

Central-City and Suburban Migration Patterns: Is a Turnaround on the Horizon?

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Abstract

The huge population losses that characterized many older, larger U.S. cities during the 1960s and 1970s slowed and in some cases ceased during the 1980s and early 1990s. Periodic media reports of neighborhood turnarounds, commercial revitalization, and improvements in housing and the quality of life in selected inner-city subareas have been taken as signs that central cities are retaining middle-class residents and even attracting some back from the suburbs.

Analysis of metropolitan household migration patterns based on the U.S. Census Bureau's 1980 and 1990 Public Use Microdata Samples and more recent Current Population Surveys shows that the dominant trend in residential movement among most population subgroups is still toward the suburbs. While not discounting reports of central-city neighborhood turnarounds and selective demographic revitalization, our findings imply that those improvements are limited and that a widespread back-to-the-city movement is not likely in the foreseeable future.

Keywords: Gentrification; Suburban; Migration

Introduction

Many concerned with housing policy believe that the "doughnut" cannot work. That is, a spatial pattern of relatively well-off suburbs surrounding a central city plagued by poverty and unemployment is not economically viable in the long run for the metropolitan area as a whole (Cisneros 1993). Many further feel that the loss of middle- and upper-income residents from cities increases the spatial isolation of the poor, decreases social networking and job opportunities, and strips the cities of potentially valuable inputs to their schools and other public institutions

(Farley 1996; Massey and Denton 1993). More immediately, attracting middle- and upper-income residents to central cities and retaining those who now live in them may be an important component of rebuilding the tax base of municipalities as the federal government devolves social programs and administrative services.

The historical processes of outward and upward mobility, income segregation, and racial avoidance have contributed to the doughnut pattern, which has been accelerated by (1) advances in transportation and telecommunications technology, (2) federal infrastructure and tax policies, (3) global competitive pressures, and (4) the restructuring of the American economy. During the 1970s, economic change collided with an oil shortage, resulting in a near collapse of the older, often heavy, industry that provided much of the employment base for Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, Philadelphia, and a host of smaller midwestern and northeastern cities. As the manufacturing export base disintegrated, suppliers and blue-collar service providers suffered as well.

African Americans who migrated from the rural South after World War II and their maturing children who lacked the skills needed for employment in the new information-processing sectors of transforming city economies were strongly affected. Family structures, already weakening, staggered under the weight of widespread financial stress. The result was growing urban joblessness, poverty, and asocial behavior, which further accelerated the flight of the middle class from the cities (Wilson 1996).

After several decades of physical, demographic, and economic decline in cities, some are heartened by journalistic reports of neighborhood turnarounds and central-city commercial revival. New office buildings, new sports and entertainment complexes, vibrant immigrant enclaves, and neighborhood upgrading have been greeted as harbingers of a revitalized era of urbanism. Improvements in housing and the quality of life in inner-city neighborhoods are taken as concrete indicators of urban demographic revival, leading some to believe that policies geared to attracting and retaining the middle and upper classes are working.

Yet despite such encouraging signs, several factors continue to work against a widespread revival of central cities. First, the attraction of the suburbs remains powerful and pervasive, in terms of both residential desirability and employment access. Residential preference surveys continue to show that Americans,

on the whole, still overwhelmingly desire lower-density living and suburban lifestyles (Downs 1994). Peripheral beltways, expressways, and interstate highways allow suburbanites access to metropolitan jobs, while advances in telecommunications enable even some of the most specialized professional workers to live anywhere in a metropolitan area, or even beyond, and be in real-time virtual proximity to colleagues and clients (Atkinson 1996).

Second, to a large extent, city life itself has changed over the past several decades, becoming increasingly suburban in orientation and style, especially in lower-density Sunbelt cities. An automobile is almost as necessary in the city as it is in the suburbs, and many middle-income residents of the central city drive the same minivans and sport-utility vehicles as their suburban counterparts. In fact, even in older cities as large as Pittsburgh and Washington, DC, many residents find it more convenient and economical to shop in suburban malls and supermarkets. A single “big-box” suburban discount store built in recent years typically contains more retail space than a small-city downtown shopping district built before World War II (O’Mara, Beyard, and Casey 1996).

Third, inner-city commercial projects no longer offer unique appeal. Urban developments, such as the Inner Harbor in Baltimore, and revived downtown shopping/entertainment districts are nice single-site (often one-time) attractions that seem to appeal more to tourists than to city residents. Moreover, these districts increasingly have the same franchises and chain stores as most suburban malls. Indeed, many new downtown retail developments actively seek to imitate the look and feel of suburban malls, despite claims of urban uniqueness.

Suburban life has also changed over the past several decades. Now suburbs contain not only preferred housing and upscale shopping, but also headquarters offices, distinctive dining, sports complexes, cultural facilities, and a host of specialized services previously confined to central-city downtowns (Downs 1994; Kasarda 1995). As this urbanization of the periphery continues, suburbanites can increasingly lead an urban (and urbane) lifestyle while avoiding undesired aspects of central-city living (e.g., higher crime, higher taxes, poor public schools).

Moreover, the suburbs are now attracting significant numbers of first-generation immigrants who are bypassing classic patterns of initial settlement in the central city. In the Chicago metropolitan area, for example, one is as likely to hear Spanish as English

spoken in the streets and shops of outer-suburban Aurora, while a perusal of the telephone directory of the closer-in traditionally Jewish suburb of Skokie shows nearly 100 households with the surname Chen. At the same time, numerous other Chicago-area suburbs remain segregated enclaves of the white well-to-do.

The growth of employment and services in the suburbs has allowed many metropolitan residents to sever their ties to the central city. A survey of residents of the New York metropolitan area in the early 1990s found that only 20 percent of the principal wage earners living in suburban areas worked within the limits of New York City. Less than half visited New York City five or more times per year, and one-quarter never went there at all. Three-quarters claimed that their lives were hardly affected by the central city (Glaberson 1992). Central cities will likely continue to appeal to and attract selective demographic and lifestyle subgroups, but for most Americans they appear to have become superfluous. This fact, combined with increased concentrated poverty, urban social problems, and the continued suburbanization of jobs of all types, leads us to ask, "Will the center hold on to its middle- and upper-income residents?"

It has been documented elsewhere that as measured by aggregate population and employment redistribution trends, the center is holding only selectively (Frey 1993; Gordon, Richardson, and Yu 1997; Kasarda 1995). The causes of suburbanization and the role of migrant income selectivity have also been extensively studied in the urban economics literature.¹ In this article we provide a demographic accounting of

¹ There is an extensive and long-established urban economics literature that attempts to explain why suburbanization is occurring in general and why it is occurring selectively for upper-income groups (e.g., Alonso 1964; Burnell 1984; Mills 1972; Mills and Price 1984; Muth 1969; Orr 1975; Tiebout 1956; Wheaton 1977). The Alonso (1964), Muth (1969), and Mills (1972) model of residential location suggests that generally larger, upper-income households will relocate to the suburbs. The exact income effects in the model are ambiguous: Commuting time is relatively more expensive for higher-income groups, drawing them closer to central cities, but demand for housing pushes higher-income groups to the suburbs, especially if the family size is large. Which income effects are dominant depends on the relative strength of the income elasticities. Wheaton (1977) empirically tested these two competing factors and concluded that neither effect was very strong in the United States, leaving the Tiebout (1956) model as the dominant mechanism to explain the income segregation of metropolitan areas. The Tiebout model implies that differences in fiscal structure between the central-city and suburban communities exacerbate central-city problems by causing selective migration of upper-income groups in search of lower tax burdens and a better package of location-specific amenities. Further, zoning restrictions in suburban communities trap lower-income groups in the central city (Burnell 1984).

central-city and suburban migration, focusing especially on income selectivity. Our specific purpose is to document the nature of central-city and suburban migrant flows and to assess how well our largest cities are faring in retaining their middle- and upper-income households and in attracting new ones. We will also analyze how these flows are affecting household income inequality between the central cities and their suburbs.

We begin with three sets of descriptive research questions. First, what are the general patterns of income selectivity for households moving to and from the central cities and suburban rings? Is there any evidence that the household migration patterns and demographic characteristics of migrants have changed between the late 1970s and the late 1980s? Are there differences across metropolitan areas and regions?

Second, what is the nature of intrametropolitan exchange between central cities and their suburbs with regard to household income levels? Intrametropolitan flows are particularly important, because a large percentage of the total households that leave the central city are destined for the immediate suburbs. Retention policies, therefore, need to be grounded in an understanding of these intrametropolitan flows.

Third, what is the pattern of immigration to the central cities and suburbs by income level, and how significant is immigration in the overall migrant flows to cities and their suburbs? Historically, immigrants have initially located in central-city enclaves and then moved out to the suburbs after a generation or so. This process of immigrant invasion-succession has been vital to maintaining central-city population bases. New settlement patterns, however, indicate that large numbers of immigrants to metropolitan areas may be bypassing the city entirely and locating directly in the suburbs. We will examine this process and the role immigrants play in central-city and suburban migration streams.

To set the analytical context, we present an overview of metropolitan population and employment trends between 1970 and 1990 and describe our initial sample of places. We then examine household net migration rates between 1985 and 1990 by household income quintile for 12 of our nation's largest central cities and their suburban rings. Afterward, we explore migrant selectivity among demographic subgroups in the late 1970s and late 1980s to assess changes over time. We conclude by describing central-city and suburban migrant flows and exchange ratios

during the 1990s and their implications for intrametropolitan income inequality.

