economic betterment. Moreover, the ongoing presence of a well-managed and well-maintained environment at Commonwealth may even have far-reaching effects on the lives of its residents, effects that are not easily measured in the customary economic terms of jobs and current annual income.

If redevelopment, tenant activism, and private management have increased domestic tranquility, it may be hoped that this, in turn, will enhance the prospects of socioeconomic mobility for the next generation. Though such questions have not yet been addressed as part of the present study, further investigation of the effects of the redevelopment on youth seems warranted. The widely discussed efforts in Chicago to relocate some public housing families to the suburbs have been praised for enhancing the school performance and job prospects of the relocated youth (Rosenbaum 1991); is it possible that well-managed public housing in the city can foster the same kinds of improvements?

The restoration of a peaceful domestic environment is certainly an important starting point, but it is surely not a substitute for enacting the promised improvements in the quality of the city's public schools. At the same time, the social and economic value of learning and earning—and the means for moving in these directions—could be demonstrated more tangibly to jobless residents by enhanced efforts to attract employed residents to public housing. For the time being, however, it seems fair to say that while the BHA likes to regard Commonwealth as its show-piece, the redevelopment effort has attained that status mostly for reasons other than its success at reducing rates of economic dependence among residents.

Resident satisfaction

If one potential public policy goal of public housing redevelopment is to foster an economic environment that enables families to afford to leave that housing, then even Commonwealth's success is more limited. If, on the other hand, success in public housing redevelopment is measured by the enhancement of an attractive, safe, and stable community where even many of those who can afford to leave will choose to stay, then the effort at Commonwealth—and, to a great extent, the effort at West Broadway—warrants the highest praise (see Vale 1995, 1996). Despite the lack of evidence of economic improvement, the long-term residents of Commonwealth and West Broadway who were interviewed for this study overwhelmingly agreed that they were better off than they were 10 years previously, before redevelopment had commenced.

No such positive direction of change was evinced at Franklin Field. There, responses resembled those from other interviews conducted at housing developments that have not undergone a major redevelopment effort, where a majority reported that their circumstances are, at best, unchanged. In the interviews with Franklin Field residents, many actually said that they believed their apartments were better before redevelopment than they were today, chiefly because of more solid original construction, though it seems that they could not fully separate such design issues from the broader feeling of insecurity that continued to pervade the development.

Similarly, when asked to rate how satisfied they were with their public housing development, 90 percent of Commonwealth respondents and 82 percent of West Broadway respondents reported feeling very satisfied or satisfied with the development,

whereas at Franklin Field only 42 percent said they felt that way, and nearly a quarter reported feeling very dissatisfied.²⁸

Despite their overall praise, residents of West Broadway and Commonwealth were far more divided over whether, if they were to move elsewhere, they would want to move to a similar place: At each place, about half said yes and half no. As for respondents from Franklin Field, 87 percent indicated they had no desire to move to a similar place. The message seems to be that redeveloped public housing can be a more acceptable and desirable form of public housing but that it still falls short of other kinds of living environments.

When asked "How long do you want to live in this development?" two-thirds of respondents from Commonwealth and West Broadway indicated they wished to stay "as long as possible" or "for a while," whereas two-thirds of the Franklin Field respondents made it clear they wished to remain "no longer than necessary." Only one-third of Franklin Field respondents said they "definitely would" recommend the development to friends looking for a place to live. By contrast, two-thirds of West Broadway respondents and three-quarters of those from Commonwealth indicated they definitely would do so. Similarly, only 42 percent of Franklin Field respondents agreed that the development was "a good place for raising kids," whereas 69 percent of respondents from West Broadway and fully 82 percent of respondents from Commonwealth found favor with the child-rearing environment in those places. This last issue underscores the dramatic transformation at Commonwealth quite nicely. When this same question was raised in the 1979 Commonwealth survey, only 19 percent of respondents then felt it to be a good place for raising kids (Community Planning and Research 1979).