Metropolitan population and employment trends, 1970 to 1990

In 1990, the 284 metropolitan areas (consolidated metropolitan statistical areas [CMSAs] and metropolitan statistical areas [MSAs]) in the United States contained 77.5 percent of the nation's population while occupying only 16.4 percent of the land area. Just over half of the country's population of almost 250 million was concentrated in the 39 metropolitan areas that had at least 1 million residents, while one in four Americans lived within the boundaries of the eight largest metropolitan areas (CMSAs)—New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington-Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, and Detroit—each with at least 4 million residents.²

While the percentage of the U.S. population living in the 1990 metropolitan area boundaries has crept up only 1 percent in 20 years,³ there has been considerable disparity between the growth rates of central cities and suburbs, with the suburban rings dominating. The total suburban population increased from 23 percent of the national population in 1950 to 46 percent in 1990, when 115 million people lived in suburbs. The suburban rings now make up 60 percent of the metropolitan population base (Frey 1995c). In the New York City CMSA, the nation's largest agglomeration of employment and population, the suburban population surpassed that of New York City proper in the late 1960s and now exceeds 60 percent. The New York City CMSA has eight suburban "realms"⁴ that together with its other suburban territory contain more than 12 million people. The suburban population of the New York City CMSA thus exceeds the populations of 43 states.

Suburban population growth and job growth have moved hand in hand. During the mid-1970s, the metropolitan employment

² CMSAs are aggregates of geographically proximate primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs), which typically have large city centers of their own that compose a broader urban complex.

³ This percentage increase is calculated by using constant (1990-defined) boundaries for metropolitan areas over time.

⁴ Urban realms are subsets of very large metropolitan areas that maintain a semiautonomous quality from other parts of the region in terms of commuting sheds (Vance 1977).

balance shifted to the suburbs; the balance is now more than 60 percent suburban and deconcentrating at a rate of 1 percent per year. Manufacturing employment is more than 70 percent suburban; wholesale and retail employment is approaching 70 percent. Even the proportion of business services that are suburbanized surpassed 50 percent during the mid-1980s (Muller 1989). By 1990, the suburbs contained 60 percent of the nation's total inventory of rental office space (Hughes, Miller, and Lang 1992).

As employment became increasingly suburbanized, the number of central-city residents living in poverty continued to expand. The proportion of that group living in poverty and extreme-poverty areas of our 100 largest central cities also increased (Kasarda 1993). High crime rates and other social problems associated with growing concentrations of poverty spilled over into the nonpoverty areas of the cities, while most large-city public school systems deteriorated.

How have such push-and-pull factors affected the ability of our central cities to hold onto and attract middle- and upper-income households? The U.S. Census Bureau's 5 percent Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) files for 1980 and 1990 and the machine-readable files from the annual Current Population Survey allow us to address this question directly. We focus on the historic central cities and suburban rings of 12 CMSAs and examine household net migration rates and net flows of householders by total household income between 1985 and 1990. Six of these major cities are in the Northeast or Midwest (Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, New York City, and Philadelphia), and six are in the South or West (Dallas–Fort Worth, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles–Long Beach, San Francisco, and Seattle). We selected those 12 CMSAs because we could identify and match central-city and suburban-ring boundaries in them over time and because they were large enough to produce reliable estimates of household migrant flows by household income groups and other demographic features.⁵ We group the metropolitan areas into

⁵ The full names of the CMSAs and the places (noted in parentheses) that served as the central city for migrant analysis are Boston–Worcester–Lawrence, MA–NH–ME–CT (Boston city); New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island, NY–NJ–CT–PA (New York City); Chicago–Gary–Lake County, IL–IN–WI (Chicago city); Philadelphia–Wilmington–Trenton, PA–NJ–DE–MD (Philadelphia city); Detroit–Ann Arbor, MI (Detroit city); Cleveland–Akron–Lorain, OH (Cleveland city); Houston–Galveston–Brazoria, TX (Houston city); Dallas–Fort Worth, TX (Dallas–Fort Worth cities); Denver–Boulder, CO (Denver city); Los Angeles–Anaheim–Riverside, CA (Los Angeles–Long Beach cities); San Francisco–Oakland–San Jose, CA (San Francisco city); and Seattle–Tacoma, WA (Seattle city). Areas outside the central city or cities but

two broad categories: one set representing the Northeast and the Midwest, and the other representing the South and the West.

Table 1 provides a descriptive profile of the central cities and suburban rings of the 12 selected CMSAs. In general, the central cities and suburbs of southern and western CMSAs (with the exception of San Francisco) have considerably lower population densities and younger housing stocks than those of northeastern and midwestern CMSAs.⁶ Central cities in the South and West also tend to be more territorially expansive, often containing suburban-style communities and substantial areas of undeveloped land (Rusk 1993). Such ecological differences no doubt influence residential choices and migration, affecting such measures as the ratio of suburban to central-city median household income, also shown in table 1. Of special note are the typically higher ratios in the Northeast and Midwest and the increase in disparity between suburban and central-city incomes in Cleveland and Detroit between 1980 and 1990. Some of the reasons for these conditions will become apparent as we proceed to analyze the income selectivity of migrants in the CMSAs.

Income selectivity of city and suburban migrants in large metropolitan areas

Household net migration rates between 1985 and 1990 for the historical (original) central cities and suburban rings of the

within the CMSA were considered suburban. We decided to use the largest central city in the CMSA unless closely linked central cities were clearly identifiable in the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) geography (e.g., Los Angeles–Long Beach). Our sample of 12 CMSAs was selected partly by choice and partly by constraints imposed by the PUMA geography. To be included in the sample, it was necessary to have geographically identifiable cities and suburbs in both 1985 (the year used to ascertain location of previous residence) and 1990. This identification process is completely described in a technical appendix available upon request from the authors.

⁶ While the suburbs of many western U.S. cities technically have low population densities, the condition is due in part to the fact that many western suburban counties are quite large and contain many square miles of open space. For example, consider Riverside County, CA, which forms the eastern part of metropolitan Los Angeles. The county contains 7,214 square miles of land—an area approximately the size of New Jersey—yet the vast majority of its population lives in a hundred square miles that border the rest of the Los Angeles region. Including Riverside in the Los Angeles CMSA causes the population density for all of suburban Los Angeles to fall dramatically. By contrast, most metropolitan suburban counties in the Northeast, Midwest, and South have land areas that roughly correspond to their built-up areas. For a discussion of how western and eastern metropolitan land use differs, see Lang, Popper, and Popper (1995, 1997).

Table 1. Descriptive Profile of Selected CMSAs, 1990

Region and CMSA	% CMSA Population in Central City	Density (Population per Square Mile)		Housing Stock (Median Year Built)		Ratio of Suburban to Central-City Median House- hold Income	
		Central City	Suburb	Central City	Suburb	1980	1990
Northeast and Midwest							
Boston	10.6	11,860	454	1939	1956	1.47	1.46
Chicago	33.8	12,251	378	1944	1966	1.62	1.60
Cleveland	17.7	6,564	307	1939	1960	1.69	1.88
Detroit	19.8	7,410	279	1945	1964	1.71	2.11
New York	37.5	23,702	555	1946	1958	1.53	1.56
Philadelphia	26.9	11,734	320	1939	1962	1.53	1.63
South and West							
Dallas-Fort Worth	36.0	2,333	148	1967	1977	1.33	1.40
Denver	23.6	3,051	123	1957	1974	1.48	1.50
Houston	43.7	3,020	122	1969	1977	1.31	1.32
Los Angeles-Long Beach	26.9	7,538	123	1959	1969	1.26	1.29
San Francisco	11.6	15,502	292	1939	1966	1.34	1.32
Seattle	17.4	6,154	136	1949	1973	1.29	1.25

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1982a, 1991b).

12 CMSAs by household income quintiles are presented in table 2.⁷ The in, out, and net household migration flows that correspond to these rates are shown in tables A.1 and A.2. Clearly apparent in these figures is that many more higher-income households left major central cities between 1985 and 1990 than entered them. Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago in the Midwest and Houston, Dallas–Fort Worth, and Denver in the South and West exhibited particularly high negative household net migration rates in the upper two income quintiles. Among our selected CMSAs, central cities remained greatly disadvantaged in the net attraction of higher-income households.

The gradients across income quintiles from the highest to the lowest for the central cities reveal the limited ability of cities to retain household mixes made up of middle- and upper-income residents. Either the cities are losing (in the net) households among the upper income quintiles at faster rates than among the lower income quintiles, or they are adding households at the lower-income end, following more traditional urban migration models.

The net flows that form the numerator of the household migration rates shown in tables A.1 and A.2 reveal just how striking some of the net migration losses of higher-income households in cities are. For example, between 1985 and 1990, 21,675 households with incomes falling into the top income quintile moved into Chicago, while 57,733 households in this income category exited the city, resulting in a net loss of 36,058 households in the upper income quintile.⁸ During the same period, the Sunbelt cities of Houston and Los Angeles–Long Beach joined New York City in the ranks of major cities experiencing large net losses of upper-income residents through migration.

The central cities of Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Dallas–Fort Worth, and Houston lost households in the net at all income levels. New York City, Denver, and Los Angeles–Long Beach added households only at the lowest income quintile. The remaining cities (Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Seattle) exhibited classic ecological-succession income gradients: They

⁷ These net migration rates were calculated for the 1985 to 1990 period by subtracting out-migrants from in-migrants falling into each income quintile and dividing the difference by the number of residents in that income quintile in 1990. The break points used to partition households across the five income quintiles are shown in table A.3.

⁸ This loss includes only changes from migrating households and does not consider changes in the income mobility of those who did not migrate.

Table 2. Household Net Migration Rates by Household Income Quintile, 1985 to 1990

Region and CMSA	Area	Quintile					Overall
		5	4	3	2	1	
Northeast and Midwest							
Boston	Central city	-10.86	-3.90	2.51	6.25	9.69	0.80
	Suburb	1.59	-1.62	-4.44	-5.20	-3.61	-1.63
Chicago	Central city	-20.92	-14.32	-9.26	-6.60	-5.79	-10.75
	Suburb	5.91	5.40	4.74	0.02	-2.03	3.94
Cleveland	Central city	-41.66	-23.17	-13.20	-6.66	-3.50	-11.30
	Suburb	0.24	1.05	1.29	-1.06	-0.74	0.26
Detroit	Central city	-21.81	-15.52	-9.64	-9.64	-3.67	-9.71
	Suburb	1.94	1.68	-0.16	-2.66	-2.86	0.21
New York	Central city	-5.30	-1.97	-1.03	-1.18	0.38	-1.89
	Suburb	1.47	-2.51	-5.35	-8.41	-7.84	-2.66
Philadelphia	Central city	-14.40	-5.81	-0.21	1.27	4.92	-1.53
	Suburb	4.56	3.18	0.49	-1.20	-3.55	1.72

Table 2. Household Net Migration Rates by Household Income Quintile, 1985 to 1990 (continued)

Region and CMSA	Area	Quintile					Overall
		5	4	3	2	1	
South and West							
Dallas-Fort Worth	Central city	-20.07	-17.28	-7.19	-2.45	-5.68	-9.96
	Suburb	12.54	14.78	15.73	13.25	5.94	13.02
Denver	Central city	-20.05	-14.40	-8.48	-0.15	3.02	-6.79
	Suburb	1.69	2.38	4.16	3.96	4.53	3.08
Houston	Central city	-24.35	-24.31	-12.92	-5.26	-3.43	-13.12
	Suburb	10.39	12.65	10.11	7.75	2.21	9.08
Los Angeles-Long Beach	Central city	-7.26	-5.97	-3.07	-0.93	0.95	-3.48
	Suburb	6.43	5.83	3.85	1.56	0.61	4.38
San Francisco	Central city	-6.91	-3.42	1.65	3.89	1.66	-1.33
	Suburb	3.83	2.25	0.86	-2.23	-4.27	1.27
Seattle	Central city	-10.16	-7.84	-2.01	7.72	6.96	-1.15
	Suburb	11.10	12.76	14.19	11.59	7.31	11.79

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992a).

experienced the greatest household migration losses at the upper-income ends and the greatest household migration gains at the lower-income ends.

These trends contrast sharply with the household migration rates and flows for the suburban rings of the same cities. All suburban areas attracted households at the highest income quintile between 1985 and 1990. Moreover, most of the suburban areas attracted their largest numbers of new residents from the highest income quintile. Under such circumstances, we would not expect the income disparity between central-city and suburban households to decrease.

The in- and out-flow components shown in tables A.1 and A.2 also reveal some interesting dynamics of migration to and from central cities and suburbs, but these dynamics are blurred by the net rates and net flows. For example, New York City had more in-migrants in the highest income quintile (67,911) than in any other income quintile. The number of high-income households migrating to New York City exceeded the total number of households migrating to each of the other central cities in the Northeast and Midwest, with the exception of Chicago.

The city of Chicago attracted nearly 120,000 migrant households between 1985 and 1990, more than one-third of which fell into the top two income quintiles. Nearly 50 percent of the 72,112 households migrating to the city of San Francisco were in the highest two income quintiles, while 42 percent of Boston's nearly 60,000 in-migrants fell into the top two income quintiles. Indeed, all cities in our sample except for Cleveland and Detroit attracted large numbers of higher-income households to their central cities between 1985 and 1990.

Many higher-income households that move to cities settle in visible residential clusters, adding to our impression that cities are undergoing demographic revitalization. Conversely, out-migration of higher-income city residents to the suburbs and beyond is typically drawn from neighborhoods across the city (especially when many of those migrating moved up in income status while residing in the city). Little attention is given to this old story of out-migration of higher-income city households, but the net household flows show that the out-migration of these households overwhelms the in-migration of households at the middle- and upper-income levels.

The back-to-the-city question

Perhaps even more telling are the patterns of intrametropolitan migration. These movements are important from a policy perspective for at least two reasons. First, intrametropolitan moves constitute the largest proportion of total in- and out-migration from the cities and suburbs. If the central cities are to retain their middle- and upper-income households and attract new ones, they must consider altering the patterns of these large flows. Second, in most cases, intrametropolitan migration is purely a residential or neighborhood choice, unlike moves starting or ending outside the CMSA, which are determined jointly by residential preferences and employment decisions. The urban economics literature suggests that higher-income households will relocate from the central city to the suburbs in search of lower tax burdens and the best composition of location-specific amenities (Bartik and Smith 1987; Luger 1996; Tiebout 1956). These amenities, or quality-of-life characteristics, can include any number of tangible or intangible factors, such as the quality of schools, the crime rate, and even the number of golf courses. Since intrametropolitan moves respond to such local characteristics, municipal and regional governments can sometimes shape certain elements of an individual's residential choice.

The suburbs are not the only places where amenities can be found, however. Central cities offer many amenities that large numbers of people find appealing. These amenities include a rich diversity of population groups and lifestyles, historically significant residential architecture, extensive nighttime entertainment options, ethnic restaurants, offbeat shops and services, and quick commutes to downtown work locations. Many people, including young singles and older empty-nester couples, have been lured from the suburbs to the central cities seeking such amenities, contributing to the pockets of residential and commercial vitality that are increasing in most large cities.

These expanding islands of promise in what have often been described as "seas of urban decline" are frequently taken as tangible and important signs that the central cities may be experiencing a rebirth. Examples of central-city neighborhood turnaround are highlighted in the media. Journalistic investigators uncover a handful of former suburbanites who have returned to the city center and feature stories about them, giving the impression that the back-to-the-city movement is a significant trend.

Intrametropolitan migration patterns indicate that the extent of the back-to-the-city movement may not be quite as significant as sometimes suggested. Table 3 presents city-suburban migrant exchange ratios for the CMSAs in our study from 1985 to 1990. These ratios are constructed by dividing the number of householders moving from the central city to the suburbs by the counterflow coming in from the suburbs to the city, categorized by total household income quintiles. The ratios in table 3 show an even stronger pattern of central-city migrant disadvantage than that provided by the household net migration rates and net flows described earlier. This intrametropolitan migrant disadvantage extends across virtually all household income categories but is particularly strong at the higher-income ends. For example, in Detroit, more than six households from the highest income quintile left the central city for every household that moved in from its suburbs. The central cities of Philadelphia, Cleveland, Chicago, and Dallas–Fort Worth are almost as demographically disadvantaged, with at least four households moving from the cities to the suburbs for every one moving back to the city.

The gross flows embedded in these ratios are also revealing. For instance, at the top income quintile in metropolitan Chicago, 41,828 central-city households moved to the suburbs between 1985 and 1990, while only 7,158 suburban households moved to the central city (see table A.4). New York City attracted 19,729 households in the top income quintile from its suburbs, but it lost 69,809 households in the same quintile to its suburbs. The number of high-income households that New York City lost through intrametropolitan migration exceeds the total number of high-income households that moved into New York City between 1985 and 1990.

Further refinement of the nature of intrametropolitan migration flows is provided in table 4. It shows, by income quintiles, the percentage of central-city out-migrants who relocated in their own suburbs compared with the percentage of suburban out-migrants who moved to their metropolitan area's central city. Two features stand out: (1) Most householders who decide to leave a central city move to that city's suburbs, whereas most of those who decide to leave the suburbs leave the metropolitan area, and (2) this trend is most pronounced at the higher household income levels. For example, in the top income quintile, 83 percent of the out-migrants from the city of Detroit moved to Detroit-area suburbs, while less than 5 percent of Detroit's suburban out-migrants in this income category moved to Detroit city. Comparable numbers for Cleveland are 77 percent versus

Table 3. Intrametropolitan Exchange Ratios (City-to-Suburb Flow over Suburb-to-City Flow) by Household Income Quintile, 1985 to 1990

Region and CMSA	Quintile					Overall
	5	4	3	2	1	
Northeast and Midwest						
Boston	2.51	1.97	1.49	1.55	1.47	1.91
Chicago	5.84	5.16	3.63	3.54	3.34	4.42
Cleveland	5.66	2.93	2.17	1.64	1.64	2.24
Detroit	6.66	4.08	2.30	2.02	1.49	2.61
New York	3.54	2.21	1.60	2.07	1.36	2.40
Philadelphia	4.36	2.28	1.36	1.03	0.65	1.78
South and West						
Dallas-Fort Worth	4.12	3.22	2.46	2.05	1.96	2.67
Denver	2.30	1.74	1.43	1.14	1.26	1.50
Houston	3.83	3.70	2.44	2.04	1.84	2.69
Los Angeles-Long Beach	2.08	1.99	1.77	1.67	1.54	1.85
San Francisco	3.22	2.30	2.20	1.67	1.68	2.39
Seattle	3.04	2.90	2.53	1.80	1.54	2.40

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992a).

Table 4. Percentage of Intrametropolitan Flows in Total Out-Migrant Flows from Central Cities and Suburbs, 1985 to 1990

Region and CMSA	Direction of Flow	Quintile					Overall
		5	4	3	2	1	
Northeast and Midwest							
Boston	CC→SB	68.44	58.58	49.44	47.89	47.22	57.27
	SB→CC	10.58	8.37	8.79	7.55	9.27	9.02
Chicago	CC→SB	72.45	70.93	59.34	47.09	37.16	59.11
	SB→CC	12.98	14.93	17.59	12.50	12.82	14.17
Cleveland	CC→SB	76.59	75.33	76.34	67.86	62.76	71.50
	SB→CC	4.67	13.74	19.08	20.07	21.79	15.67
Detroit	CC→SB	82.58	76.93	64.12	54.94	51.92	65.07
	SB→CC	4.52	8.18	11.19	12.47	19.59	11.01
New York	CC→SB	67.71	47.89	33.01	23.68	18.98	42.61
	SB→CC	14.60	12.83	12.11	7.14	10.72	11.89
Philadelphia	CC→SB	68.68	58.11	44.95	43.31	30.59	52.59
	SB→CC	8.04	12.44	13.90	16.64	20.35	13.49

Table 4. Percentage of Intrametropolitan Flows in Total Out-Migrant Flows from Central Cities and Suburbs, 1985 to 1990 (continued)

Region and CMSA	Direction of Flow	Quintile					Overall
		5	4	3	2	1	
South and West							
Dallas-Fort Worth	CC→SB	56.06	57.36	56.24	51.36	39.68	52.73
	SB→CC	15.32	23.57	29.81	29.18	21.60	23.58
Denver	CC→SB	47.16	51.55	47.68	44.05	42.57	46.78
	SB→CC	10.07	15.49	22.15	23.93	22.53	18.20
Houston	CC→SB	47.40	55.58	51.58	48.16	39.69	49.00
	SB→CC	20.22	26.98	33.11	32.36	26.31	27.69
Los Angeles-Long Beach	CC→SB	74.99	70.09	63.00	55.43	49.02	64.00
	SB→CC	31.01	27.22	25.88	22.33	22.86	26.13
San Francisco	CC→SB	71.87	65.12	58.63	45.71	39.72	60.27
	SB→CC	8.26	8.36	6.77	5.78	5.35	7.07
Seattle	CC→SB	62.61	67.56	60.44	54.60	41.25	58.75
	SB→CC	19.27	19.04	18.13	19.20	17.61	18.67

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992a).