In the end, the notion of "resident satisfaction" is a kind of metacriterion for success. It is, at least in part, an indirect measure of the successes achieved in the other six dimensions. Yet it also may prove to be a deceptive barometer; even high scores may mean little more than temporary stability in high-pressure lives. Alternatively, for some who care about public housing but who do not live in it, high rates of resident satisfaction may even be seen as a liability, if they mean that tenants will make less effort to leave public housing. Ultimately, the questions may be more about which kinds of people are most satisfied and whether these are the kinds of people who are

²⁸ This level of dissatisfaction is far higher than that reported even at the two non-redeveloped places where interviews were also conducted.

contributing to community stability. Arguably, the most successful public housing communities will be those where many of those most able to leave will choose not to. Yet this community-centered definition of success is in conflict with a more individual-centered and family-centered model of success that is predicated on the development of education, skills, and sustainable employment as a means to exit from public housing and from other sources of government subsidy. Moreover, a community-centered success criterion directly contradicts any lingering belief that public housing developments should be reserved for exclusive use by the most disadvantaged members of society.

Conclusions: Expanding and applying the measures of success

All of the above suggest that public housing redevelopments can, in the best cases, improve residents' satisfaction with their living environments but that some redevelopment efforts will improve resident satisfaction much more than others. Moreover, even where high levels of satisfaction are achieved, redevelopment may do little to ensure that this satisfaction translates to increased residential or economic mobility.

In the end, the complexity of redevelopment processes and the multiplicity of potential redevelopment goals make these processes all too easy to derail. They can be stymied by cost overruns and implementation impasses, by design miscalculations, by the absence of tenant support, by the inability to manage and maintain the changes, by unchecked crime and violence from surrounding impoverished neighborhoods, and by the inability to propose, implement, and sustain commitments to programs that can improve the socioeconomic prospects of residents. Redevelopment efforts can fall short because of a failure in any one of these seven areas, and a failure in one area exacerbates the problems in all others.

Taken together, the three redevelopment efforts discussed here confirm the promise of well-conceived attempts by well-organized communities to implement well-designed redevelopment plans, but they also highlight the ways that equally well-intentioned plans—especially if they lack a solid base of community support, fall victim to implementation snafus, and take place in extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods—may do little to improve the lives of public housing residents. While there is considerable evidence that the physical redevelopment of Franklin Field itself was problematic, it is clear that many of the major problems at that

development are driven by the inability to stem the crime that continues to plague the community and by the inability of the management to cooperate with residents. At the other extreme, when comprehensive physical redevelopment is accompanied by adequate security provisions, careful maintenance, and strict rule enforcement, even the enormously high cost (which in Boston has averaged about \$100,000 per unit in today's dollars) seems possible to justify.

A full decade after its redevelopment was completed, Commonwealth seems to have sustained its successes in nearly all dimensions. So too, West Broadway—in spite of the failure to complete the redevelopment, and in spite of the added challenges of the racial integration—receives high marks in many dimensions. Even though these redevelopment efforts were centered chiefly on bricks-and-mortar initiatives and have made only minimal progress as economic development ventures, these design changes seem to have generated a more cooperative climate for future initiatives. Creating safe and attractive apartments, buildings, and community facilities may be seen as a crucial first step in rebuilding communities and may serve as a vital haven for individuals struggling to cope with the debilitating psychological and social effects of persistent poverty. The most disheartening aspect of this study's findings, however, is that there are not *three* redevelopment success stories to report. While it is readily apparent that success does not come cheaply, it is also once again all too clear that money, in itself, does not guarantee success. Just as the BHA planning department had hypothesized in 1979, Commonwealth's redevelopment proved most successful, West Broadway achieved many partial successes, and Franklin Field lagged behind.

At a time when federal funding for public housing is once again under attack, what does it mean that the place that had the most perceived advantages when the redevelopment process began also turned out to be the most successful? If it is indeed possible to predict success, what does this suggest for cases where success in any of the seven measures outlined here seems highly unlikely right from the start? Was it a mistake to make such a large public investment at Franklin Field? Is it good public policy to focus only on the projects seen as having the greatest chance of success?