Note: CC = central city; SB = suburb.

5 percent; for San Francisco, 72 percent versus 8 percent; and for Philadelphia, 69 percent versus 8 percent.

These patterns of intrametropolitan migration exchange (which are influenced by ecological structure and political boundaries) do not negate the fact that many higher-income households are moving from the suburbs to their central cities. Nonetheless, the predominant pattern of migration among middle- and upper-income central-city households is to the suburbs. If there is a back-to-the-city movement, it has not been large enough to counter this long-standing trend toward suburbanization.

Immigrant impacts

The media have publicized the role that increased immigration is playing in revitalizing many declining central-city neighborhoods. Since the days of Robert Park (who started in the early 1900s as a journalist reporting on immigrant flows to mid-western cities), Ernest Burgess, and other Chicago-school human ecologists, it has been contended that immigrants have been the demographic fuel sustaining metropolitan centers. The classic Burgess (1923) concentric-zone model of urban growth emphasized the movement out of central cities by socially mobile city residents and their replacement in the core by waves of newly arrived immigrants. In time, these new arrivals replicated the congruent processes of social mobility upward and spatial mobility outward, only to be replaced by another wave of immigrants (or rural migrants) to the urban core. This migration-succession process pumped new demographic life into the central cities, enabling them to hold their own (and even grow) despite increasing suburbanization.

Immigration, which slowed considerably from the 1920s to the 1970s, accelerated dramatically during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when it reached absolute levels approaching earlier turn-of-the-century peaks (Chiswick and Sullivan 1995; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995a). As we noted earlier, many immigrants are now bypassing the central cities and settling directly in the suburbs. Nonetheless, many recent foreign arrivals have settled in previously declining large cities, slowing or reversing population losses.

The substantial increase in immigration during the past two decades has prompted new avenues of research. Economists and policy analysts have begun to study (1) whether recent immigrants, especially those who are poor and low skilled, are

displacing native-born workers (see, for example, Borjas 1994; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1996; Hunt 1996) and (2) the extent to which immigrants are increasing the burden on state and local governments to provide public services (U.S. General Accounting Office 1994). The widespread belief that immigrants are taking jobs away from native-born workers and relying too heavily on public services led to Proposition 187, the California ballot initiative that aimed to deny public services to illegal immigrants (Armbruster, Geron, and Bonacich 1995). Anti-immigrant politics are also gaining strength in the high-immigration states of Arizona and Texas (Smith and Tarallo 1995).

A related avenue of research prompted by the increase in immigration is the link between the highly focused immigrant streams in the United States and internal migration patterns (Frey 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Frey and Liaw 1997; Walker, Ellis, and Barff 1992; White and Imae 1994). Frey and Liaw (1997, 1) characterize the phenomenon with the following three observations:

- (1) most recent immigrants still locate in a small number of traditional port-of-entry States and metropolitan areas;
- (2) [the] greatest domestic native-born migrant gains occur in different areas than those attracting recent immigrants; and
- (3) [there is] evidence of a unique, accentuated out-migration of less-skilled domestic migrants away from High Immigration areas.

The interacting dynamics of internal migration and immigration have led to what Frey (1995a, 1995b) has termed both the “new flight” and a “demographic balkanization” of the United States. The latter term refers to the fact that immigrants are not assimilating into society as they had classically done, but are instead displacing native populations and changing the demographic profiles of entire states and metropolitan areas. These patterns are present at the state level but much more pronounced at the metropolitan level. Indeed, it has been suggested that the waves of recent urban immigrants may be causing nonimmigrant groups to flee from the cities (Frey 1995b).

Therefore, although the new immigration sustains central-city populations, it may also stimulate higher population losses in certain cities among select groups. To our knowledge, there have been no investigations of the patterns of immigration and internal migration at the intrametropolitan level. The Tiebout-style models of neighborhood choice suggest that if the new wave of immigrants is indeed increasing the need for local public

expenditures, the net out-migration of higher-income central-city residents will continue and, depending on the size of the immigrant wave, possibly increase.

We investigated the effects of immigration on central cities by examining the relative attractiveness of central cities compared with that of suburbs and by determining the percentage of immigrants in the total in-migration streams to both central cities and suburbs. Eight of the 12 metropolitan areas in our sample are classified by Frey (1995b) as high-immigration areas: Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Chicago, Boston, Houston, Philadelphia, and Dallas–Fort Worth.

Table 5 compares the relative attractiveness of the central cities and the suburbs for immigrants who located in the 12 CMSAs between 1985 and 1990, again by household income quintiles. Only 3 of the 12 central cities—Chicago, New York, and Houston—attracted more immigrants than their suburbs did. For New York City and Chicago, the relative attractiveness of the city was heavily skewed to the lower-income immigrant end. The city of Chicago attracted approximately three immigrants in the lowest income quintile for every one who settled in its suburbs. Conversely, Chicago's suburbs attracted two immigrants with incomes in the highest income quintile for every one high-income immigrant who settled in the central city. New York City attracted more immigrants than its suburbs did in all but the highest income quintile, while the city of Houston had the most pervasive relative draw, attracting more immigrant households than its suburbs in all income categories. Again, city-suburban boundaries for the Houston area and territorial expansiveness of the central city likely played important roles here.

The immigrants arriving today can decentralize faster than previous generations, partly because of improvements in transportation and communications technology. In the past, immigrants often located in dense urban enclaves in order to maintain their in-group identity and information support networks. Today, immigrants can live in suburbs and still maintain many of their ethnic contacts through use of cars, telephones, and the Internet. Cities have thus lost yet another major locational advantage they once had over the suburbs. Larger proportions of new arrivals to this country today also have better educations and higher incomes, permitting them more options in locations. Of course, this proportion varies by origin group (e.g., Asian Indians versus Mexican Americans).

Table 5. Ratio of Suburb to Central-City Immigration Flows by Household Income Quintile, 1985 to 1990

Region and CMSA	Quintile					Overall
	5	4	3	2	1	
Northeast and Midwest						
Boston	3.84	2.48	2.74	2.12	1.60	2.30
Chicago	2.19	1.07	0.97	0.50	0.34	0.75
Cleveland	49.00	6.85	3.51	1.32	1.59	2.65
Detroit	21.27	9.33	4.90	3.32	6.29	6.39
New York	1.11	0.87	0.82	0.49	0.36	0.67
Philadelphia	6.05	2.20	2.25	1.67	0.61	1.54
South and West						
Dallas-Fort Worth	1.75	1.20	1.25	0.86	1.22	1.19
Denver	10.36	4.42	2.58	1.74	1.00	2.01
Houston	0.86	0.75	0.84	0.42	0.38	0.57
Los Angeles-Long Beach	2.26	2.26	1.57	1.31	1.10	1.52
San Francisco	5.43	5.09	3.61	3.39	2.70	3.82
Seattle	2.81	2.30	2.76	1.91	1.14	1.94

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992a).

The city of Detroit fared poorly relative to its suburbs in attracting immigrants; more than six immigrants located in its suburbs for every one settling in the central city. At the upper income quintiles, the settlement gap between the suburbs and the central city was considerably wider; there was a 21-to-1 ratio in the highest income quintile and a 9-to-1 ratio in the second-highest income quintile. Cleveland also attracted few higher-income residents compared with its suburbs, as shown by the suburb-to-city ratio in table 5 and by table A.5, which provides absolute immigrant household flows. In fact, except for New York City and Houston, all suburbs in our study dominated their central cities in attracting immigrants in the top two income quintiles, and most of them dominated by at least a 2-to-1 margin.

Apart from these relative locational preferences, how would the central cities have fared without immigrants? Table 6 reveals that 44 percent of all households moving to New York City between 1985 and 1990 were made up of immigrants. Immigrants constituted 22 percent of the households moving to the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach, 21 percent of those moving to Chicago, 20 percent of those moving to San Francisco, and 19 percent of those moving to Boston. Income gradients show that as household income increases, the proportion of immigrants among all migrants to the city decreases. Yet the immigrant flows in table A.5 indicate that cities such as New York, Los Angeles–Long Beach, Chicago, Houston, and San Francisco attracted substantial numbers of immigrant households in the top two income quintiles.

In terms of total household immigration to the suburbs and the percentage of all suburban in-migrants who were immigrants, certain areas stand out. More than 100,000 immigrant households settled in the suburbs of Los Angeles–Long Beach between 1985 and 1990, while more than 80,000 immigrant households settled in New York City's suburbs. More than one out of every five households migrating to the suburbs of New York City were immigrant households, while immigrants accounted for 18 percent of the households arriving in San Francisco's suburbs, 17 percent of those arriving in Los Angeles–Long Beach's suburbs, and 16 percent of those arriving in Boston's. Unlike in-migrant income selectivity for the central cities, suburban immigrant income selectivity tends to be far less skewed toward the lower-income end (see table A.5). New York City's suburbs, for instance, attracted more immigrant households in the highest income quintile than in any other income category. The suburbs of Los Angeles–Long Beach, San Francisco, Boston, and Chicago also attracted considerable numbers of higher-income immigrant

Table 6. Household Immigration as a Percentage of Total In-Migration to Central Cities and Suburbs by Household Income Quintile, 1985 to 1990

Region and CMSA	Area	Quintile					Overall
		5	4	3	2	1	
Northeast and Midwest							
Boston	Central city	9.67	18.64	16.39	21.45	31.65	19.39
	Suburb	8.90	12.83	17.65	21.36	33.92	15.83
Chicago	Central city	9.51	16.58	18.77	25.83	34.00	21.46
	Suburb	4.86	5.46	8.22	7.78	9.59	6.59
Cleveland	Central city	1.28	3.62	4.36	8.12	12.18	7.40
	Suburb	4.50	4.67	4.10	3.92	8.66	5.07
Detroit	Central city	5.41	5.74	8.24	9.43	3.84	6.34
	Suburb	7.15	6.50	8.16	8.76	11.32	8.09
New York	Central city	29.54	35.24	40.89	55.84	60.56	43.84
	Suburb	13.88	19.24	27.26	30.14	35.34	21.13
Philadelphia	Central city	5.47	11.85	10.84	13.11	24.49	14.67
	Suburb	4.48	6.04	9.64	10.93	16.14	7.72

Table 6. Household Immigration as a Percentage of Total In-Migration to Central Cities and Suburbs by Household Income Quintile, 1985 to 1990 (continued)

Region and CMSA	Area	Quintile					Overall
		5	4	3	2	1	
South and West							
Dallas-Fort Worth	Central city	5.51	7.37	6.45	8.76	12.08	8.09
	Suburb	2.80	3.29	4.16	4.74	10.07	4.51
Denver	Central city	1.83	3.16	4.27	6.52	12.64	6.44
	Suburb	4.16	4.07	4.62	5.98	8.13	5.19
Houston	Central city	11.75	9.79	8.17	12.26	20.40	12.68
	Suburb	3.96	3.14	4.36	4.15	7.24	4.36
Los Angeles-Long Beach	Central city	11.00	15.61	20.97	29.73	36.33	22.47
	Suburb	9.41	14.59	16.79	23.05	29.16	16.81
San Francisco	Central city	11.29	14.04	19.94	25.09	35.48	19.58
	Suburb	12.41	15.78	18.60	24.18	30.38	18.10
Seattle	Central city	7.27	8.57	9.01	10.96	18.59	11.07
	Suburb	5.37	5.51	8.01	9.86	12.73	7.74

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992a).

households (see quintile 5 in table A.5). More than 1 in 10 high-income households moving to the suburbs of New York City and San Francisco between 1985 and 1990 were made up of immigrants; the levels were only slightly lower for the suburbs of Boston and Los Angeles–Long Beach.

Among migrants in the lowest income quintiles, immigrants constituted 61 percent of all movers to New York City and 35 percent of all movers to that city's suburbs. Immigrants made up about one-third of all low-income movers to the central cities and the suburbs of Boston, San Francisco, and Los Angeles–Long Beach. Immigrants accounted for considerably greater percentages of low-income in-migrants to the central cities of Chicago, Philadelphia, and Houston than to the suburbs of those cities. These cities also dominated their suburbs in terms of absolute numbers of immigrant households falling in the lowest income quintile.

The influx of immigrant households has contributed to the demographic vitality of many of our major central cities. For example, between 1980 and 1990, immigrants played a major role in Houston's aggregate 3 percent population growth, New York City's 4 percent growth, and Los Angeles's 5 percent growth. Without this considerable influx of immigrants, demographically declining cities such as Chicago and Philadelphia would have declined even further during the 1980s. At least for some larger cities, then, immigrants have resumed their historic role of demographically bolstering historic urban centers. However, we also find ample evidence that the suburbs hold a new attraction for immigrants, especially among the middle- and upper-income groups.

Trends and characteristics of city and suburban migrants

The 1985–90 period was one of substantial net central-city exodus of higher-income households. Did the exodus of these households accelerate or slow down compared with the 1975–80 period? What about changes in the selectivity of movers by such features as race, ethnicity, age, and family structure? In this section, we use some of the migration measures described in the three preceding sections to explore how migration varied between 1975–80 and 1985–90 by income group and demographic characteristics.⁹ The analysis is based on aggregate migration

⁹ The total household income quintile break points for the 1975–80 period are \$7,020 (20th percentile), \$13,315 (40th percentile), \$20,235 (60th percentile), and \$29,735 (80th percentile).

flows for the central cities and suburban rings of the six CMSAs in the Northeast and Midwest and the six in the South and West (see tables 7 and 8).

Income composition of migrant flows, 1975 to 1980 and 1985 to 1990

Tabulations of migrants by income quintiles indicate that conditions in the central cities of the six CMSAs in the Northeast and Midwest improved over the 1975–80 and 1985–90 periods. The net loss and out-migration rates of higher-income groups from the central cities slowed between the two periods, and the percentage of immigrants among in-migrants generally increased. The modest reductions in the suburb–central-city migrant exchange ratios for the two highest quintiles—from 5.0 to 4.1 (quintile 5) and from 4.1 to 3.0 (quintile 4)—highlight the more favorable, but still disadvantageous, intrametropolitan migration patterns for the central cities.

During the same time, the net losses of households in the upper income quintile in the central cities of the Northeast and Midwest also slowed, and the marginal gain among households in the lowest quintile in 1975–80 turned to a modest loss in 1985–90. This slight reversal occurred while the out-migration rate stayed almost the same and the percentage of immigrants among in-migrants increased from 36.5 to 40.5 percent. This pattern suggests that the presence of immigrants deterred potential domestic in-migrants from coming to the central cities rather than that residents fled from central cities. Changes in the gross domestic in-migration, immigration, and out-migration confirm this conjecture. Although the gross level of all three flows dropped over the period, domestic in-migration had the most pronounced decline.¹⁰

One important cross-regional difference in household net migration flows favoring large cities in the Northeast and Midwest over those in the South and West bears special note. Cities in the Northeast and Midwest experienced markedly fewer household net migration losses between the late 1970s and late 1980s among the top two income quintiles than cities in the South and West. Northeastern and midwestern cities also experienced lower out-migration rates for these income groups. Large central cities in the South and West, however, exhibited net migration

¹⁰ The gross flows for domestic in-migration, immigration, and out-migration are not included in table A.4 because of space constraints.

Table 7. Household Migration Measures by Demographic Subgroup, 1975 to 1980

Region and Demographic Group	Net Flow		Net Rate		Out-Migration Rate		Immigrants as % of In-Migrants		Exchange Ratio
	CC	SB	CC	SB	CC	SB	CC	SB	
Northeast and Midwest									
Income quintile									
5	-137,880	58,360	-15.8	1.9	21.7	9.7	19.3	8.2	5.0
4	-108,760	16,600	-12.2	0.7	19.1	11.3	23.0	8.1	4.1
3	-59,120	-43,240	-5.9	-2.4	16.7	14.6	24.2	10.6	2.5
2	-46,920	-89,720	-4.2	-5.9	14.7	16.5	30.3	12.7	2.2
1	680	-73,520	0.0	-5.4	10.3	15.1	36.5	17.9	1.9
Race									
White	-331,040	-211,480	-10.8	-2.4	20.5	12.9	15.5	6.6	3.0
Black	-46,800	19,600	-2.9	2.8	7.9	10.9	22.5	7.8	2.9
Asian	10,520	27,080	9.7	30.1	26.0	21.8	77.8	50.3	5.6
Hispanic	14,120	31,680	2.3	10.4	10.1	12.5	69.1	44.6	3.4
Other	1,200	1,600	4.7	6.0	18.8	19.2	62.8	37.5	3.2
Household type									
Two-parent	-313,880	-23,400	-13.4	-0.4	19.2	11.6	41.2	11.2	5.5
One-parent	-19,560	1,840	-1.8	0.1	8.6	8.9	39.2	14.5	2.8
Nonfamily	-18,560	-109,960	-1.0	-4.7	15.7	17.8	16.2	7.6	1.7
Age									
16-24	17,160	-77,720	4.8	-13.7	29.7	33.5	20.0	11.1	1.4
25-34	-88,200	61,400	-7.3	2.8	27.0	20.9	24.7	10.4	2.8
35-44	-79,840	16,400	-8.8	0.9	16.7	12.2	40.0	12.8	4.6
45-54	-42,160	-15,320	-5.0	-0.9	9.9	7.4	42.0	11.3	3.7
55-64	-58,920	-60,240	-6.6	-3.5	9.1	7.6	36.2	8.2	4.3
65+	-100,040	-56,040	-8.4	-3.0	9.6	7.3	27.2	4.7	5.5

Table 7. Household Migration Measures by Demographic Subgroup, 1975 to 1980 (continued)

Region and Demographic Group	Net Flow		Net Rate		Out-Migration Rate		Immigrants as % of In-Migrants		Exchange Ratio
	CC	SB	CC	SB	CC	SB	CC	SB	
South and West									
Income quintile									
5	-62,840	176,400	-9.3	9.2	27.8	12.0	11.4	8.1	3.0
4	-35,040	143,720	-6.4	9.6	30.8	14.7	12.8	9.8	2.8
3	11,800	93,920	1.9	7.6	27.9	18.6	15.7	11.9	2.2
2	31,600	55,880	4.8	5.0	25.4	20.3	17.5	13.5	1.8
1	23,960	38,040	3.6	4.0	22.1	19.0	25.7	18.8	2.0
Race									
White	-84,840	299,840	-4.2	5.6	30.4	17.2	7.9	6.6	2.3
Black	7,640	47,320	1.4	12.5	13.9	12.6	7.0	6.5	2.2
Asian	23,760	64,400	17.4	33.3	26.5	13.1	65.7	50.6	3.5
Hispanic	20,040	89,600	4.8	12.0	24.0	11.2	42.1	29.3	2.3
Other	2,880	6,800	9.8	10.2	36.0	22.3	40.8	27.6	2.2
Household type									
Two-parent	-154,840	319,560	-10.8	7.8	30.1	15.4	22.8	12.8	3.5
One-parent	-2,720	60,640	-0.6	7.4	21.3	14.3	23.5	14.1	2.1
Nonfamily	127,040	127,760	10.0	7.1	24.4	19.1	10.5	8.7	1.5
Age									
16-24	68,680	68,080	21.9	11.9	43.0	31.7	15.0	13.0	1.4
25-34	14,840	277,720	1.8	16.1	42.5	24.4	16.5	11.8	2.5
35-44	-41,600	108,000	-7.9	8.0	30.4	16.6	19.1	12.7	2.8
45-54	-14,480	39,800	-3.2	3.7	18.3	10.8	21.7	12.7	2.2
55-64	-27,120	5,880	-6.0	0.6	15.1	9.9	16.3	9.2	2.5
65+	-30,840	8,480	-5.4	0.8	11.1	7.9	12.6	5.0	2.7

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Census Bureau (1983a, 1992a).