Clearly, every housing authority contemplating large-scale redevelopment would like to replicate the successes achieved at Commonwealth while avoiding the failures of Franklin Field. The core problem here is that all housing developments are not

equally promising sites for redevelopment, and a good redevelopment process can go only so far to guarantee success in the most troublesome cases. For housing authorities with several properties that would qualify as severely distressed by almost anyone's measure, the solution would seem to entail choosing for redevelopment only the most salvageable among the most distressed places, even though that choice means failing to help those residents who need assistance most.

Yet if one does wish to focus scarce dollars on the "least disadvantaged" of highly disadvantaged places, what does that choice imply for the places that are most in decline? The key to an equitable and morally acceptable strategy may be for housing authorities to acknowledge frankly that there are some places where—because of the density of impoverished families housed together in a devastated neighborhood—the problems are beyond repair through any existing redevelopment program. In those places, untransformable even through the unprecedented generosity of the Boston experiments or the federal Urban Revitalization Demonstration program, and unlikely to be able to attract a wider mix of incomes, the best solution may be to rehouse residents elsewhere through voucher programs and, as that is accomplished, to demolish the projects.

The cases presented here, when taken together, suggest that this kind of triage should, however, be seen as a last resort. To withhold public housing redevelopment dollars from the most distressed neighborhoods will represent yet another blow to the prospects for reinvestment in such places. The story of Franklin Field, for all its problems—before, during, and after its redevelopment—is not necessarily a tale of woe that was either inevitable or irreversible. Before giving up on places like Franklin Field that seem to be at the margins of salvageability, whether in Boston or elsewhere, it would seem worth trying more of the techniques that seemed to work so well at Commonwealth.

The redevelopment effort at Franklin Field suffered for reasons that went well beyond the problems of its neighborhood and the poverty of its residents. At the heart of the failure was, and is, a level of animosity between tenants and management that works against the formation of the kind of partnerships that were the hallmark of the Commonwealth redevelopment effort. One can only speculate whether use of a first-rate private developer and private management team could bring about Commonwealth-type results at Franklin Field-type places, but such measures seem well worth trying, especially in combination with enhanced efforts to recruit and retain a greater economic mix of residents.

If privatization is to proliferate, however, it is important to scrutinize the spirit and structure of the Commonwealth redevelopment process. The public sector has no monopoly on lousy landlords. Commonwealth's success entailed a carefully considered and scrupulously monitored process of finding not only an available private sector alternative but the best possible one from among many to meet a variety of goals and to work in partnership with a variety of constituencies. It is not merely that a public agency devolved its responsibilities onto the private sector; it is that a highly intelligent group of thoughtful and motivated housing authority officials, working with a core group of committed and well-advised tenants, jointly developed a vision for a tenant-monitored system of private development and private management. It is not the act of privatization itself but the hundreds of hours that went into reaching consensus on the thousands of details that went into both the *Commonwealth Developer's Kit* and the *Commonwealth Management Plan* that laid the groundwork for Commonwealth's sustained successes.

Even in these highly touted national success stories there are, unfortunately, clear limits to the range of issues by which such success is being measured. Part of what is needed—at Commonwealth and West Broadway as well as elsewhere—is a broader based definition of success in public housing redevelopment. Achieving success in each of the seven dimensions set out here is certainly daunting, but progress is necessary on all fronts if redevelopment efforts are ever to have a major impact on the quality of life of most residents. To make progress on all seven fronts—design, implementation, tenant organizing, management, security, socioeconomic development, and resident satisfaction—requires a careful articulation of goals right from the beginning and a system of transoccupancy evaluation for monitoring progress toward those goals.