Note: The boundaries of the CMSAs are constant across the two periods according to 1990 census definitions.

Table 8. Household Migration Measures by Demographic Subgroup, 1985 to 1990

Region and Demographic Group	Net Flow		Net Rate		Out-Migration Rate		Immigrants as % of In-Migrants		Exchange Ratio
	CC	SB	CC	SB	CC	SB	CC	SB	
Northeast and Midwest									
Income quintile									
5	-104,347	103,418	-10.1	2.6	19.5	8.6	20.7	8.8	4.1
4	-59,340	17,350	-6.4	0.7	16.5	10.8	24.7	10.5	3.0
3	-34,132	-24,880	-3.5	-1.3	15.2	13.4	26.3	14.3	2.1
2	-24,224	-59,762	-2.6	-4.0	13.6	14.7	34.9	15.2	2.0
1	-6,602	-62,472	-0.5	-4.5	10.4	14.4	40.5	20.3	1.6
Race									
White	-178,713	-149,524	-6.3	-1.5	18.2	11.5	18.5	7.8	2.5
Black	-83,643	35,163	-5.1	4.1	10.0	10.8	25.5	8.7	3.0
Asian	25,480	50,071	12.4	24.7	19.6	17.3	70.0	49.2	3.6
Hispanic	10,317	24,512	4.1	15.2	10.5	10.4	70.5	53.5	3.6
Other	-2,086	13,432	-0.8	9.4	9.3	10.8	60.1	37.3	3.9
Household type									
Two-parent	-229,974	39,220	-11.6	0.6	18.8	10.3	44.7	13.7	5.6
One-parent	-36,038	20,804	-2.9	1.3	9.7	8.4	41.5	16.9	2.6
Nonfamily	37,367	-86,370	1.9	-2.8	13.8	15.6	17.4	8.4	1.3
Age									
16-24	38,563	-54,628	15.7	-14.3	28.0	37.7	21.7	15.7	0.7
25-34	-22,896	110,632	-2.1	4.8	26.1	19.0	26.8	12.6	2.2
35-44	-102,264	71,090	-9.3	2.7	17.5	11.0	37.5	13.2	4.4
45-54	-30,847	-11,337	-3.8	-0.6	10.1	7.7	40.4	13.8	2.9
55-64	-36,521	-68,310	-4.9	-4.0	8.1	8.0	38.4	9.8	3.5
65+	-74,680	-73,793	-6.0	-2.9	7.8	6.5	28.5	4.0	4.6

Table 8. Household Migration Measures by Demographic Subgroup, 1985 to 1990 (continued)

Region and Demographic Group	Net Flow		Net Rate		Out-Migration Rate		Immigrants as % of In-Migrants		Exchange Ratio
	CC	SB	CC	SB	CC	SB	CC	SB	
South and West									
Income quintile									
5	-90,014	180,803	-12.4	6.7	28.8	11.3	9.7	7.8	2.6
4	-66,713	136,183	-11.4	7.1	31.0	14.0	11.8	9.8	2.5
3	-36,344	101,289	-5.6	6.3	28.5	16.5	13.5	11.3	2.0
2	-6,238	48,896	-1.0	3.9	25.6	19.3	18.5	14.8	1.7
1	-3,463	12,186	-0.5	1.1	22.7	20.1	25.8	20.0	1.6
Race									
White	-174,242	255,244	-8.5	3.8	30.5	15.8	9.1	7.2	2.0
Black	-34,282	60,645	-6.1	11.1	19.3	14.5	6.7	6.3	2.6
Asian	14,482	96,080	6.3	19.6	26.2	11.4	50.6	43.4	2.5
Hispanic	4,471	23,226	2.6	10.7	20.1	14.1	44.9	28.5	1.8
Other	-13,201	44,162	-5.2	8.4	24.2	11.9	29.9	23.8	2.2
Household type									
Two-parent	-215,617	290,450	-15.8	5.9	30.5	13.9	22.9	13.4	3.2
One-parent	-41,673	76,721	-7.3	6.2	23.4	13.2	21.9	14.8	2.2
Nonfamily	54,518	112,186	4.1	4.7	25.4	18.9	9.5	7.5	1.3
Age									
16-24	44,378	39,886	20.6	9.2	42.7	34.3	17.1	14.7	1.0
25-34	-40,862	261,615	-4.9	12.6	41.8	22.7	14.9	11.9	2.1
35-44	-106,071	148,658	-14.3	7.0	31.4	15.4	16.7	11.6	2.6
45-54	-32,327	44,257	-6.8	3.1	21.1	11.3	17.3	12.0	2.0
55-64	-29,571	-8,658	-7.7	-0.8	16.4	10.3	18.9	11.2	2.3
65+	-38,319	-6,401	-6.1	-0.4	11.0	8.0	14.1	6.6	2.6

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Census Bureau (1983a, 1992a).

Note: The boundaries of the CMSAs are constant across the two periods according to 1990 census definitions.

losses across the entire range of income groups, losing poor and rich alike, and these net losses accelerated over the two time periods.

The pattern in the South and West of large net gains in the lowest three quintiles in 1975–80 and net losses in 1985–90 is curious. As in the Northeast and Midwest, the reversal was characterized by almost no change in the out-migration rates. But unlike the Northeast and Midwest, the South and West saw no associated increase in the share of immigrants among in-migrants. The pattern in the six central cities of the South and West was caused by an increase in the gross level of out-migration and declining gross levels of both immigration and domestic in-migration in equal proportions.¹¹

Do these temporal migration patterns suggest a demographic turnaround in our central cities? Despite a few encouraging signs, we do not think so. As we stated above, the revival of the central cities depends in large part on intrametropolitan flows. The city-suburban household migration exchange ratio clarifies these flows. In both the Northeast and Midwest and the South and West, the exchange ratios improved (decreased) slightly, indicating that the relationship of the central cities to their suburbs has improved. At the same time, the level of household migration losses among the upper income quintiles was staggering. If revitalization efforts are slowing the losses, they still have far to go before any widespread demographic turnaround can be claimed.

In regard to city-suburban income inequality, the household migration patterns are not encouraging. Between 1985 and 1990, the central cities in all regions continued to lose substantial numbers of higher-income households to net out-migration, while their suburbs attracted huge numbers of these households. In the Northeast and Midwest, the suburbs actually lost substantial numbers of households in the bottom three income quintiles through net out-migration. The income gap between central cities and suburbs will not close under such conditions.

Demographic composition of migrant flows, 1975 to 1980 and 1985 to 1990

Let us digress from questions of income selectivity and turn briefly to a broader demographic profile of central-city and

¹¹ See footnote 10.

suburban migrants. Given that the migration patterns were fairly consistent at the upper income levels across the two periods, we now explore the demographic characteristics of race, family type, and age to gain further insight into household migration patterns. (See tables 7 and 8.) In general, in both regions and both periods, whites, two-parent family households, and the middle aged led the charge out of the central cities. Among blacks, households with the same profiles were close behind, while young, nonfamily, Hispanic, and Asian households made gains in the central cities. Asian-headed households also gained strongly in the suburbs of both regions, mainly because of increased immigration from the Pacific Rim and because Asians tend to have higher household incomes than most other racial/ethnic groups.

The percentage of immigrants among in-migrating Hispanics and Asians is high. In the central cities of the Northeast and Midwest, 78 percent of Asian in-migrants were immigrants in 1975–80, and 70 percent were immigrants in 1985–90. The percentage of Hispanic immigrants among Hispanics migrating to the same cities was fairly constant at 70 percent. The percentage of immigrants among Hispanic in-migrants to southern and western central cities was not as high, but it was still over 40 percent.

There were net losses of white households in the six CMSAs of the Northeast and Midwest over the two periods, while the six CMSAs of the South and West increasingly lost white households in their central cities but gained huge numbers in their suburbs. Slight convergence across regions can be inferred by the fact that cities and suburbs in the Northeast and Midwest lost fewer white households through net migration over the two periods, while the central cities of the South and West lost more white households in 1985–90 and their suburbs gained fewer white households through net migration.

By 1985–90, black households were exiting the central cities and entering the suburbs of both regions in substantial numbers. This pattern accelerated over the previous period. It is important to emphasize that these numbers refer to the central cities of the 12 CMSAs under study and that some suburbs (especially in New York) contain other census-defined central cities of considerable size.

Recent trends in income disparity and intrametropolitan exchange between cities and suburbs

In this final section, we present more recent evidence from the March Current Population Survey (CPS), which covers the 1989–96 period. The CPS sample size precludes analysis of individual metropolitan areas. But CPS results are more generalizable than the data used in the previous sections since the CPS covers all metropolitan areas. The more recent CPS data indicate that the patterns found among the central cities and suburban rings of our 12 sample CMSAs for the 1985–90 period represented general trends that have continued up to 1996.

Our first tabulation from the CPS data focuses on suburb–central-city household migrant exchange ratios. The measure is somewhat different from the measure we used previously because of the structure of the CPS data. We constructed CPS-based exchange ratios for each of our two regions by dividing the total number of households leaving central cities in the region and moving to suburbs anywhere in the United States by the total number of households leaving the suburbs in the region and moving to central cities anywhere in the United States. This measure, unlike the other exchange ratios cited in this article, is not composed only of intrametropolitan flows, but it captures a similar dynamic.

Table 9 presents CPS-based suburb–central-city household migration flows and exchange ratios by region for the 1989–96 period.¹² In each of the years covered in the table, more higher-income households (quintiles 3, 4, and 5) than lower-income households (quintiles 1 and 2) left the cities for the suburbs. There is little evidence of an increasing or decreasing trend over the period, although the exchange ratios for 1996 are the highest. Throughout the 1990s, lower-income household migration tilted toward the suburbs. But for our purposes, what happened at the middle- and upper-income ends is more important. The absolute flows presented in table 9 indicate that the central cities as a whole continued to lose large volumes of middle- and upper-income households to the suburbs. The substantial net loss of these households has a negative ripple effect on city tax bases, public schools, commercial activity, and urban social networks, all of which are essential to long-run urban vitality.

¹² The 1995 series is missing because of coding problems related to the migration questions of the March 1995 CPS machine-readable files. Percentile break points can be found in table A.3.

Table 9. Suburb-Central-City Flows and Exchange Ratios, 1989 to 1996

Year	Household Income Quintile	Northeast and Midwest		South and West		Exchange Ratio	
		CC→SB	SB→CC	CC→SB	SB→CC	Northeast and Midwest	South and West
1989	5,4,3	324,927	168,674	712,524	281,916	1.93	2.53
	2,1	153,846	102,521	452,367	236,315	1.50	1.91
	Total	478,773	271,195	1,164,892	518,231	1.77	2.25
1990	5,4,3	360,363	184,845	677,188	287,553	1.95	2.35
	2,1	179,997	166,865	450,873	260,309	1.08	1.73
	Total	540,360	351,710	1,128,061	547,863	1.54	2.06
1991	5,4,3	292,186	168,602	624,440	306,968	1.73	2.03
	2,1	195,650	115,366	372,830	216,268	1.70	1.72
	Total	487,836	283,967	997,271	523,236	1.72	1.91
1992	5,4,3	331,353	147,485	607,003	324,134	2.25	1.87
	2,1	179,172	123,169	399,677	275,539	1.45	1.45
	Total	510,525	270,655	1,006,680	599,674	1.89	1.68
1993	5,4,3	318,423	168,423	581,760	313,548	1.89	1.86
	2,1	142,410	140,338	461,418	276,554	1.01	1.67
	Total	460,833	308,761	1,043,178	590,102	1.49	1.77
1994	5,4,3	325,624	175,847	645,859	310,155	1.85	2.08
	2,1	208,434	125,163	420,991	227,478	1.67	1.85
	Total	534,058	301,010	1,066,851	537,632	1.77	1.98

Table 9. Suburb-Central-City Flows and Exchange Ratios, 1989 to 1996 (continued)

Year	Household Income Quintile	Northeast and Midwest		South and West		Exchange Ratio	
		CC→SB	SB→CC	CC→SB	SB→CC	Midwest and South	South and West
1995	5,4,3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	2,1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Total	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1996	5,4,3	528,493	156,745	1,173,001	256,040	3.37	4.58
	2,1	268,523	117,068	681,067	258,166	2.29	2.64
	Total	797,016	273,813	1,854,068	514,206	2.91	3.61

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989a, 1990a, 1991c, 1992c, 1993a, 1994a, 1995a, 1996a).

Note: N/A = not available.

A related issue of considerable importance is the trend in household income disparity between central cities and suburbs. We used CPS data to examine this trend between 1989 and 1996. In table 10 and figure 1 we present data and graphic evidence showing that income disparity between central-city and suburban households is widening, particularly in the largest metropolitan areas. We divided the median household income of the suburb by the median household income of the central city to come up with our measure. Chinitz (1991) calculated the ratio of suburban to central-city median family income in 1950 and found it to be 1.08. Since household income and family income are closely related (and in most cases identical), we can see just how much the suburban-city income disparity has grown. Considering that the large net flows of higher-income households from the central cities to the suburbs continued through 1996, it seems likely that income disparities will widen further in the years ahead.

Summary and conclusion

Many believe that a return of middle- and upper-income residents to the cities can revive urban housing, tax bases, schools, and neighborhoods. Some argue that closer proximity of the well-to-do and the less well-to-do is an effective antidote to the urban social and economic ills that have developed over the past several decades. Specific instances of neighborhood turnaround and renewal are therefore greeted with enthusiasm. Some people even claim that central cities are experiencing a rebirth. We did not address the question of whether the return of middle- and upper-income residents can revive cities, but we examined the demographic trends that would be needed to undergird such a return—and our findings are less than encouraging.


Net out-migration from the central cities continued during the period we studied, and the rate of household exodus increased with income level. In the central cities of some metropolitan areas, the situation was compounded by net in-migration of the poorest households. Suburban areas held strong attraction for most demographic subgroups, while central cities continued to have difficulty in holding onto white households, middle- and upper-income residents, and two-parent families. Major cities fared best in attracting nonfamily households of people under age 25, which may be because the cities have colleges and universities and amenities that appeal to young singles.

Table 10. Ratio of Suburban to Central-City Median Household Income by Region and Metropolitan Population Size Class, 1989 to 1996

Year	Total			Population <1 million			Population 1–5 million			Population >5 million		
	NE & MW	S & W	S & W	NE & MW	S & W	S & W	NE & MW	S & W	S & W	NE & MW	S & W	
1989	1.58	1.22	1.07	1.42	1.07	1.34	1.59	1.34	1.72	1.19	1.19	
1990	1.60	1.23	1.07	1.39	1.07	1.34	1.63	1.34	1.75	1.24	1.24	
1991	1.65	1.22	1.14	1.46	1.14	1.30	1.69	1.30	1.77	1.17	1.17	
1992	1.65	1.24	1.13	1.52	1.13	1.31	1.60	1.31	1.87	1.23	1.23	
1993	1.61	1.28	1.09	1.36	1.09	1.41	1.58	1.41	1.81	1.26	1.26	
1994	1.62	1.28	1.13	1.43	1.13	1.38	1.56	1.38	1.90	1.32	1.32	
1995	1.69	1.30	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
1996	1.67	1.31	1.15	1.32	1.15	1.35	1.59	1.35	1.88	1.46	1.46	

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989a, 1990a, 1991c, 1992c, 1993a, 1994a, 1995a, 1996a).
Note: NE & MW = Northeast and Midwest; S & W = South and West; N/A = not available.

Figure 1. Ratio of Suburban to Central-City Median Household Income by Region and Metropolitan Population Size Class, 1989 to 1996



Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989a, 1990a, 1991c, 1992c, 1993a, 1994a, 1995a, 1996a).
 Note: N = Northeast and Midwest; S = South and West; m = million.

We observed small improvements in suburb–central-city migration exchange ratios for higher-income households between the late 1970s and late 1980s. Despite this slight improvement, the intrametropolitan migration flows strongly favored the suburbs. Moreover, the small improvement in these migrant exchange ratios may have stalled. Analysis of CPS data for the 1989–96 period reveals no improvement in the ratios since the late 1980s. Although the PUMS- and CPS-based ratios are not directly comparable (as noted earlier), they do suggest that the long-standing pattern of migration from central cities to suburbs is not abating, especially among higher-income households.

In short, little support was found for a widespread back-to-the-city movement. Considerable numbers of households moved from the suburbs to the central cities through the mid-1990s, but they were numerically overwhelmed by city out-migrants moving the other way. On the more positive side, the substantial growth in immigration to certain cities during the 1980s did stem their decline and resulted in renewed overall population growth for some. Nonetheless, suburbs exerted increasingly broad draws of essentially all demographic subgroups, including immigrants.

The widening disparity between suburban and central-city median household income is a direct outcome of the income selectivity of migrants. Within our sample of CMSAs, this ratio deteriorated between the late 1970s and the late 1980s. Analysis of CPS data showed that the disparity continued to widen between 1989 and 1996, particularly within the largest metropolitan areas and those in the Northeast and Midwest.

Despite the continuing disadvantages that central cities face, many downtown commercial districts and urban neighborhoods may have favorable futures. Our analysis does not speak to commercial revival, nor does it refute the growing presence of expanding pockets of neighborhood revitalization. Nonetheless, we find little hard evidence that a widespread demographic turnaround of our central cities is on the immediate horizon. Even with new immigration streams demographically bolstering a number of these cities, the suburbs continue to be the overwhelming choice of middle- and upper-income households.