Author

Lawrence J. Vale is an Associate Professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

References

- Bauman, John F. 1994. Public Housing: The Dreadful Saga of a Durable Policy. *Journal of Planning Literature* 8(4):347–61.
- Boston Housing Authority. 1979a. *State of the Development Report*. October. Boston.

- Boston Housing Authority. 1979b. *Site Selection Criteria for Substantial Rehabilitation*. December. Boston: Planning Department.
- Boston Housing Authority. 1979c. *Occupancy Analysis by Development Classification*. Boston.
- Boston Housing Authority. 1981. *Commonwealth Developer's Kit*. Boston.
- Boston Housing Authority. 1993a. *State of the Development Report*. Boston.
- Boston Housing Authority. 1993b. *Tenant Demographics Report*. April. Boston.
- Boston Police Department. 1994. *Reported Crimes in Boston Housing Authority Developments*. Boston.
- Braverman, Jane. 1989. Tenant Group Losing Funds. *Allston Brighton Citizen Item*, June 15.
- Carr, Lynch Associates Inc. and Wallace, Floyd Associates Inc. 1982. *Franklin Field Redevelopment: Design Report*. February 22. Cambridge, MA.
- Chandler, Mittie. 1991. What Have We Learned from Public Housing Resident Management? *Journal of Planning Literature* 6:136–43.
- Chermayeff, Serge, and Christopher Alexander. 1965. *Community and Privacy*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
- Cisneros, Henry. 1995. *Defensible Space: Deterring Crime and Building Community*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
- Cohen, Bernard. 1981. Is Harry Spence God? Or Is He Just Damn Good? *Boston Magazine*, December.
- Coleman, Alice. 1985. *Utopia on Trial: Vision and Reality in Planned Housing*. London: Hilary Shipman.
- Commonwealth Tenants Association, Boston Housing Authority, and Corcoran Management Company. 1983. *Commonwealth Management Plan: Memorandum of Understanding*. Boston.
- Commonwealth Tenants Association Management Committee. 1981. Memo to Robert Pickette et al., John M. Corcoran Company, and Sandy Henriquez et al., BHA, on "Preliminary Management Recommendations for Fidelis Way." October 7.
- Community Planning and Research, Inc. 1979. *The Commonwealth Report: Proposals for Capital Improvements, Management Reorganization and Expansion of Resident Services and Opportunities*. Boston.
- Cooper, Clare. 1975. *Easter Hill Village: Some Social Implications of Design*. New York: Free Press.
- Epp, Gayle. 1994. Interview by author. April. Boston.

Francescato, Guido, Sue Weidemann, James R. Anderson, and Richard Chenoweth. 1979. *Residents' Satisfaction in HUD-Assisted Housing: Design and Management Factors*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Franck, Karen A., and Michael Mostoller. 1995. From Courts to Open Space to Streets: Changes in the Site Design of U.S. Public Housing. *Journal of Architectural and Planning Research* 12(3):186–220.

Garrity, Paul. 1979. Findings of the Massachusetts Superior Court, with Memorandum of Recorded Observations at the Commonwealth Development during the View on April 11, 1979, and Memorandum of Recorded Observations at the Orient Heights, D Street, and Mission Hill Main Developments during the View on April 19, 1979, Perez Case. July 25. *Armando Perez v. Boston Housing Authority*. Boston Housing Authority Archives, Massachusetts State Archives, Boston.

Gilmore, David C. (planner and project manager of Franklin Field Redevelopment, 1982–1984, Boston Housing Authority). 1994. Interview by author. February. Boston.

Jacobs, Jane. 1961. *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Vintage.

Jones, Ronald, David Kaminsky, and Michael Roanhouse. 1979. *Problems Affecting Low Rent Public Housing Projects: A Field Study*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Kahn, Ric. 1993. Brighton Tenants Fear the Bad Old Days. *Boston Globe*, October 10.

Kell, Amy. 1978. *General Management Innovations Developed under the Target Projects Program*. Washington, DC: National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials.