Appendix

Table A.1. In, Out, and Net Household Migration Flows by Income Quintile, Northeast and Midwest, 1985 to 1990

CMSA and Quintile	Central City			Suburb		
	In	Out	Net	In	Out	Net
Boston						
5	13,947	19,276	-5,329	58,131	49,692	8,439
4	11,007	12,670	-1,663	39,599	44,999	-5,400
3	11,968	10,901	1,067	30,444	41,175	-10,731
2	9,873	7,436	2,437	21,043	30,515	-9,472
1	12,967	7,658	5,309	19,372	26,439	-7,067
Total	59,762	57,941	1,821	168,589	192,820	-24,231
Chicago						
5	21,675	57,733	-36,058	92,668	55,145	37,523
4	21,327	47,945	-26,618	69,061	44,112	24,949
3	26,586	45,472	-18,886	59,140	42,318	16,882
2	23,511	36,532	-13,021	38,984	38,927	57
1	26,424	41,434	-15,010	31,773	35,957	-4,184
Total	119,523	229,116	-109,593	291,626	216,459	75,167
Cleveland						
5	1,561	7,353	-5,792	21,770	21,285	485
4	3,980	10,168	-6,188	21,150	19,015	2,135
3	5,946	10,732	-4,786	22,166	19,771	2,395
2	6,721	9,708	-2,987	18,349	20,049	-1,700
1	7,940	10,638	-2,698	17,711	18,735	-1,024
Total	26,148	48,599	-22,451	101,146	98,855	2,291
Detroit						
5	2,550	11,926	-9,376	41,072	32,709	8,363
4	4,302	13,058	-8,756	35,457	30,126	5,331
3	6,065	12,185	-6,120	29,996	30,383	-387
2	6,885	13,692	-6,807	24,617	29,905	-5,288
1	11,144	16,254	-5,110	23,772	28,899	-5,127
Total	30,946	67,115	-36,169	154,914	152,022	2,892
New York						
5	67,911	103,102	-35,191	159,745	135,115	24,630
4	51,536	61,493	-9,957	82,001	103,832	-21,831
3	53,195	58,358	-5,163	65,129	99,571	-34,442
2	46,392	51,757	-5,365	42,468	83,108	-40,640
1	60,677	58,113	2,564	37,395	75,609	-38,214
Total	279,711	332,823	-53,112	386,738	497,235	-110,497
Philadelphia						
5	8,958	21,559	-12,601	66,168	42,190	23,978
4	10,858	17,016	-6,158	46,985	34,819	12,166
3	14,000	14,244	-244	35,415	33,952	1,463
2	12,208	10,689	1,519	24,413	27,132	-2,719
1	18,916	10,573	8,343	17,542	24,398	-6,856
Total	64,940	74,081	-9,141	190,523	162,491	28,032

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992a).

Table A.2. In, Out, and Net Household Migration Flows by Income Quintile, South and West, 1985 to 1990

CMSA and Quintile	Central City			Suburb		
	In	Out	Net	In	Out	Net
Dallas–Fort Worth						
5	19,621	39,641	-20,020	67,475	35,222	32,253
4	22,720	39,106	-16,386	61,270	29,550	31,720
3	31,449	39,988	-8,539	60,944	30,701	30,243
2	29,978	32,818	-2,840	47,577	28,159	19,418
1	24,603	31,299	-6,696	36,047	29,278	6,769
Total	128,371	182,852	-54,481	273,313	152,910	120,403
Denver						
5	6,381	13,104	-6,723	29,163	26,690	2,473
4	8,628	13,875	-5,247	29,622	26,534	3,088
3	11,658	15,420	-3,762	27,864	23,158	4,706
2	13,029	13,095	-66	24,678	21,238	3,440
1	13,224	11,692	1,532	20,517	17,550	2,967
Total	52,920	67,186	-14,266	131,844	115,170	16,674
Houston						
5	19,869	47,087	-27,218	50,546	28,793	21,753
4	20,029	44,719	-24,690	47,049	24,920	22,129
3	27,923	44,105	-16,182	43,846	28,122	15,724
2	27,883	34,533	-6,650	35,027	25,139	9,888
1	27,727	32,591	-4,864	29,570	26,718	2,852
Total	123,431	203,035	-79,604	206,038	133,692	72,346
Los Angeles–Long Beach						
5	69,424	94,665	-25,241	183,474	109,855	73,619
4	57,180	72,001	-14,821	138,311	93,295	45,016
3	60,746	68,607	-7,861	118,790	94,113	24,677
2	58,749	61,040	-2,291	98,947	90,985	7,962
1	61,668	59,114	2,554	84,851	82,109	2,742
Total	307,767	355,427	-47,660	624,373	470,357	154,016
San Francisco						
5	19,747	25,531	-5,784	97,521	69,043	28,478
4	14,877	16,926	-2,049	67,309	57,356	9,953
3	14,350	13,380	970	55,584	52,624	2,960
2	12,199	10,296	1,903	42,952	48,761	-5,809
1	10,939	10,040	899	34,429	44,274	-9,845
Total	72,112	76,173	-4,061	297,795	272,058	25,737
Seattle						
5	10,113	15,141	-5,028	38,421	16,194	22,227
4	12,141	15,661	-3,520	43,419	19,142	24,277
3	13,578	14,548	-970	42,153	19,174	22,979
2	14,892	11,186	3,706	31,686	17,689	13,997
1	13,089	9,977	3,112	21,846	15,145	6,701
Total	63,813	66,513	-2,700	177,525	87,344	90,181

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992a).

Table A.3. Total Household Income Quintile Break Points in Dollars, 1989 to 1996

Year	Percentile			
	20th	40th	60th	80th
1989	11,214	21,051	32,800	49,897
1990	12,008	22,700	35,050	53,000
1991	12,346	23,207	35,898	54,546
1992	12,400	23,500	36,498	55,802
1993	12,571	24,000	37,314	57,300
1994	12,802	24,321	38,179	59,800
1995	13,281	25,050	40,010	62,291
1996	13,994	26,112	41,112	63,960

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989a, 1990a, 1991c, 1992c, 1993a, 1994a, 1995a, 1996a).

Table A.4. Intrametropolitan Exchange Flows (City-to-Suburb Flow and Suburb-to-City Flow) by Household Income Quintile, 1985 to 1990

Region and CMSA	Direction of Flow	Quintile					Overall
		5	4	3	2	1	
Northeast and Midwest							
Boston	CC→SB	13,192	7,422	5,389	3,561	3,616	33,180
	SB→CC	5,259	3,765	3,618	2,303	2,452	17,397
Chicago	CC→SB	41,828	34,007	26,984	17,204	15,397	135,420
	SB→CC	7,158	6,588	7,443	4,866	4,611	30,666
Cleveland	CC→SB	5,632	7,660	8,193	6,588	6,676	34,749
	SB→CC	995	2,613	3,772	4,024	4,083	15,487
Detroit	CC→SB	9,849	10,045	7,813	7,523	8,439	43,669
	SB→CC	1,479	2,463	3,400	3,728	5,662	16,732
New York	CC→SB	69,809	29,451	19,266	12,257	11,030	141,813
	SB→CC	19,729	13,320	12,059	5,935	8,103	59,146
Philadelphia	CC→SB	14,807	9,888	6,403	4,629	3,234	38,961
	SB→CC	3,393	4,333	4,721	4,515	4,965	21,927

Table A.4. Intrametropolitan Exchange Flows (City-to-Suburb Flow and Suburb-to-City Flow) by Household Income Quintile, 1985 to 1990 (continued)

Region and CMSA	Direction of Flow	Quintile					Overall
		5	4	3	2	1	
South and West							
Dallas-Fort Worth	CC→SB	22,221	22,430	22,490	16,856	12,419	96,416
	SB→CC	5,395	6,964	9,153	8,218	6,323	36,053
Denver	CC→SB	6,180	7,152	7,353	5,769	4,977	31,431
	SB→CC	2,688	4,110	5,130	5,082	3,954	20,964
Houston	CC→SB	22,321	24,854	22,750	16,632	12,936	99,493
	SB→CC	5,821	6,724	9,311	8,134	7,029	37,019
Los Angeles-Long Beach	CC→SB	70,988	50,462	43,225	33,836	28,980	227,491
	SB→CC	34,062	25,393	24,353	20,313	18,767	122,888
San Francisco	CC→SB	18,348	11,022	7,845	4,706	3,988	45,909
	SB→CC	5,701	4,796	3,561	2,820	2,367	19,245
Seattle	CC→SB	9,480	10,581	8,793	6,108	4,116	39,078
	SB→CC	3,120	3,645	3,477	3,396	2,667	16,305

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992a).

Table A.5. Household Immigration to Central Cities and Suburbs by Household Income Quintile, 1985 to 1990

Region and CMSA	Area	Quintile					Total
		5	4	3	2	1	
Northeast and Midwest							
Boston	CC	1,349	2,052	1,962	2,118	4,104	11,585
	SB	5,174	5,082	5,372	4,495	6,571	26,694
Chicago	CC	2,061	3,537	4,989	6,072	8,985	25,644
	SB	4,506	3,771	4,860	3,034	3,046	19,217
Cleveland	CC	20	144	259	546	967	1,936
	SB	980	987	909	720	1,534	5,130
Detroit	CC	138	247	500	649	428	1,962
	SB	2,985	2,304	2,448	2,157	2,690	12,534
New York	CC	20,063	18,161	21,754	25,904	36,745	122,627
	SB	22,171	15,778	17,756	12,798	13,215	81,718
Philadelphia	CC	490	1,287	1,517	1,601	4,632	9,527
	SB	2,963	2,837	3,415	2,669	2,831	14,715

Table A.5. Household Immigration to Central Cities and Suburbs by Household Income Quintile, 1985 to 1990
(continued)

Region and CMSA	Area	Quintile					Total
		5	4	3	2	1	
South and West							
Dallas-Fort Worth	CC	1,082	1,675	2,030	2,626	2,972	10,385
	SB	1,891	2,013	2,537	2,256	3,631	12,328
Denver	CC	117	273	498	849	1,671	3,408
	SB	1,212	1,206	1,287	1,287	1,668	6,849
Houston	CC	2,334	1,961	2,282	3,419	5,656	15,652
	SB	2,001	1,476	1,913	1,913	2,142	8,984
Los Angeles-Long Beach	CC	7,634	8,928	12,739	17,466	22,402	69,169
	SB	17,260	20,178	19,942	19,942	24,740	104,927
San Francisco	CC	2,230	2,088	2,862	3,061	3,881	14,122
	SB	12,099	10,620	10,337	10,337	10,460	53,903
Seattle	CC	735	1,041	1,224	1,632	2,433	7,065
	SB	2,064	2,391	3,375	3,375	2,781	13,734

Source: Tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992a).

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