Kell, Amy. 1979. *Maintenance, Management, and Administrative Systems under the Target Projects Program*. Washington, DC: National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials.

Keyes, Langley C. 1992. *Strategies and Saints: Fighting Drugs in Subsidized Housing*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.

Kolodny, Robert. 1979. *Exploring New Strategies for Improving Public Housing Management*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Lane, Frenchman, & Associates, Inc., and Goody, Clancy, & Associates, Inc. 1981. *West Broadway Comprehensive Renewal Program: Master Plan*. October 30. Boston.

Lovinger, Robert. 1981. Can Harry Spence Fix Public Housing? *Boston Globe Magazine*, August 23.

Massachusetts Executive Office of Communities and Development. 1990. *Redevelopment Handbook: Procedures and Guidelines for Redeveloping Public Housing*. Boston.

- National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing. 1992a. *Final Report*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing. 1992b. *Case Studies and Site Examination Reports*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Newman, Oscar. 1972. *Defensible Space*. New York: Macmillan.
- Newman, Oscar. 1980. *Community of Interest*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press.
- Peterman, William. 1993. Resident Management and Other Approaches to Tenant Control of Public Housing. In *Ownership, Control, and the Future of Housing Policy*, ed. R. Allen Hays. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Pynoos, Jon. 1986. *Breaking the Rules: Bureaucracy and Reform in Public Housing*. New York: Plenum.
- Rohe, William M., and Michael A. Stegman. 1992. Public Housing Homeownership: Will It Work and for Whom? *Journal of the American Planning Association* 58(2):144–57.
- Rosenbaum, James E. 1991. Black Pioneers: Do Their Moves to the Suburbs Increase Economic Opportunity for Mothers and Children? *Housing Policy Debate* 2(4):1179–213.
- Sadacca, Robert, et al. 1974. *Management Performance in Public Housing*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
- Schill, Michael H. 1993. Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from Here? *University of Chicago Law Review* 60:497–554.
- Schneiderman, Eric T. 1982. *Armando Perez v. Boston Housing Authority: A Case Study in Institutional Reform Legislation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School.
- Shlay, Anne B. 1993. Family Self-Sufficiency and Housing. *Housing Policy Debate* 4(3):457–95.
- Spence, Lewis H. 1993. Rethinking the Social Role of Public Housing. *Housing Policy Debate* 4(3):355–68.
- Vale, Lawrence J. 1992. *Occupancy Issues in Distressed Public Housing: An Outline of Impacts on Design, Management, and Service Delivery*. Washington, DC: National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing.
- Vale, Lawrence J. 1993. Beyond the Problem Projects Paradigm: Defining and Revitalizing “Severely Distressed” Public Housing. *Housing Policy Debate* 4(2):147–74.
- Vale, Lawrence J. 1994. Seven Kinds of Success: Assessing Public Housing Comprehensive Redevelopment Efforts in Boston. In *Future Visions of Urban Public Housing: Proceedings of an International Forum*, ed. Wolfgang F. E. Preiser, David P. Varady, and Francis P. Russell, 327–40. Cincinnati.

Vale, Lawrence J. 1995. Transforming Public Housing: The Social and Physical Redevelopment of Boston's West Broadway Development. *Journal of Architectural and Planning Research* 12(3):278–318.

Vale, Lawrence J. 1996. The Revitalization of Boston's Commonwealth Public Housing Development. In *Affordable Housing and Urban Development in the United States*, ed. Willem vanVliet, 100–34. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Vale, Lawrence J. Forthcoming. Destigmatizing Public Housing. In *Geography and Identity: Living and Exploring the Geopolitics of Identity*, ed. Dennis Crow. Washington, DC: Institute for Advanced Cultural Studies/Maisonneuve Press.

Walsh & Associates. 1979. *Refinancing and Marketing the Fidelis Way Housing Project*. Boston.

Whittlesey, Robert B. 1976. *Report of the Master in the Case of Perez v. Boston Housing Authority*. CA 03096. Boston.